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Abstract 
This thesis examines the process of informed decision-making for low-risk women in their 
first pregnancies as they consider whether or not to participate in non-invasive, non-
diagnostic prenatal screening.  
Using a social constructionist approach with a theoretical lens of feminist bioethics, data 
from three sources were used to consider different aspects of the process of informed 
decision-making about prenatal screening. Data obtained from patient education materials, 
Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists of Canada policy documents, and interviews with 
pregnant women were examined using the principles of constructivist grounded theory.  
Findings are presented in the form of four integrated articles, addressing the issues of: I) the 
potential for metaphors and figurative language in prenatal patient education materials to be 
implicitly or explicitly directive; II) different counseling strategies and decision-making 
models for health care providers to consider when striving to offer prenatal screening in a 
way which supports autonomous informed choices; III) the type and content of information 
that women have identified as necessary to consider themselves informed when preparing to 
make a decision about participation in prenatal screening; IV) a proposed model for the ways 
in which information from different sources is sought, received, and interpreted by women 
engaged in the process of making a decision about prenatal screening.  
Informed decision-making about prenatal screening is a complex issue, requiring significant 
efforts on the part of the health care professional offering screening, and necessitating careful 
consideration by the woman making the choice. Given an understanding of the complex 
social context within which these screening tests are offered and chosen, the process of 
informed decision-making may be more challenging than suggested by current policy and 
public education documents.  
Keywords 
Prenatal screening, informed decision-making, informed choice
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1 Introduction 
This dissertation presents a grounded theory study of the process of prenatal screening, 
considering professional policy, public education materials, and the perspectives of 
women pregnant with their first child. In 2007, the Society of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists of Canada (SOGC), in conjunction with the Canadian Council of Medical 
Geneticists (CCMG) released a clinical practice guideline instructing that all women 
should be offered non-invasive prenatal screening to detect fetal aneuploidy and 
incomplete neural tube closures (Summers, Langlois, Wyatt, & Wilson, 2007). This 
guideline was re-affirmed in 2011 (Chitayat, Langlois, & Wilson, 2011), with increased 
emphasis on the variety of conditions that can be detected through the first trimester 
ultrasound and blood work. 
Prenatal screening, as will be explained in more detail in Chapter 2, is a non-invasive, 
non-diagnostic test performed by ultrasound measurements and a series of blood tests. 
The results of these tests are combined with the mother's age at the expected date of 
delivery to produce a probability that the fetus has a chromosomal anomaly or incomplete 
neural tube closure. The pregnant woman can then choose to have an additional invasive, 
diagnostic test, such as amniocentesis or chorionic villus sampling, to confirm the 
findings (Wilson et al., 2005). There are few in-utero treatments for the conditions 
detected; for most women, prenatal screening provides information to consider when 
choosing to continue or terminate the pregnancy.  
The guiding question for this research is: From the perspective of women under the age 
of 35 in their first pregnancies, seeking prenatal care from a family physician, how is the 
process of choosing to participate in prenatal screening enacted in light of the new 
SOGC guidelines? This guiding question informed the data collection and analysis of 
data from three different sources: policies and guidelines, patient education materials, and 
pregnant women. The data from these three different sources were examined to respond 
to different elements of the process of choosing whether or not to participate in prenatal 
screening:  
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1) How do prenatal screening patient education materials portray concepts related to 
prenatal screening? 
2) How do policies and guidelines shape the offer of prenatal screening? 
3) How do women use information when making a decision about whether or not to 
participate in prenatal screening?  
This dissertation reviews and analyzes the medical and social scientific literature on 
prenatal screening; investigates the ways in which it takes place in Canada by analyzing 
Canadian professional policy and patient information materials; gathers information from 
pregnant women who have been offered and made a decision about participation in this 
screening test; and composes an argument for changes that may increase the potential for 
women to make informed choices about participation in prenatal screening. 
1.1 Interdisciplinary Bricolage 
The process of prenatal screening is at the juncture of many disciplines, such that this 
dissertation is necessarily interdisciplinary, engaging with literature from medicine, 
genetic counseling, bioethics, women's studies, sociology, anthropology, library and 
information science, and disability studies. As this research has evolved, I have 
recognized that the most compelling aspects of the topic are at the intersection of multiple 
types of disciplinary knowledge: doctor-patient communication, reproductive rights, and 
social justice in terms of available choices and resources for women, families, and people 
with disabilities. 
In this interdisciplinary endeavour, I have taken the approach of a researcher as bricoleur 
(Levi-Strauss, 1962), a term which has no exact translation in English, but which Claude 
Levi-Strauss describes as a person who works with a heterogeneous repertoire, using 
whatever she has at her disposal (Levi-Strauss, 1962). The bricoleur does not have a set 
repertoire of tools and materials to use for every job, but uses whatever is available to 
complete the task, collecting and making use of an enlarging stock of tools which is the 
"contingent result of all the occasions there have been to renew or enrich the stock or to 
maintain it with the remains of previous constructions or deconstructions" (Levi-Strauss, 
1962, p. 11). In this quotation I see acknowledgement that bricolage approaches are a) 
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those which fit, work, illuminate, and aid, regardless of disciplinary affiliation and b) 
often a result of techniques, ideas, and approaches that have fit, worked, illuminated and 
aided in the past. With that said, coherency between approaches is important; while 
hammers and screws are both tools with a myriad of effective uses, applying a hammer to 
a screw will have poor results. 
 With bricolage, I attempt to fashion a theoretical and methodological approach through 
which multiple perspectives are used, shaped by the topic of inquiry and internal 
congruence rather than disciplinary knowledges or expectations. This approach 
recognizes the socially constructed nature of knowledge and the tendency of objectivism 
to "avoid contextual specificities that subvert the stability of its [objectivist] structures, its 
fragmenting impulse that moves it to fold its methodologies and the knowledge they 
produce neatly into disciplinary drawers" (Kincheloe, 2001, p. 681).  The metaphor of the 
researcher as bricoleur also acknowledges the iterative nature of qualitative research; 
choices of analytical practices are not always made in advance, but are made in response 
to the evolving context and questions of the research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). This 
iterative strategy is encouraged in grounded theory as a way of being responsive to the 
evolving nature of qualitative inquiry (Charmaz, 2006). 
The evolving, iterative  approach of research as bricolage requires a new form of rigor 
that accounts for a new ontological context, where the object of inquiry is inseparable 
from its socio-cultural and historically situated context (Kincheloe, 2001).  In Chapter 9, I 
propose guidelines for quality criteria to assess the rigor of this interdisciplinary work, 
drawing on a shift in the humanities and social sciences to standards of reflexivity, 
situation/standpoint, and means of production and re-presentation (Hodge, 1995). 
Emerging work on quality criteria for interdisciplinary research concerns an emphasis on 
contributions to different knowledge domains, coherent theoretical perspectives and 
effective communication (Manathunga, Lant, & Mellick, 2006; Mitchell & Willetts, 
2009; Mitrany & Stokols, 2005; Wickson, Carew, & Russell, 2006).  
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1.2 Situated Research 
The knowledge I have produced in this dissertation sits at the junction of several situated 
standpoints: mine, yours, and the research participants'. My standpoint has been 
influenced not just by my experiences and situation, but also by supervisory committee 
collaborators and the literature.  Dorothy Smith (Smith, 1987; Smith, 1990) describes 
standpoint  as the way we each make knowledge that draws upon our individual 
experiences and subjectivity.  For Smith (1987), it is important to begin research inquiry 
from a standpoint rooted in every day experiences with recognition that one's own 
particular subjectivity is located in a constantly shifting matrix of social locations (Hesse-
Biber, 2007). It's not only important to recognize the impact of the standpoint of the 
researcher; in Chapter 9 I explore the possibilities for understanding the standpoint of the 
research participants and as you are reading, I ask you to consider your own standpoint. 
The meaning of the text you hold in your hands is not mine, but remains to be completed 
by you, from your particularly situated perspective (Smith, 1987). Smith (1983) states 
that readers make sense of texts in a social way, using the interpretive schemas they have 
learned as individual members located in  particular positions of particular societies. In 
Chapter 9 I discuss some of the reflexive decisions that I made while working on this 
research to assist you to travel between my perspective, the perspectives of the 
participants, and your own perspective (Koch & Harrington, 1998).  
1.2.1 Standpoint of the researcher. 
It is common for qualitative research dissertations to include a short sketch of the author, 
so that readers may understand the particular standpoint or situated location of the person 
who created that work. I will describe my social standpoint and then briefly outline the 
major way in which my intellectual standpoint has changed throughout this research, a 
conversation that will be continued in Chapter 9.   
My social standpoint is one of privilege. I am young, white, able-bodied, educated and 
wealthy.  I am married to a man who supports my intellectual and other endeavours both 
financially and emotionally.  I have not yet been pregnant, although I plan to be a mother 
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one day. I have not grown up in close contact with someone who has a disability, but I 
have known people with disabilities as friends and classmates.  
My  intellectual standpoint cannot be named so easily. I have an undergraduate degree in 
Philosophy and  Health Studies. I have always liked to read and talk, to argue and debate. 
I chose not to become a lawyer because I hated the idea of precedent- that the decision in 
one case should be applied to other cases if they could be argued to be sufficiently 
similar. I have always been interested in the idea of exceptions, and grey areas.  I entered 
the M.Sc program at Western looking to do a medical ethics project about a topic related 
to reproduction. I decided at that time that I should pick a topic that I was interested in, 
but about which I had no strong personal viewpoint, so that I could think of it from 
different angles, and look at different perspectives. I didn't realize it at that time, but I see 
now that topics which have a personal meaning forced me out of the comfort of the grey 
area and made "intellectualizing" difficult.  I think this is why I chose to study prenatal 
screening- it was at the juncture of many topics I find interesting, but I don't have a 
personal experience or connection that keeps me in one corner. It's less challenging for 
me to be open minded about different perspectives than it might be if I had a disability, a 
religious affiliation, or the experience of being pregnant. My challenge has become to 
recognize the ways in which this is a personal topic, and to see how my past experiences 
and situation make me gravitate to particular ideas or points of view.  
In the endeavour to identify the ways in which my personal standpoint has shaped and 
changed the questions I ask, the data I collect, and the claims I make, I am attempting to 
engage in a process of scholarship with 'strong objectivity' (Harding, 1987). Strong 
objectivity describes  a socially situated view of the researcher, research participants and 
the research process that examines the data created and claims made at the junction of 
these perspectives. "The notion of strong objectivity conceptualizes the value of putting 
the subject or agent of knowledge in the same critical, causal plane as the object of her or 
his inquiry" (Harding, 1986, p. 161). When considering the extent to which I engaged in 
reflexive examination of my standpoint and positioning, it is important to consider the 
limitations of the structure of the integrated article style. Each article was written within 
the genre and word limit of a particular journal, with a specific audience in mind. In most 
6 
 
cases, it was not possible to expound upon the ways in which I tried to work reflexively 
throughout the research process. In Chapter 9 I address these ideas more fully, drawing 
together the choices made necessary by the integrated article style and outlining some of 
the considerations of standpoint and perspective in which I engaged, but which were not 
included in the published manuscripts. 
A final note about my motivation throughout this project: when I explain my thesis topic 
to non-academics, I am often asked the same question: "So..... are you for or against 
prenatal screening?" I think academic contacts are interested in this question, too, but 
tend to ask it in a more subtle way. The short answer is that I am neither for nor against 
prenatal screening and abortion, nor is taking a stance on that question the aim of my 
research. Professionally, I think that any choice a woman decides to make is the right 
choice, as long as it is informed to a degree she judges sufficient. I am interested in doing 
this research to examine and develop ways in which informed choices can be supported. 
Prenatal screening is an important opportunity for some women. For some, it's a source 
of anxiety. Prenatal screening may be an essential part of the choice to become a parent 
for some women while for others, it's unnecessary and may even be offensive.  My 
interest in this project is to try and help women obtain the information they need to make 
their own decision about the screening tests.   
In the interest of transparency to the reader and reflexive awareness of myself, I have 
thought about what I might choose when offered prenatal screening.  I would probably 
choose to participate in the tests, since I consider myself, in the words of one participant, 
"the type of person who likes to know as much as possible". Knowing what I do now, I 
would request my first trimester results when available, so that if a high risk result was 
returned, I could access earlier diagnostic testing (chorionic villus sampling). I'm not sure 
what I would do with a definitive positive finding. Thinking reflexively, I recognize my 
reluctance to include this information in my dissertation, but I think it is important for the 
reader to understand the way I approach the research. My decision whether or not to 
terminate an affected pregnancy would depend on many factors, including what condition 
was found, how I felt at the time about pregnancy, motherhood, social and financial 
resources, my career, and my partner's feelings about the same. I think it's hard to know 
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what you would do in a difficult situation before you are faced with that choice, and have 
access to all the information available to you at that time. This difficulty in forecasting 
decisions was illustrated in my interview data. I asked each research participant what 
options she would be considering if she received a high risk result from the screening 
test. Some women stated they would consider invasive, diagnostic testing, some women 
stated that they wouldn't consider this testing. Only two of the sixteen women told me 
that they would consider abortion for Down syndrome, a percentage which is very 
different from epidemiological statistics, which show that about 90% of pregnancies with 
confirmed cases of Down syndrome will be terminated (Biggio, Morris, Owen, & 
Stringer, 2004; Gekas et al., 2009; Joan & Alberman, 2009; Korenromp, Page-
Christiaens, van, Mulder, & Visser, 2007) . Considering the discrepancy between these 
figures emphasizes the importance of participant standpoint: did the volunteer 
participants have particular views on the topic that made them more likely to volunteer? 
How did the social situation, experiences and resources of the volunteer participants 
differ from the epidemiological research populations? Were research participants less 
likely to express their intention to terminate in the event of a condition? Is it harder to 
predict how you might make a difficult choice before you are in that situation? 
1.3  Story of the Research 
The germ of this research idea started in September 2006, the last year of my 
undergraduate degree, during a class on qualitative research methods. For the final 
project of this class, we created a research project and completed a literature review, 
chose a methodology, and outlined a study design. I chose prenatal screening for this 
project, and developed a research project that is (rightfully) quite different from the one 
contained in this thesis. As I look back to my initial literature review, I am struck by 
some of the enduring issues of interest. In my first "statement of the problem", written in 
October 2006, I wrote: "what is lacking, however, is literature on best practices for 
introducing and explaining prenatal screening".  I problematized the consequences of this 
gap in a much different way than I do now, but my enduring interest has been in the ways 
the presentation of prenatal screening shapes and constrains the choices available to 
women.  
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I enrolled in the M.Sc program at Western in September 2007, and developed a proposal 
for a project that involved audio-taping  prenatal visits and analyzing the ways prenatal 
screening was discussed. I was interested in the context and structure of information 
provided, assessment of comprehension, and indicators of directiveness towards a 
particular course of action. During my first year of graduate studies, I started to become 
interested in metaphors and figurative language and the impact that words have on 
directiveness. I also started reading about different types of genetic testing throughout the 
life span and was thinking critically about the ways in which prenatal screening is 
different from preconception genetic screening, newborn genetic screening and pediatric 
and adult genetic screening. These developed into two separate projects which I 
presented for various audiences including medical students at Western, the Western 
Graduate Research Forum, the Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists of Canada 
annual clinical meeting, and the University of Western Ontario's Department of 
Obstetrics and Gynecology annual research day.  
When meeting with my supervisors about my M.Sc proposal in the summer of 2008, we 
discussed the challenge that the research I was proposing was too large for the scope of 
an M.Sc degree, and was really quite related to my side projects about metaphors and 
genetic testing policy. The three of us made the decision to re-work the project to include 
some of the ideas I found the most compelling from the other projects and to complete it 
as a PhD project. I enrolled in the PhD program in September 2008. 
As I re-worked the thesis proposal and thought about what was most interesting and most 
compelling from the other projects, I realized (or perhaps re-realized, looking back at my 
2006 statement of the problem) that I was most interested in the issue of informed choice. 
I structured the  project as an examination of the process of prenatal screening, to 
examine the ways that patient information materials and policy guidelines relate to the 
ways in which prenatal screening was presented to women. I decided at this point that 
instead of audio-taping the first prenatal visit between family doctors and pregnant 
women, I would talk to pregnant women directly. I was interested in more than what was 
said inside the doctor's office, including the ways that women might inform themselves 
and work towards making a choice by engaging with other material, or talking with their 
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partners, friends, and families. I also realized that I wasn't really interested in what the 
doctors said so much as in what the women heard -what they understood and 
remembered- and how they contextualized this information with that from other sources.   
I continued to refine the research project while I wrote my comprehensive papers and 
created and defended a new proposal. I started to re-read the policy documents and 
patient education materials with a new eye for their influence on informed -decision 
making. The patient education materials were rich with metaphor and figurative 
language, inspiring  a  "struck by" moment (Cunliffe, 1999; Cunliffe, 2002) about the 
relation between this language and non-directiveness,  an idea which informed the first 
manuscript.  The sensation of being "struck by" something  may inspire us to re-think or 
re-consider previous ideas, or open us up to new ideas. Through this, we may "be making 
new connections between tacit knowing and explicit knowledge" (Cunliffe, 1999, p. 9).  
This realization, described further in the first manuscript, re-directed my thinking about 
the process of prenatal screening to focus explicitly on the idea of informed decision-
making and informed choice. This refinement in the direction of inquiry changed the 
focus of my interview guide and probes, shaping the data I collected. After interviewing 
the first few participants about their experiences,  what I identified as most interesting in 
the policy documents started to shift. Instead of comparing prenatal screening policy to 
other genetic policy, I thought about the particular context of prenatal screening and the 
counseling requirements mentioned as necessary in the SOGC guideline. I started writing 
the second manuscript after collecting most of the participant data, during the process of 
analysis. Manuscript number two does not contain any participant quotes, but was formed 
directly in response to what participants were telling me about the conversations they had 
with the doctors and those which they had with their friends. Manuscript three was 
written at approximately the same time, and attempted to respond to the articulations of 
what information was important to consider when making a decision about whether or 
not to participate in prenatal screening. Manuscript four was the last paper written, a 
grounded theory of the interview data about the  process of decision-making about 
participation in prenatal screening, including discussion of the ways women worked with 
information received from their doctors and other sources, sought out additional 
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information, and then worked on interpreting that information to come to an 
understanding about the screening test in order to make a decision. 
In the summer of 2011, I was working on the second manuscript, a critique of the idea of 
non-directive counseling, an approach described as an imperative for the presentation of 
prenatal screening by the SOGC policy. This manuscript was written for submission to 
the Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology Canada. The day after we submitted the 
manuscript, the next issue of JOGC was released, with a new prenatal screening policy 
(Chitayat et al, 2011). We revoked the submission so that it wouldn't go out to reviewers 
while we were reading the new policy. Fortunately or unfortunately, the instructions for 
counseling in the 2011 policy were identical to those in the 2007 policy, and so we re-
submitted the manuscript without changes. Interestingly, there weren't many changes 
between the 2007 and 2011 policies. Chitayat et al (2011) specified that the information 
concerned singleton pregnancy and gave more information  for physicians choosing 
different types of prenatal screening tests, specifications that the ultrasound should be 
performed by sonographers with specific training, a list of patient factors which may 
potentially affect screening performance, and information on additional conditions that 
prenatal screening can detect.  In my reading of the two policies, the reason for the 
updated guideline seems to be the provision of practical advice for primary care 
physicians offering screening tests. Unfortunately, neither guideline offers practical 
advice on how to offer the screening tests. 
1.4 Definitions of Terms 
Related to the interdisciplinary and sensitive nature of the topic, there are controversies 
and inconsistencies around several of the key terms that I will use. In an 
acknowledgement that discourse and word choices can shape and construct the way we 
think about the world (Foucault, 1972; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), I have made several 
particular choices about the language I use to describe my research topic and participants: 
• To reflect my feminist theoretical perspective and in acknowledgement of the 
literature about the medicalization and institutionalization of birth, I refer to 
11 
 
pregnant women or women rather than patients in an effort to avoid historical 
and emotional overtones of illness (Herxheimer & Goodare, 1999).  
• Informed consent is a legal term, and refers to an educated acquiescence to the 
suggestion or recommendation of a health care professional. Prenatal 
screening should not happen through a process of informed consent, but rather 
through one of informed choice or informed decision-making (Sherwin, 
1998).  I alternate between informed decision-making and informed choice, 
using the former to refer to the process and the later to refer to the product of 
that process in an effort to be consistent  with the literature with which I am 
engaging.  
• Dixon-Woods (2001) discusses the difference between patient information 
materials and patient education materials, reasoning that the former aims to 
provide information and the latter aims to indoctrinate to a particular way of 
understanding (Dixon-Woods, 2001). In this dissertation I have chosen to 
refer to the written materials on prenatal screening as patient education 
materials, reflecting the  way they are commonly known and the discursive 
purpose that many serve. In my analysis of these materials I have found some 
which provide information I judged as carefully considered, balanced, and 
expressed in neutral language. These pamphlets might  more accurately be 
termed information materials, but as a genre, I believe this material reflects 
the patient education definition suggested by Dixon-Woods (2001). Also, 
while I don't use the word patient to describe pregnant women, I retain that 
word to describe the educational materials, to nod to the embedded 
assumptions informing most of the examples of this genre. 
• Consistent with person-first discourse advocated by disabilities scholars and 
advocated by the American Psychological Association (American 
Psychological Association, 2010), I refer to person with a disability rather 
than disabled person; person without a disability, and typical or average 
rather than normal or healthy.  
• Along this same line of thinking, when making reference to the conditions 
detected by the prenatal screening test, I choose to use the words of condition, 
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aneuploidy, anomaly, incomplete neural tube closure, or the specific name of 
the condition rather than potentially alienating terms such as disorder, disease, 
birth defect, abnormality or neural tube defect (Grant & Flint, 2007; Hodgson, 
Hughes, & Lambert, 2005). Aneuploidy is a term which refers to the 
possession of an unusual number of chromosomes and is often used to refer to  
trisomy conditions (ex. Down syndrome) detected by prenatal screening. 
Trisomy conditions  manifest when three chromosomes exist (triploid) where 
two are typical (diploid).  
• I use risk to refer to the genre of risk status (i.e. low risk result), but am aware 
of the negative overtones this word may have (Hodgson, Hughes & Lambert, 
2005). I use chance and probability when referring to the likelihood that a 
pregnant woman may be carrying a fetus with aneuploidy (e.g. a 20 year old 
woman has a 1 in 1600 chance of carrying a fetus with a chromosomal 
anomaly. Based on her age, she is likely to receive a low risk result from 
prenatal screening). 
• The terminology used to describe the "product" of a pregnancy is particularly 
difficult and a very personal matter for pregnant women. During interviews, I 
adopted the terminology that the participant used, sometimes fetus or baby or 
pregnancy. In my written work, I use fetus or embryo before birth, depending 
on the stage of pregnancy, although the distinction between the two is 
arbitrary (Nisker, Baylis, Karpin, McLeod & Mykitiuk, 2010). Following the 
dictionary definition and to reflect my belief that personhood begins at birth, I 
use baby, infant and child only after the child is born. I use pregnancy to 
describe the process, and fetus to describe the creation of that process.  
• Terms for abortion are often misused, sometimes for intentional effect 
(Grimes & Stuart, 2010). For instance, pregnancy termination, commonly 
used in medical literature, may be ambiguous- all pregnancies terminate, but 
not all abort (Grimes & Stuart, 2010).  I alternate between termination and 
abortion depending on the disciplinary audience. I do not use the term 
therapeutic abortion, since all abortions can be therapeutic, for instance, 
therapeutic for the mother's mental health and wellbeing. I do not use elective 
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or genetic as an adjective for abortion to avoid inferring a moral hierarchy of 
types of abortion.  
 
1.5 The Study of Prenatal Screening as Conceptualized 
in this Dissertation 
In Chapter 2, I review the basic medical and social scientific concepts that inform my 
understanding of prenatal screening. In Chapter 3, I detail the particular way in which I 
understand prenatal screening to fit in a broader context of medicalization of pregnancy, 
risk, normalization, united by Foucault's notion of governmentality. I then let these 
threads lie loose while I respond directly to the data and the literature suggested by my 
research findings, engaging with ideas of information-seeking practices, informed 
decision-making, and non-directiveness. In Chapter 9, I pick up the literature that has 
been left to lie fallow from the literature review (Charmaz, 2006) and conclude by 
weaving together these different threads.  
1.6 Methodology 
Constructivist Grounded Theory (Charmaz, 2006) is the methodology used for this study, 
due to its: congruence with a constructionist epistemology (which I discuss at length in 
Chapter 3); flexibility and range of acceptable methods (Charmaz, 2006); recognition of 
the importance of language (Charmaz, 2005); inductive approach to examining the data 
without imposing particular theories (Charmaz, 2006); and congruence with an 
interdisciplinary approach.  
As necessitated by my doctoral program and institutional research ethics requirements, I 
began the study with a literature review (Chapter 2), through which I identified particular 
areas of analytical sensitivity. When designing the study, I was aware of my interest in 
exploring issues of language, directive counseling, social justice, and disability. While 
the initial literature review was necessary for pragmatic reasons, and informed the study 
design, it was put aside, as per Charmaz's (2006) recommendations. As data collection 
and analysis simultaneously evolved, new areas of theoretical interest were identified and 
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explored, including information-seeking and informed choice. After data collection and 
analysis was completed, further literature was reviewed in response to categories 
identified through data collection, demonstrating a refinement of the topic, from a 
consideration of the broad "process" of prenatal screening to a focused examination of 
informed decision-making in prenatal screening.  Each piece of data (patient education 
pamphlets, policy documents, women's perspectives) was collected and considered 
separately, and as part of a whole. Each manuscript speaks to one piece of data collection, 
but is informed by the previous data, literature, and insights that came before. Chapter 9 
details insights from the inter-connection of these pieces.  
1.7 Plan of Presentation 
In Chapter 1, I set the stage for the research by discussing my philosophy of 
interdisciplinary scholarship,  situating myself as a researcher, outlining the story of how 
this research came to take the shape it has taken, clarifying terms,  and introducing 
methodological and theoretical choices, which will be elaborated on in chapters 4 and 9. 
Chapter 2 situates the context and background of the study in an interdisciplinary 
collection of literature on the topic. Chapter 2 also gives some explanation of the medical 
and scientific aspects of prenatal screening for readers who are not familiar with the test. 
Emergent tensions and key issues informing the shape and importance of the study will 
be discussed prior to an introduction of the purpose and questions of this research. 
Chapter 3 discusses the philosophical foundations of the particular iteration of 
constructionism I have used throughout this work. Chapter 3 also reviews  the feminist 
bioethics and medicalization literature, which inform my theoretical framework.   
Chapter 4 gives a methodological grounding of the study, including an explanation of the 
ways in which Constructivist Grounded Theory is congruent with a constructionist 
approach. Chapter 4 also includes an outline of the study design and methods and 
concludes with an explanation of some of the methodological decisions I made 
throughout the process. 
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Chapter 5 is my first manuscript, "Critical reflection and prenatal screening public 
education materials: a metaphoric textual analysis", published in 2010 in the journal 
Reflective Practice. This manuscript includes data from a textual analysis of Canadian 
prenatal screening patient education materials and engages with the idea of non-directive 
counseling from the SOGC guideline, querying whether or not existing written material 
support this counseling directive through critical reflection on the metaphors and 
figurative language used. The findings conclude that written material on prenatal 
screening is rife with directive elements encouraging women to participate in screening 
tests for the purpose of detecting and terminating affected pregnancies.  
Chapter 6 is the policy manuscript, "Information sharing to promote informed choice in 
prenatal screening in the spirit of the SOGC clinical practice guideline: a proposal for an 
alternative model", published in March 2012 in the Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology 
Canada. Chapter 6, like Chapter 5, addresses the idea of non-directive counseling in the 
SOGC guideline, reviewing the literature critiquing this approach and offering an 
alternative way of counseling, based on a particular combination of Shared Decision-
Making and Informative Decision-Making. This article concludes that while the aims of 
non-directive counseling (autonomous informed decisions) are admirable, the method is 
problematic, and may be neither a desirable nor possible way of counseling. The article 
proposes a particular way of approaching Shared Decision-Making that supports a shared 
information and deliberation process culminating in the woman making her own decision, 
without recommendation or suggestion from the health care provider. 
Chapter 7 is entitled "Pregnant women's self-identified information requirements when 
deciding to participate in non-invasive prenatal screening" and is currently under review 
at the journal Health Expectations. Drawing on data from participant interviews, this 
manuscript draws on women's discussions of what information they found important for 
making their decisions about participating, including information they came across after 
making their decision, but wished they had known earlier. The findings are structured in a 
way that may be of use to clinicians offering the prenatal screening test, as seven topics 
that could be used to guide a conversation.  This manuscript draws a distinction between 
information about the test and information to make a decision about participation, a 
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distinction made by women but usually absent from the literature. This manuscript 
acknowledges the time commitment required by clinicians to provide thorough 
information about prenatal screening and discusses alternative ways of providing this 
information after the initial consultation. 
Chapter 8, "Women's decision-making about participation in prenatal screening: Beyond 
the clinical encounter", is the synthesis of the participant information in an over-arching 
grounded theory. This manuscript inductively generates a model of the ways in which 
pregnant women seek and receive information, how they work with that information, and 
how this process informs decision-making. The findings contrast three different types of 
theories on this topic: a) the grounded theory developed from my thesis data, b) 
consumerist and shared theories of decision-making in health care, c) theories of 
information seeking practices for decision-making in the library and information sciences 
literature. The health care literature tends to assume a more linear process of knowledge 
acquisition for decision-making which places the health care provider as a central figure 
in the process. My iterative theory is closer to theories found within library and 
information sciences literature, which tend to take a non-linear view of the ways in which 
people seek, receive, and use information in everyday life. 
Chapter 9 discusses my understanding of reflexivity and reflexive research, offers 
emerging insights and reflections on the relations between these four manuscripts and the 
research process as a whole. I propose quality criteria drawn from literature on 
interdisciplinary scholarship and constructivist grounded theory as a guideline for 
assessing the quality of this work. Finally, I address the contributions of this work and 
implications for prenatal screening patient education materials, policy, and counseling. 
1.8 Conclusion 
Prenatal screening is a process which is at the juncture of issues of interest to many 
disciplines, and as such, requires an interdisciplinary approach. Drawing on literature, 
theories, and methodologies from several disciplines, I construct a bricolage approach to 
this study, aiming for internal congruency rather than disciplinary consistency 
(Kincheloe, 2001). The shape and focus of this research has been continually refined 
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throughout the process, to reflect an iterative inductive approach where initial data 
collection and analysis provide insights to further structure the process (Charmaz, 2006).  
The story of this research is one of examining the process of making an informed 
decision about prenatal screening; the contribution is generative insights into barriers and 
facilitators of this process, with suggestions for how it might be improved.  
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2 Literature Review 
In this chapter, I first define and explain common terms and concepts that surround the 
topic of prenatal screening. Second, I summarize key aspects of the 2007 SOGC Clinical 
Practice Guidelines, which inspired my interest in this area of research and discuss the 
differences between this guideline and the new 2011 guideline. Third, I examine some of 
the philosophical values that inform discussions of prenatal screening such as notions of 
risk, non-directiveness, and autonomy. Fourth, I survey the literature concerning the 
effect of prenatal screening on the disabled community. Fifth, I discuss the existing 
literature on prenatal screening by examining the work of key scholars in the field.  
2.1 Background Terms and Concepts 
2.1.1 Types of prenatal and diagnostic screening.  
First, it is important to note that in many popular works and media publications the terms 
prenatal screening, prenatal testing, prenatal genetic diagnosis, and prenatal diagnostic 
screening are conflated. There are important distinctions among these terms: a screening 
program is not diagnostic, or even technological. For example, one of the most common 
forms of screening is maternal age, as obstetric and perinatal risks increase with maternal 
age (Johnson & Tough, 2012). As with other types of screening, in this example a 
particular criterion is used to identify individuals who may face higher levels of risk than 
the average person; this criterion is not sufficient to identify whether or not these 
individuals are actually at risk, only that they are more likely to be at risk than others who 
do not share this characteristic. Prenatal screening looks at a number of different markers 
(biochemical markers in the mother's blood, physiological markers visible in an 
ultrasound) to suggest whether or not the fetus is at higher risk for fetal aneuploidy or 
incomplete neural tube closures.  Testing and Diagnosis are terms with connotations of a 
definitive result and are correctly used to refer to diagnostic testing such as amniocentesis 
or chorionic villus sampling.  This study concerns the non-diagnostic prenatal screening 
presented during the first prenatal visit; the terms prenatal testing or prenatal diagnosis 
will be used to refer only to diagnostic prenatal tests.  A high risk result after a screen 
will, in most cases, result in the offer of diagnostic testing. 
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There are many types of prenatal screening and an explanation of the procedural, 
historical, and medical information surrounding them is beyond the scope of this paper.  
The most commonly used and studied procedures are as follows:  
Integrated Pregnancy Screening: Integrated Pregnancy Screening (IPS) is one 
type of non-invasive screening referred to by the SOGC guideline. IPS combines an 
ultrasound with two different blood tests. The ultrasound and first blood test (first 
trimester screen) take place between 11 and 14 weeks gestation. The second blood test 
(maternal serum screen) is done between 15 and 18 weeks gestation (Goel et al, 1998).  
For details about ultrasound and maternal serum screening, please see the sections below.  
The first trimester screen measures Pregnancy-Associated Plasma Protein A (PAPP-A) 
and free beta Human Chorionic Gonadotrophin (hCG) which can indicate a risk status for 
aneuploidy and incomplete neural tube closures. Unusual levels of this pregnancy related 
protein (PAPP-A) and hormone (β-hCG) can indicate (but do not always mean) a higher 
likelihood of aneuploidy (Breathnach & Malone, 2007). IPS has a sensitivity rate of 
about 85% with a false positive rate of 2% (Malone et al., 2005). 
Serum Screening:  Maternal serum screening (MSS) is a three part analysis of 
women’s blood  performed at 15-18 weeks gestation (Goel, Glazier, Zummers, & 
Holzapfel, 1998). Maternal serum screening used to be the norm for prenatal screening in 
Ontario (Carroll & Reid, 1997), and as such is the type of screening addressed in many 
social scientific studies. MSS no longer meets the minimum standard for detection rate 
and false positive rate (Summers, Langlois, Wyatt, & Wilson, 2007). Serum IPS is a 
blood-work only type of screening which meets the minimum standards suggested by 
Summers and colleagues (2007). Serum IPS includes a first trimester PAPP-A test as well 
as a second trimester test of the panel of biochemicals included in the Quad Screen.  The 
quadruple screen is a second trimester blood test which includes the original three 
biochemicals from MSS: Human Chorionic Gonadotrophin (hCG), Alpha fetoprotein 
(AFP) and Estriol (E3) and adds one additional biochemical marker, inhibin-A (Chitayat, 
Langlois, & Wilson, 2011). The quadruple screen takes place in the second trimester, and 
so may be the only prenatal screening option available for women who are late seeking 
prenatal care.  
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Ultrasound: Ultrasound, or ultrasonography, is a medical imaging technology which 
uses high frequency sound waves and echoes to create an image of the fetus. Sonographic 
"markers" visible on the ultrasound may detect physical characteristics such as nuchal 
translucency, which may suggest the presence of conditions such as Down Syndrome 
(Unterscheider & Malone, 2011). Ultrasound technology is one of the most common 
tools for prenatal screening because it can detect markers early in pregnancy 
(Unterscheider & Malone 2011) and is generally accepted to be safe, although some 
authors disagree (Gudex, Nielsen, & Madsen, 2006). Ultrasound for nuchal translucency 
is included in several types of prenatal screening approved by the 2007 SOGC Guideline 
(Summers et al, 2007), although there are endorsed methods of prenatal screening (Quad 
Screen, Serum IPS) that do not include ultrasound. 
Amniocentesis:  Amniocentesis is the most commonly used form of prenatal 
diagnosis for chromosomal and single gene disorders (Wilson, Langlois, Johnson, & 
Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists of Canada, 2007). Amniocentesis involves 
the extraction of amniotic fluid (which surrounds the fetus) with a needle. Current 
techniques allow the use of ultrasound imaging to accurately guide the needle, thus 
reducing negative effects of the procedure (Seeds, 2004). Amniocentesis enables the 
culture of fetal cells contained in the amniotic fluid to perform genetic analysis (including 
chromosome karyotyping) (Borrell et al., 1999). Amniocentesis was first used in the 
1950s to determine the sex of the fetus so that sex-linked genetic conditions could be 
detected (Rothschild, 2005). The risk of fetal loss after amniocentesis is not agreed upon 
(see the “Physical Risk” section below), but the procedure is generally performed only to 
verify the results of a less invasive test when an anomaly is detected. Amniocentesis can 
be performed prior to 15 weeks gestation (early amniocentesis) but is more commonly 
performed between 15 and 20 weeks gestation (mid trimester amniocentesis) (Seeds, 
2004). 
Chorionic Villus Sampling: CVS is the only accepted method for first trimester 
diagnosis (Brambati & Tului, 2005). Evidence shows it may be as safe and as reliable as 
amniocentesis (Borrell et al, 1999). CVS can be performed two ways; a needle can be 
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inserted into the placenta through the maternal abdomen (known as transabdominal CVS) 
or a catheter or biopsy forceps can be inserted through the cervical canal (known as 
transcervical CVS) (Brambati & Tului, 2005). CVS can be done at 7-12 weeks gestation, 
compared to more than 15 weeks gestation for amniocentesis. CVS can detect most 
conditions that amniocentesis can detect. It is appropriate for DNA analysis and has the 
advantage over amniocentesis of quicker test results and efficacy at an earlier gestational 
age. It is considered to be reasonably safe, although there are risks of fetal loss, and low 
risks of bleeding and amniotic fluid aspiration (Brambati & Tului, 2005). 
Transabdominal CVS is considered safer than transcervical CVS because the needle does 
not pierce the membrane therefore the antibacterial barrier properties of the maternal 
tissues remain intact (Brambati & Tului, 2005). In the mid 1990’s there were reports of a 
few clusters of children born with limb anomalies after CVS (Kuliev et al., 1992) 
however, later research reported that the rates of limb anomalies were similar to the 
general population and that the clusters may have been coincidental (Brambati & Tului 
2005; Philip et al., 2004). 
2.1.2 Risk status. 
It should be noted that some authors find the word risk to be value laden (Grant & Flint, 
2007; J. Hodgson, Hughes, & Lambert, 2005; Skotko, 2005; Skotko, 2006). They suggest 
a term such as “chance” would be more congruent with a non-directive approach. For a 
more theoretical discussion of risk, please see section 2.6, "Re-examining Risk". 
Prenatal screening is not diagnostic, but rather gives the patient an idea of her risk status 
of having a child with an anomaly. Furthermore, as prenatal screening is only targeted 
towards certain anomalies, it is possible that a woman could receive a low risk result, but 
still have a child with an anomaly (Fanos, Spangner, & Musci, 2006). The opposite of 
this can also occur- a woman can receive a high risk result that is found to be a false 
positive on amniocentesis or after birth (Fanos, Spangner & Musci, 2006).  Risks are 
provided statistically (i.e. 1 in 200, 1 in 37), with the high/low/medium risk lines drawn 
idiosyncratically. Patients and physicians might not agree on what constitutes a high or 
low risk.  
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Rayna Rapp (1999) conducted a 9 year ethnographic study of genetic counselors and 
their patients. She concluded that risk status is a significant stress to pregnant women and 
that many do not initially understand that prenatal screening tests will not provide a 
definitive answer (Rapp, 1999). This theme is echoed throughout both the social science 
and medical literature (Carroll, Brown, Reid, & Pugh, 2001; Heyman et al., 2006; 
Kleinveld, Timmermans, de Smit, & Ader, 2006).  Rapp also includes an interesting 
discussion of how risk status interpretation varies across ethnic and socioeconomic lines:  
How do we convey a chromosome risk when a low income pregnant Afro-Puerto 
Rican woman experiences a 100 percent chance of running out of food stamps 
this month, a 25 percent risk of having one son or brother die in street violence, 
and an 80 percent chance of getting evicted by the end of the year? A one-in-180 
chance of having a child with a chromosome abnormality at age 35 is probably 
the best odds she’s facing. (New York genetic counselor in Rapp, 1999, p.69) 
2.1.3 Physical risk. 
Prenatal screening tests have low physical risk, although diagnostic prenatal tests, such as 
amniocentesis or CVS, do carry physical risks (Farrell et al., 1999).  As discussed earlier, 
amniocentesis carries a risk of miscarriage, as well as the rare risk of malformation 
(Farrell et al, 1999), and so is only performed when other, less invasive procedures 
indicate that there is a higher risk of anomaly.  It is difficult to establish an exact rate of 
miscarriage for amniocentesis. The commonly accepted rate by SOGC is 0.6-1% or 
(Wilson et al., 2007) but a recent, and much criticized, study (Kuehn, 2006) suggests that 
the rate is actually closer to 0.06% or 1 in 1600 (Eddleman et al., 2006). The rate has also 
been reported as high as 1.53% (Wilson et al, 2007). It should be noted that even 
procedures seen as low risk (for example, ultrasound) are not proven safe (Gudex et al, 
2006) and may require additional testing to determine whether or not there are long term 
effects.   
2.1.4 Social-psychological risk. 
The social and psychological risks of prenatal screening are often overlooked in the 
medical literature. Some authors contend these risks are also often neglected in 
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discussions of prenatal screening between physicians and patients (Browner, Preloran, 
Casado, Bass, & Walker, 2003; Marteau et al., 1992; Pilnick, Fraser, & James, 2004; 
Pilnick, 2004; Press & Browner, 1995; Press & Browner, 1997; Smith, Slack, Shaw, & 
Marteau, 1994; Smith, Shaw, & Marteau, 1994). 
Social and psychological risks are the greatest risks that many pregnant women and 
couples face during prenatal screening and are the concern of many excellent social 
scientific and bioethical works (Franklin & Ragone, 1998; Gastmans, 2002; Rapp, 1999; 
Rothenberg & Thomson, 1994; Rothschild, 2005). There are several authors who have 
dedicated much of their careers towards exploring these issues (see all listed sources: 
Abby Lippman, Carole H. Browner, Nancy Press, Rayna Rapp, Barbara Katz Rothman) 
and there have been many national and international conferences convened to work on 
these issues.  Issues commonly addressed in this literature include the emotional strife of 
selective termination, aborting a much wanted but potentially anomalous fetus, anxiety 
around testing, carrying an “abnormal” fetus, struggling with issues of abortion, not being 
able to acknowledge a pregnancy until the fetus is “confirmed healthy”, worrying about 
the impact of a disabled child on other children, a marriage, mental resources, and 
finances.  
2.2 The 2007 SOGC Clinical Practice Guideline on 
 Screening for Fetal Aneuploidies: Implications for 
 prenatal care 
Prior to the 2007 clinical practice guideline, Canadian women were offered prenatal 
screening based on advanced age or family history, although some provinces had 
screening programs offered to a wider population of pregnant women (Carroll & Reid, 
1997). The definition of advanced maternal age has changed as scientific knowledge and 
the field of biostatistics has progressed, but in Canada it is generally considered to be 35 
years (Johnson & Tough, 2012).  Rothschild (2005) notes that 35 years is a generally 
accepted marker of advanced maternal age in many countries, but it is an arbitrary 
threshold based more on economics than medicine. It is also often cited that 35 years of 
age is the threshold because at that age the physical risks of amniocentesis are equal to 
the risk of receiving a test result positive for anomalies (Wilson et al, 2007). The new 
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SOGC guidelines are, in effect, recognizing the arbitrary nature of screening after age 35. 
After all, although older women have a much higher probability of bearing a child with 
Down Syndrome (for example), most children with Down Syndrome are born to women 
below 35, due to the higher numbers of women under 35 having children (Rapp, 1999). 
The 2007 SOGC guidelines state that all pregnant women, regardless of age, must be 
offered non-invasive screening for “the most common clinically significant fetal 
aneuploidies in addition to a second trimester ultrasound for dating, growth, and 
anomalies” (Summers et al 2007, p. 149).  
There are several implications to the SOGC guideline: first of all, it implies that all 
pregnancies have the potential to be high risk pregnancies. Secondly, it forces 
consequences of testing such as iatrogenic anxiety or the experience of a “tentative 
pregnancy” (Rothman, 1989) on to a larger number of women. Third, this 
recommendation expands the scope of practice of many family physicians who care for 
pregnant women. Previously, if a woman desired prenatal screening or was over the age 
of 35, her physician might refer her to a genetic counselor or obstetrician. With the new 
guidelines, physicians must discuss prenatal screening with all their pregnant patients.  
Some family physicians may lack the knowledge necessary to provide all the necessary 
information (Tyzack & Wallace, 2003), or be unprepared to provide counseling in a non-
directive way (Summers et al, 2007), considering that in other circumstances (e.g. 
regulating blood sugar, controlling hypertension) non-directiveness may be seen as a 
problematic way of practice (Caplan, 1993; Williams, Alderson, & Farsides, 2002b). 
Fourth, it normalizes the experience of prenatal screening in the eyes of the health care 
provider, which may affect both the standard of care and the discourse used by the 
physician (Press & Browner, 1995; Press & Browner, 1997; Seavilleklein, 2009). Fifth, 
Asch (2000) has argued that the expansion of prenatal screening will continue to 
eliminate people with disabilities from our society, which could increase marginalization 
and reduce many forms of social and financial support, this idea is  further elaborated in 
section 2.3, “Prenatal Screening and Disability”. 
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2.2.1  Genetic screening and primary care providers. 
It is predicted that genetic screening services will increasingly become the domain of 
primary care providers (Biesecker & Peters, 2001; Greendale & Pyeritz, 2001). This  
raises questions concerning the implications of this transfer of counseling from specialist 
genetic counselors to family physicians, including whether family doctors have sufficient 
time, training, knowledge, and resources to provide this service. 
Genetics has an ever expanding role in medicine and is poised to change family medicine 
in a number of different ways.  By generating new screening and diagnostic tests, the 
Human Genome Project will introduce new ethical challenges with regard to informed 
consent, patient autonomy, confidentiality, malpractice, and psychological complications 
(Fetters, Doukas, & Phan, 1999). As genetic services expand into the domain of family 
medicine, there are many benefits, but also many potential challenges. 
The SOGC Clinical Practice Guideline (Summers et al, 2007) expands the scope of 
prenatal care in family medicine to include genetics. Prenatal screening has been 
performed by family physicians in the UK (Qureshi, Armstrong, & Modell, 2006) and 
California (Browner & Press, 1996) for some time. Ontario family physicians have been 
counseling patients about Maternal Serum Screening (MSS) since 1993 (Carroll & Reid, 
1997). Park and Mathews (Park & Mathews, 2009a) found that 68% of pregnant women 
in Newfoundland and Labrador discussed Maternal Serum Screening with their family 
physician.  There have been several investigations into the strengths and weaknesses of 
genetics in family medicine, the findings of which will be summarized in the following 
section. The conclusion of most of these studies and systematic reviews is that good 
quality counseling about genetic and prenatal testing requires knowledge, training, time, 
and commitment on the part of the health care provider, however the question is raised as 
to whether the majority of family physicians possess all of  these necessary components.   
Greendale and Pyeritz (2001) have produced an important commentary on the current 
state and future direction of genetic screening in primary care.  For various reasons, the 
number of specialist geneticists (both PhD and MD medical geneticists as well as 
master’s level genetic counselors) has not kept pace with the need for these professionals.  
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The result of this is that non-genetic specialists and primary care providers take on an 
increasing amount of this workload. Greendale and Pyeritz (2001) suggest that non-
specialists providing this service “may not be able to provide accurate risk assessment, 
choose appropriate tests based on clinical and family histories, or interpret DNA results” 
(p. 226). Furthermore, there is a shortage of family physicians in general (CFPC-CMA 
PCWTP, 2009), and adding another service to their already full roster is problematic.  
There are some significant advantages to moving genetic services into the domain of the 
primary care provider. First, it is unlikely that there will ever be enough specialist 
geneticists and genetics counselors to provide these services. The nature of family 
medicine (long term care, ability to develop relationships, knowledge of family members 
and family dynamics) has many possibilities for excellent genetic care (Greendale & 
Pyeritz 2001). Unfortunately, the nature of family medicine also discourages excellent 
genetic care because of issues such as time constraints (Carroll, Blaine, & Ashbury, 2006; 
Watson, Shickle, Qureshi, Emery, & Austoker, 1999; Young & Ward, 1999), financial 
considerations (Carroll et al, 1999), and lack of current knowledge about developments in 
genetics (Watson et al, 1999).  
2.3 Prenatal Screening and Disability 
One of the most compelling arguments against a cavalier attitude to prenatal screening 
comes from the disabled community. Known in bioethical circles as the expressivist 
argument, it is argued that by identifying certain genetic conditions as undesirable and 
aborting fetuses with these conditions, negative judgments are made about the status and 
value of the lives of people with these particular conditions. This argument is taken up 
widely by feminist philosophers and by the disabled community (Edwards, 2004; Gedge, 
2010; Kaplan, 1994; Klein, 2011; Lippman, 1991; Lippman, 1999b; McMahan, 2005; 
Patterson & Satz, 2002; Press, Browner, & Tran, 1998; Scott, 2005) who argue that a 
systematic bias against people with disabilities is embedded within the structure and 
practice of prenatal screening.  
Another related argument is the quality of life argument. Terms such as suffering and low 
quality of life are subjective and many people with disabilities do not rate their subjective 
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life experience as poor (Albrecht & Devlieger, 1999; Asch, 2000). Disability scholars are 
concerned with the way that quality of life is perceived by the general public and 
interpreted in the prenatal screening debate. Disability advocates frequently argue that 
their quality of life is affected more by societal barriers than their disability. For instance, 
Deborah Kaplan (1994) compares a wheelchair to a pair of eyeglasses; it is a tool for 
people with mobility limitations. A wheelchair only impacts on quality of life when 
architecture, technology, and attitudes get in the way.  Scholars participating in this 
debate question the use of selective abortion as a response “to social problems that could 
be resolved through other policy initiatives” (Kaplan, 1994). It should be noted that most 
“birth defects” are the result of prematurity, low birth weight, and environmental 
exposure.  Many of these conditions could be ameliorated with social, environmental and 
economic programs  (Wertz & Fletcher, 1995). 
Because caring for a disabled child, as any other child, requires patience, time, and 
resources,  advocates of the expressivist argument do not support a ban on prenatal 
screening (Gedge, 2007; McMahan, 2005; Patterson & Satz, 2002). Instead, they 
advocate for increased awareness about living with a disability, increased social support 
for persons with disabilities and their caregivers, and non-directive counseling that does 
not include subconscious prejudice against disability (Kaplan, 1994; Parens & Asch, 
2000; Wertz & Fletcher, 1995).  
Within these ideas, feminist standpoint theory1 (Harding, 1987; Harding, 2004) 
contributes to an understanding of the phenomenon. Harding's standpoint theory argues 
that “knowledge claims are always socially situated and that failure by dominant groups 
to interrogate beliefs arising from their social situation leaves them in an 
epistemologically disadvantaged position, that is, one that distorts” (Patterson & Satz, 
2002, p.121 ). For example, if health care providers who counsel about prenatal screening 
fail to make themselves aware of the reality of living with a disability, they may impart 
                                                 
1
 While both Harding (1986, 2004) and Smith (1987, 1992) name their work "standpoint theory", the 
theories are quite disparate (Smith, 1993). This section uses Harding's conception of standpoint theory; 
Smith's standpoint theory is discussed in Chapter 3 and 9. 
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incorrect knowledge to their clients, who then make decisions based on this distorted 
knowledge (Grant & Flint, 2007). It is necessary for genetic counselors (and other health 
care professionals who provide prenatal screening counseling) to acquire knowledge 
about the lived experiences of the conditions identified with prenatal screening so that 
they can provide appropriately “non-directive” counseling to patients. Some writers 
wonder if truly informed choice and completely non-directive counseling is possible, 
noting that the words used to describe the process of prenatal screening create anything 
anomalous as inherently pathological (Grant & Flint, 2007; Skotko, 2006; Hodgson et al, 
2005).  Press et al (1998), Grant and Flint (2007), and Skotko (2005, 2006) argue that 
when health care professionals speak about prenatal screening, they should be prepared to 
provide patients with contact information for parent groups and social groups that 
advocate and care for people with the conditions being discussed. A number of scholars 
have suggested that this is not happening, that many women receive no information 
whatsoever about what it is like to live with or raise a child with the different conditions 
being tested for by prenatal screening (Browner & Press, 1996; Marteau, Slack, Kidd, & 
Shaw, 1992; Marteau, 1995; Pilnick et al., 2004;  Pilnick, 2004;  Press & Browner, 1995;  
Press & Browner, 1997; Skotko, 2005; Skotko, 2006). 
During informal communication during the International Conference on the “Healthy” 
Embryo (University of Western Ontario, November 16 2007), legal and disability scholar 
Jackie Leach Scully made the valuable point that it is important to differentiate between 
terms such as disability, disease, condition, illness, impairment.  There is significant 
difference between the participatory abilities of people with deafness, cystic fibrosis, 
Down syndrome, or hydroencephaly. Different conditions should be given different 
considerations  (Leach Scully, personal communication, November 16, 2007). Various 
conditions are often conflated in prenatal screening debates, created as the “other” in 
opposition to “normal” (Rothschild,  2005). Wertz and Fletcher have also noted that the 
academic literature tends to consider “disability” rather than speak about certain 
conditions and they identify this trend as harmful and counterproductive (Wertz & 
Fletcher, 1995). 
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2.3.1 Social construction of disability. 
There is a wide range of literature on the ways in which disability is socially constructed. 
Scholars tend to take what I term a strong constructionist (e.g. Wendell, 1996) or a weak 
constructionist (e.g. Asch, 2000) viewpoint. The strong constructionist view of the social 
construction of disability, exemplified by the work of Susan Wendell, holds that 
impairments in functioning are only disabling because of the way in which society is 
constructed- they are not inherently disabling. Weak constructionists differ in stating that 
although disability is largely socially constructed, there are some attributes of 
impairments which are inherently disabling, such as the experience of living with chronic 
pain (Asch, 2000).  
Wendell (1996) outlines a number of ways in which society disables people who do not 
live up to the idealized vision of a citizen, that is the white, male, young, fit, able-bodied, 
wealthy citizen. First, she describes ways in which social conditions affect people’s 
bodies. Then she names a number of societal norms which can be disabling. In one 
illuminating example, Wendell identifies the pace of life as a societal factor which 
disables people who may be able to be productive and contributing members of society, 
but because of the pace they are expected to keep, are unable to make contributions. For 
example, we could consider a worker who would be able to work a half time job based on 
the productivity expectations for this amount of work. If those productivity expectations 
were to increase, the worker may not be able to keep up and be forced to leave 
employment. In this way, the social construction of the expected level of  individual 
productivity “can eclipse the actual contributions of people who cannot meet them, 
making people unemployable when they can in fact do valuable work” (Wendell, 1996, p. 
39). 
Wendell points out that disability is also constructed by the inability to give individuals 
the assistance they need to live productively. For example, the inefficiency of public 
transit disables people who cannot drive for reasons such as poverty, epilepsy, blindness, 
paralysis etc. Wendell points out that society gives a lot of assistance to non-disabled 
people such as education grants and training, public communication, public 
transportation, recreation, social support etc. When these services are geared towards 
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non-disabled people they are considered an entitlement of being a citizen. If these 
services are adapted so that people with impairments can use them, they are considered 
charity. 
Such discussions about the social construction of disability raise a number of questions 
related to prenatal screening. How is disability constructed by health care professionals 
when they talk about prenatal screening? How do societal constructions of disability and 
the lives of disabled people affect the decisions that pregnant women make about prenatal 
screening? How can health care professionals circumvent these societal norms and 
constructions to assist the woman in making her own decision about her own family? The 
SOGC guidelines (Summers et al., 2007; Chitayat et al., 2011) do not explicitly address 
the issue of how disability is constructed in society, however they do address the issue 
that prenatal screening, diagnostic testing, and the decision to continue or terminate the 
pregnancy should be the woman’s own decision. They suggest this can happen through 
non-directive counseling.  
2.4 The Ethos of Non-directive Genetic Counseling 
Non-directiveness is one of the original and principal tenets of genetic counseling (Fine, 
1993; Weil, 2003; Wertz & Fletcher, 1989) and has long been considered the “norm” in 
genetic counseling practice (Burke & Kolker, 1994; Kolker & Burke, 1998). Non-
directiveness originated from Carl Roger’s (1951) psychosocial counseling model of 
Client Centered therapy, adopted by the first graduate program in genetic counseling, at 
Sarah Lawrence College (Weil, 2003). Non-directiveness is thought to be important 
because it aims to promote and support autonomous decision making by clients. 
Emphasizing individual choice and decisions separates the field of genetic testing and 
diagnosis from its undesirable cousin, eugenics (Duster, 2003).  Bartels et al (1997) 
report that 96% of American genetic counselors surveyed thought non-directiveness is 
very important to genetic counseling practice (Bartels, LeRoy, McCarthy, & Caplan, 
1997). It is regularly included as an imperative in literature from other medical 
professions, including the SOGC Clinical Practice Guideline (Summers et al, 2007). 
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There is a core group of scholars in genetics and bioethics who question whether non-
directive counseling is possible or desirable. These discussions center around definitions 
of non-directiveness, the values that it may hide or silence, the opportunities that may be 
lost for active engagement with counselees, and the moral and ethical discussions that it 
prevents.  Within this argument, there are four different camps:  
N-D is possible, desirable N-D is not possible, but it is desirable 
N-D is possible, but not desirable N-D is neither possible nor desirable. 
Of these four options, the accepted view in the medical mainstream is that non-directive 
counseling is both desirable and possible, but the tide has shifted in the genetic 
counseling and midwifery communities  (Burkell & McKenzie, 2005). Many authors 
present compelling arguments to support the need for an acknowledgement of the 
impossibility of non-directive counseling. I situate myself in the place which sees the 
spirit of non-directiveness as desirable and on a continuum of possibility, however I view 
a purist practice of non-directive counseling as neither desirable nor possible. By the 
spirit of non-directiveness, I mean the aim of providing complete and balanced 
information provided without intent to persuade the woman to pick a particular outcome. 
I propose that providing information in the spirit of non-directive counseling becomes 
more possible when we acknowledge the effect our personal standpoint has on the 
information we provide and the way we provide it.  An ideal approach towards non-
directive counseling appreciates the standpoint of the counselor and counselee (Smith, 
1987), and encourages counselors to provide information in a way that the counselee can 
apply to her particular situation. I describe this idea further in the second manuscript, 
Chapter 6. 
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Table 1: Reasons why non-directive counseling may not be possible 
Author (year) Reasoning 
(Anderson, 1999) There are moral imperatives embedded within counseling that make  
non-directiveness impossible. 
(Bartels et al., 1997; 
Williams et al., 2002a; 
2002b) 
Difficulty ensuring that verbal and non-verbal cues are non-directive. 
By choosing what information to present and how to present it, you 
cannot be non-directive. 
(Cunningham-Burley 
& Kerr, 1999) 
Practitioners and clients may hold different perspectives about genetic 
risk and disease, making neutrality on the part of practitioners 
impossible.  
(Bhogal & Brunger, 
2010) 
Health professionals cannot help weaving their own values into the 
information they impart.  
(Greendale & Pyeritz, 
2001; Smith et al., 
1994) 
There is often a lack of time for proper counseling, especially when this 
counseling is provided by primary care providers. 
(Stacey, 1996) There is a power differential between patient and physician which 
prevents neutrality in their communication. 
(Weil, 2003) Directiveness can be inadvertent (counselor’s values show despite 
attempts to be neutral), inevitable (there are inevitable choices to be 
made re: choosing information to present and how it should be 
presented), or institutional (the message and setting can imply one 
course of action is preferable or desirable). 
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(Williams et al., 
2002b) 
Attempting to give information in a value neutral way can undermine 
the possibility of encouraging open communication.  
Denial of advice/opinion may be interpreted as a lack of care. 
There is influence to follow particular screening pathways. This can be 
overt or covert, such as the state sanctioning a screening program. 
(Greendale & Pyeritz, 
2001; Williams et al., 
2002a; Williams et al., 
2002b) 
Genetic counseling has now expanded to be the jurisdiction of 
practitioners who may not normally practice in a non-directive way.  
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Table 2: Reasons why non-directive counseling may not be desirable 
 Author (year) Reasoning 
(Anderson, 1999) The moral imperatives hidden in counseling make it difficult for 
couples to make a decision that these imperatives do not support. They 
make the offer of genetic testing a medical directive rather than a 
choice. 
(Benkendorf, Prince, 
Rose, De Fina, & 
Hamilton, 2001) 
Practitioners often practice non-directively by using indirect speech, 
which leads to confusion on the part of the patients. Indirect speech 
does not invite the patient to state his or her values.  
(Caplan, 1993) Non-directiveness ignores many difficult issues and isolates itself from 
the moral, ethical, and political issues inherent in genetic screening. 
(Clarke, 1997) Non-directiveness fails to address the social and economic context in 
which the decision is being made. 
(Clarke, 1994) Unacknowledged directiveness is much more dangerous than 
acknowledged directiveness. Using a norm of non-directiveness may 
hide directive elements. 
(Gervais, 1993) Non-directive counseling may hide the value of autonomy from 
examination and reevaluation. 
(Caplan, 1993; Stacey, 
1996) 
The ethos of neutrality silences public discussion of difficult issues 
related to “improving the population”. It also prevents discussion 
within medical genetics about these issues. 
(Vanstone, Kinsella, & 
Nisker, 2012) 
A non-directive approach may hide excuses for directiveness, such as 
Bartels et al (1997) informants who admitted using directive counseling 
when their clients could not comprehend information because of low 
socioeconomic status, low education, different cultures. 
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(Weil, 2003) Non-directiveness impedes the future progress and evolution of the 
profession by inhibiting creative responses to the challenges posed by 
advances in genomic medicine. 
It may constrain counselors, many of whom feel they cannot counsel 
both actively and non-directively. 
Bartels et al (1997) found that while 96% of American genetic counselors thought of non-
directiveness as a very important value, 72% of them admitted to being sometimes 
directive. They acted in a directive fashion for several reasons. Many admitted that it was 
difficult to be non-directive because the language they use, the information they present 
and the way they present it are all directive, even if the counselor strives to take a neutral 
stance. Others admitted consciously pursuing a directive counseling strategy when the 
client didn’t understand the information, a better choice was clear, there was a perceived 
need for further medical care or counseling, or the client couldn’t make a decision. 
Bartels et al (1997) did not examine the assumptions behind some of these reasons, for 
instance, that 15% of their respondents took a directive stance when clients were unable 
to understand the information for reasons of low mental function, low socioeconomic 
class, low education, client immaturity, cultural practice, and comprehension.  I wonder if 
there would be a more effective way of presenting the information so that the client could 
understand it in order to articulate his or her values and preferences, rather than the 
counselor deciding that a directive approach was necessary due to the socially 
disadvantaged status of the client.  
Williams, Alderson, and Farsides (2002b) examine what is happening with genetic 
counseling now that it is increasingly being carried out by health care providers who do 
not normally practice in a non-directive way, such as obstetricians and family physicians. 
Anderson (1999) and Greendale and Pyeritz (2001) share this concern about the provision 
of genetic counseling by other care providers. Park and Matthews (2009) report that 37% 
of women in Canada who participated in prenatal screening did so because their 
physicians instructed them to participate.  Williams et al (2002b) state that attempting to 
give facts in a value neutral way is not possible or desirable and ask instead, what aspects 
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of directiveness are acceptable and what aspects are problematic? They support an 
attempt to understand the difficulties of non-directiveness and the possible uses of 
alternative counseling strategies through professional and public debate. 
Anderson (1999) interviewed 24 couples who received prenatal genetic counseling. She 
found that there are moral imperatives embedded in the process of genetic counseling 
which are not explicitly articulated and therefore not questioned. These moral imperatives 
empower professionals and make it possible for them to portray genetics as a social good.  
With this in mind, it is not correct to equate non-directiveness with the protection or 
fostering of autonomous decision making.  The informants Anderson interviewed who 
accepted genetic testing did not see it as an autonomous choice, but rather as a medical 
directive that a person could follow or not follow. They were “swept away” (p. 132) by 
the moral imperatives embedded in the testing and unable to articulate a counter 
argument to justify not pursuing the testing. 
2.5 Autonomy 
One of the most commonly cited advantages for striving towards non-directive 
counseling is that it promotes patient autonomy. Literature on directive vs. non-directive 
counseling often assumes the inherent value in supporting autonomy and concerns itself 
with the achievement of this value, without questioning whether it is something we 
should strive to achieve. This approach is well grounded in traditional bioethics, but 
traditional conceptions of autonomy in relation to prenatal screening have recently been 
challenged by a number of scholars (Ho, 2008; Langston, 2009; McLeod, 2002; 
Seavilleklein, 2009). Victoria Seavilleklein (2009) has written an interesting synthesis of 
the ways in which autonomy is used to justify the widespread offer of prenatal screening. 
She contends that prenatal screening does not promote autonomy and a more patient-
centered approach necessitates the use of a relational conception of autonomy, as 
articulated by Susan Sherwin (1998).   
Autonomy is one of Beauchamp and Childress’ (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009) four 
guiding principles of bioethics. While many bioethicists have critiqued the theory of 
principlism (Clouser & Gert, 1990) and traditional conceptions of the principle of 
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autonomy (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000; Sherwin, 1998; Wolpe, 1998), it is still one of the 
most popular decision making guides in medicine and the values espoused by Beauchamp 
and Childress have been adopted by other disciplines to guide ethical decision making.  
Autonomy is the central value espoused by most of the leading approaches in health care 
ethics (Sherwin, 1998). 
Despite its wide popularity, autonomy has been challenged as a worthy principle on 
several fronts and these arguments will be explored briefly. But first, where does the 
value of autonomy come from? Whose value is it? Is it really a universal good that should 
be used to guide clinical decisions as Beauchamp and Childress (2009) suggest? 
Catherine Myser (2003) suggests that autonomy is part of the normativity of whiteness of 
bioethics, a term she uses to describe the invisible cultural norms that are behind so-
called universal values. Myser challenges the universality of autonomy by contending 
that it is a cultural value. Fox (1990) identifies self determination/autonomy as the 
'highest moral good' in American bioethics. She discusses the “American-ness” of 
bioethics as an important indicator of its WASP ethos and whiteness. Myser (2003) calls 
for the problematization, displacement, and relocation of the dominant white center of 
bioethics. This would involve the adjustment or revision of dominant bioethics values 
and concepts, such as autonomy. Myser (2003) asks us to examine the dominant values in 
bioethics and ask what ideas and concepts these values suppress. For instance, the focus 
on self determination, individualism, and autonomy may subjugate values of community, 
relationships, altruism, sacrifice, and love. What ideas do our values hide and what do 
they show? Whose values are they and where do they come from?  
The principle of autonomy guides many approaches in prenatal screening: the norm of 
non-directiveness in genetic counseling, the idea that an individual has the right to 
determine her own future without consideration of the community, and the idea that 
suffering hardship (e.g. financial difficulties that may be encountered when raising a 
child with special needs) is an experience one must deal with alone. Discussions of 
choice and the right to choose are considered in isolation from and without 
acknowledgement of the influence of the social and political structures in which they are 
deeply embedded (Ho, 2008; Lippman, 1999a) Considering the social construction of the 
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value of autonomy and the implications this value has in relation to the offer of prenatal 
screening, I introduce a different conception of autonomy, Sherwin's (1998) relational 
autonomy. Relational autonomy fits well with a feminist approach to prenatal screening, 
and allows consideration of the ways in which decisions about prenatal screening are 
linked to family, community, societal, and socio-economic considerations.  
2.5.1 Relational autonomy. 
Feminist scholars are particularly concerned with the value of autonomy. As Sherwin 
(1998) points out, feminists are often unsure whether or not to support the principle of 
autonomy. On one hand, it affords protection to people who are vulnerable to coercion 
and other influences.  Without strong respect for the principle of autonomy, patients and 
other vulnerable populations may be abused and exploited. On the other hand, is 
autonomous decision-making really possible? When one considers the power differential 
between physician and patient (Bhogal & Brunger, 2010; Summers, 1994), social and 
political structures which oppress women (Lippman, 1999) and possibly coercive or 
constraining contextual factors specific to prenatal screening (García, Timmermans, & 
van Leeuwen, 2008; Hunt & deVoogd, 2003), it is unclear if wholly autonomous 
decisions are possible. Sherwin makes a distinction between autonomy and agency. A 
woman presented with choices about prenatal screening may exercise agency by 
choosing the option which she prefers, yet due to constraining factors outside of her 
control, that decision may not be autonomous (Lippman, 1999a; Sherwin, 1992; Sherwin, 
1998). For instance, societal factors may constrain autonomous choice in prenatal 
screening; 
The societal treatment and professional viewpoints of disability continue to shape 
the meaning of pregnancy and the role of screening programs, pre-determining 
people's decision-making framework and feasible options while giving the 
illusion of autonomy. ... the ableist socio-cultural framework is full of negative 
messages about impairments. It constructs the meanings of a good life according 
to the able-bodied and able-minded ideals, underlying the social and professional 
structures within which discussions and decisions regarding various impairments 
are held.(Ho, 2008, p.197)  
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McLeod and Sherwin (McLeod & Sherwin, 2000) declare that oppression is 
unrecognized as an inhibitor of autonomy equal to coercion, internal compulsion, and 
ignorance. Sherwin (1998) makes the assertion that the value of autonomy serves to “hide 
the workings of privilege and to mask the barriers of oppression” (Sherwin, 1998, p. 25) 
by letting those indoctrinated into the North American culture of individualism and 
autonomy think of their successes as self created and deserved. Sherwin infers that this 
type of thinking creates an obliviousness to the barriers that oppression and disadvantage 
pose to self determination. As a result, privileged people may be inclined to blame less 
privileged people for not achieving similar levels of success, without acknowledging the 
costs of oppression. 
Oppression problematizes the conditions for autonomy.  Sherwin (1998) writes that 
patient decisions are thought to be autonomous if 1) the patient is deemed to be 
sufficiently competent (rational) to make the decision at issues, 2) the patient makes a 
reasonable choice from a set of available options, 3) the patient has adequate information 
and understanding about the available options and 4) is free from explicit coercion 
toward or away from one of those options. Sherwin (1998) states that each criterion is 
more problematic than it initially appears. The call for patient competency can exclude 
people who are not equated with being rational - traditionally the rationality of women 
and other members of oppressed groups have been questioned. The requirement of a 
patient to make a reasonable choice from a set of available options is problematic 
because the set of options and the “reasonableness” of the decision is constructed by 
someone other than the patient herself.  The call for adequate information and 
understanding is problematic because the information that is made available to patients is 
that which has been deemed: worthy of funding by policy-makers, worthy of study by 
researchers, and relevant by health care providers.  Decisions made at policy, research, 
and management levels affect the relevance of the available information and the list of 
available options. Regarding the third criterion, access to relevant information, power, 
knowledge and experience differences between the health care provider and patient can 
make the provision of comprehensible and relevant information difficult. Patients may 
feel too intimidated to ask questions and so may not receive the information they need in 
a way they can understand. The fourth condition, a demand for freedom from coercion 
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when making decisions is difficult to evaluate when the decision-maker is oppressed. 
Sherwin (1998) gives the example of a woman who chooses prenatal diagnosis and 
abortion because she cannot afford to care for a disabled child in the society in which she 
lives, even if she would value that child herself.  
When a woman’s sense of herself and her range of opportunities have been 
oppressively constructed  [so that]…  having a(nother) child will impose unjust 
and intolerable costs on her, it does not seem sufficient to restrict our analysis to 
the degree of autonomy associated with her immediate decision about a particular 
treatment offered. We need a way of acknowledging how oppressive 
circumstances can interfere with autonomy. (Sherwin, 1998, p. 28)  
Sherwin proposes the concept of relational autonomy as an essential element of a 
feminist health care ethic (Sherwin 1992, 1998; McLeod & Sherwin, 2000) that will both 
serve as an alternative to and address some of the shortcomings of a traditional 
conception of autonomy. Relational autonomy could be called situational or contextual 
autonomy, because it focuses on considering the individual as part of a web of relations, 
both personal and public. It is best understood to be “a capacity or skill that is developed 
(and constrained) by social circumstances. It is exercised “within relationships and social 
structures that jointly help to shape the individual while also affecting others’ responses 
to her efforts at autonomy” (Sherwin, 1998, p. 37).  
Sherwin supports this theory with Marilyn Friedman’s call for contextualized thinking as 
a way of highlighting the limitations of minimalist moral theory by paying attention to 
contextual details in issues of justice, care, and relationships (Friedman, 1987 as cited in 
Sherwin, 1992). Relational autonomy recognizes that individuals define and pursue 
autonomy within their own specific context and that particular context shapes the way 
that autonomy can be achieved (McLeod & Sherwin, 2000). Relational autonomy also 
calls for attention to dimensions beyond the individual patient, focusing on the broader 
social context of the individual patient rather than his or her cognitive decision-making 
capacity. McLeod and Sherwin (2000) argue that a focus solely on the individual ignores 
key elements at the source of problems and fails to acknowledge the interconnected 
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nature of a person in her society. A focus on the individual encourages patients to see 
their decisions in isolation from the decisions of others, which can increase their sense of 
vulnerability and dependence on medical authority (Sherwin, 1998).  
2.6 Re-examining Risk 
Risk is a concept that is often discussed in relation to prenatal screening. In an earlier 
section I discussed the idea of physical risk and the expression of statistical risk. Risk is a 
word with an unclear meaning and status, both in the context of prenatal screening and 
social science inquiry in general (Heyman, Alaszewski, & Brown, 2010; Roth, 2010). 
Risk is used in many different ways in prenatal screening, for instance, risk may be used 
to refer to physical risk and statistical expressions of risk, as discussed earlier in this 
chapter. There is literature describing risk in many contexts: minimizing risks of prenatal 
screening (Ekberg, 2007); the risk of invasive procedures (Wilson et al, 2007); the 
experience of having a pregnancy labeled high risk (Heyman et al., 2006); negative 
connotations associated with the word risk and the transfer of those negative connotations 
to the conditions one may be at risk for (Hodgson et al, 2005; Grant &Flint, 2007); 
congruency between pregnant women's perceptions of risk and the risk statistic derived 
from prenatal screening (Georgsson Öhman, Grunewald, & Waldenström, 2009) and the 
challenges  of interpreting risk statistics (Burkell & Campbell, 2005; Gigerenzer, 
Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke, Schwartz, & Woloshin, 2007; Gigerenzer & Gray, 2011; 
Miron-Shatz, Hanoch, Graef, & Sagi, 2009; Press and Browner, 1995; Rapp, 1999). 
Receiving a label of high-risk has been shown to produce several negative psychological 
sequelae in pregnant women, including perceptions of a loss of control (Saxell, 2006), 
fewer positive expectations about the pregnancy (Heaman, Gupton, & Gregory, 2004), 
increased stress and increased negative emotions (Jordan & Murphy, 2009). 
But what is risk? There is a large body of literature on risk theory, but in this thesis I 
engage with a few particular conceptions of risk. Abby Lippman examined the socially 
constructed nature of risk in regards to prenatal screening (Brunger & Lippman, 1995; 
Lippman, 1991; Lippman & Wilfond, 1992) and the ways in which it may be used to 
exert social control over women.  Bob Heyman (Heyman, Henriksen, & Maughan, 1998; 
Heyman et al., 2006; Heyman et al., 2010) has considered the increasing societal 
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sensitivity to risk as providing a particular historically and socially situated approach to 
visualizing alternative futures  (Heyman et al., 2010); preoccupation with a risk oriented 
way of looking at the world shapes health care delivery and practice. This perspective 
was explored in relation to midwifery practice, where medical conceptions of risk were 
found to create tensions between midwives' wishes to empower and protect their clients 
(Scamell, 2011). Deborah Lupton is a sociologist who has examined the social 
construction of risk (Lupton, 1999a) in the context of public health (Petersen & Lupton, 
1996), everyday life (Tulloch & Lupton, 1997; Tulloch & Lupton, 2003), AIDS and HIV 
(Lupton, McCarthy, & Chapman, 1995; Tulloch & Lupton, 1997) and pregnancy 
(Lupton, 2011; Lupton, 1999b). Her work is discussed at length in Chapter 3 for its 
relevance to prenatal screening.  Lupton’s book traces the evolution of different concepts 
of risk, based on the idea that the identification of risks takes place in specific socio-
cultural and historical concepts.  Lupton believes that Western culture’s fascination with 
control over one’s life has resulted in the popularization of the concept of risk to explain 
deviations from the norm, misfortune, and frightening events. This concept assumes 
human responsibility for these events and behooves us to recognize that “something must 
be done” to prevent misfortunes.  Risk is culturally significant because the “concepts we 
identify as risky are ontologically important- they have significant implications in the 
way we understand the world, and social and material orders” (Lupton, 1999a) (p. 14).  
2.7 Influential Prenatal Screening Literature 
There is an enormous amount of literature about prenatal screening available in the fields 
of medicine, nursing, midwifery, and philosophy, but most of the literature I have 
engaged with addresses prenatal screening from a social scientific perspective. A 
significant amount of critical literature on prenatal screening was published in the 1990's; 
foundational work was published by Canadian scholar Abby Lippman (Basen, Eichler, & 
Lippman, 1993; Beaulieu & Lippman, 1995; Brunger & Lippman, 1995; Lippman, 1991; 
Lippman, 1993; Lippman & Wilfond, 1992;  Lippman, 1993; Lippman, 1994; Lippman, 
1999a;  Lippman, 1999b); American anthropologists Carole Browner and Nancy Press 
(Browner et al., 2003; Browner et al., 2003; Browner & Press, 1996;  Browner et al., 
1996;  Browner, Preloran, & Press, 1996; Markens, Browner, & Press, 1999a; Markens, 
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Browner, & Press, 1999b; Markens et al., 2010; Markens, Browner, & Mabel Preloran, 
2010; Press et al., 1998; Press & Browner, 1995; Press & Browner, 1997; Root & 
Browner, 2001); American medical anthropologist Rayna Rapp (Rapp, 1984; Rapp, 
1988; Rapp, 1998; Rapp, 1999); American sociologist Barbara Katz Rothman (Rothman, 
1989; Rothman, 1993) and British health psychologist Theresa Marteau (Dormandy, 
Hankins, & Marteau, 2006; Loeben, Marteau, & Wilfond, 1998; Marteau et al., 1992; 
Marteau et al., 1992; Marteau, Plenicar, & Kidd, 1993; Marteau, 1995;  Marteau et al., 
2000;  Marteau & Dormandy, 2001;  Marteau, Dormandy, & Michie, 2001; Marteau & 
Kinmonth, 2002; Marteau & Richards, 1996;  Michie, Bron, Bobrow, & Marteau, 1997; 
Michie, Dormandy, & Marteau, 2003;  Michie, Lester, Pinto, & Marteau, 2005; Sapp et 
al., 2010; Smith et al., 1994; Smith et al., 1994; Van den Heuvel et al., 2008; Van den 
Heuvel et al., 2009). Several significant interdisciplinary collections of work on prenatal 
screening were also published during this time period (Asch, 2000; Franklin & Ragone, 
1998; Rothenberg & Thomson, 1994). Much of this work addresses the diagnostic 
prenatal test amniocentesis and precursors to contemporary prenatal screening, such as 
the maternal serum screen or the alphafetoprotein screen. These differences 
notwithstanding, this literature articulates an array of foundational questions about non-
diagnostic prenatal screening. 
Browner, Lippman, Marteau, Rapp, Rothman and Press have greatly influenced 
contemporary social scientific scholarship of prenatal screening, and more recent 
literature has built on their scholarship by examining prenatal screening in the national 
contexts of Canada (Bhogal & Brunger, 2010; Burkell & McKenzie, 2005; Gagnon et al., 
2010; Legare et al., 2011; Park & Mathews, 2009a; Park & Mathews, 2009b; 
Seavilleklein, 2009; Spoel, 2006; St-Jacques et al., 2008); Australia and New Zealand 
(Hodgson et al., 2005;  Hodgson, Gillam, Sahhar, & Metcalfe, 2010;  Jaques, Halliday, & 
Bell, 2004; Jaques, Bell, Watson, & Halliday, 2004; Jaques, Sheffield, & Halliday, 2005;  
Jaques et al., 2010; Milligan, 2004; Milligan, 2008; Mulvey & Wallace, 2000;  Mulvey & 
Wallace, 2001; Rostant, Steed, & O'Leary, 2003; Rowe, Fisher, & Quinlivan, 2006; 
Tyzack & Wallace, 2003) and Europe (Dahl, Hvidman, Jørgensen, & Kesmodel, 2011; 
Dahl, Kesmodel, Hvidman, & Olesen, 2006; Ekelund, Jørgensen, Petersen, Sundberg, & 
Tabor, 2008; Gottfreðsdóttir & Árnason, 2011; Gourounti & Sandall, 2008; Gudex et al., 
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2006; Heyman et al., 2006; Pilnick et al., 2004; Pilnick, 2002; Pilnick, 2004; Pilnick, 
2008; Sandelowski & Barroso, 2005; Schoonen et al., 2011; Schwennesen, Svendsen, & 
Koch, 2010; Williams et al., 2002a; 2002b; Williams, 2005; Williams, 2006).  In this 
section, I will review some of the contributions of the foundational social scientific work 
on prenatal screening mentioned above and describe some of the emerging themes in 
contemporary work. 
2.7.1 Abby Lippman (Canada, Epidemiologist, Bioethicist). 
Abby Lippman is a Canadian scholar who works with issues of genetics, feminism, and 
ethics. She uses a critical feminist/social justice and constructionist lens to examine 
prenatal screening. In three similar articles, Lippman (1991, 1992, 1995) examines the 
ways in which prenatal screening has been socially constructed and the impact that this 
construction has had on the status of women, children, and people with disabilities. Her 
argument is relevant to my motivation for undertaking a critical and constructionist 
examination of prenatal screening. 
Lippman (1995, pg. 375) identifies a number of contradictory constructions of prenatal 
screening: 
• “public health”, or a way of reducing the frequency of selected birth 
defects. 
• “reproductive autonomy”, or a way of giving women information to 
expand their reproductive choices. 
• “assembly line”, a way of separating out those products we wish to 
develop from those we wish to discontinue. 
• “autonomous control”, a way of respecting (increasing) women’s 
autonomy to choose the kinds of children they will bear. 
• “reassurance”, a means of reassuring women to enhance their experience 
of pregnancy. 
• “disaster avoidance”, a way of avoiding an undesirable future. 
Lippman recognizes that these constructions are in tension with each other, but often 
occur together, particularly the themes of reassurance, control, and choice. Lippman 
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decries this discourse as marketing strategy, one which hides other facets of prenatal 
screening by not asking questions such as why reassurance is sought, how risk groups are 
generated, and how eligibility for obtaining this kind of reassurance is determined. The 
discourse on prenatal screening further constructs the project by constructing a “need” for 
prenatal diagnosis and the promotion of “choice”. These concepts are further analyzed in 
Lippman (1991) and (1992). 
Despite its insistence of objectivity and neutrality, the Western biomedical system is 
grounded in particular social and cultural assumptions. These assumptions shape the way 
that disease, malady, and disorder are constructed by biomedicine, as there is no 
essentialist or universal biological basis for these conditions. There is no value-free view 
of disease, rather, scientists give biological processes different forms in different people, 
thereby creating disorders and disabilities as social products. Technology used by 
biomedicine reinforces and reflects social norms and standards that exist within power 
relationships in our society. Just as disease cannot be value-free, neither can technology.  
As a development in a world stratified by hierarchies of gender, class, and race, prenatal 
screening cannot escape being used in a stratified way, and therefore reinforcing unequal 
distribution of health. Prenatal screening takes place in a particular historical and cultural 
context where risk dominates pregnancy. Lippman notes that when pregnant, women are 
immediately labeled high-risk or low-risk, but never no-risk (Lippman, 1992). The risk 
identified by authorities is never external, never the effect that a woman’s occupational or 
social environment might have on the baby. Risk is always internal, and sets up the 
pregnant woman as the party worthy of blame regarding behavior she may have engaged 
in during pregnancy, food or vitamins she may not have ingested, and substances she may 
have smoked, eaten, or drunk. After attaching a risk label, medicine reconstructs a normal 
experience – one that requires their supervision. Lippman (1991, 1992) predicts that 
eventually the “high-risk” age category of 35 years and older will be removed, thereby 
making all pregnancies high risk and encouraging physician surveillance and control over 
all pregnant women.  
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Lippman (1991,1992, 1995) asks what choice really means when the pregnant woman is 
forced to choose from options constructed by others. The discourse of reassurance that 
surrounds prenatal screening hides the fact that reassurance could be offered in other 
ways. Many more babies have health problems after being born premature or 
underweight than with a genetic anomaly. Would it not be more reassuring to provide 
women who live below the poverty line with adequate nutrition? Why is genetic testing 
more reassuring than allocating funds for home care, respite care, and domestic 
alterations that would let women manage their special needs if their child is born or later 
develops a health problem? Is bearing a child with Down Syndrome really a choice when 
society does not truly accept children with disabilities or provide assistance for their 
care? 
2.7.2 Barbara Katz Rothman (USA, Sociology). 
Any discussion of prenatal screening would be remiss not to include Barbara Katz 
Rothman’s groundbreaking work The Tentative Pregnancy: Prenatal Diagnosis and the 
Future of Motherhood (1989). Katz-Rothman interviewed 120 women, men, physicians, 
and genetic counselors in the early and mid eighties, when the prevalence of 
amniocentesis and genetic abortion was growing and the issues with which this literature 
review is concerned were first being articulated. Reading this work more than two 
decades later, I am struck by the prescience of many of the questions and issues that 
Rothman raised. When she completed her book in 1989, chorionic villus sampling was 
just starting to be used in mainstream clinics, and it was expected to solve many of the 
difficult “late abortion” issues of amniocentesis. Serum screening was not available in the 
form that we know it today, but the potential of an early blood test for abnormalities was 
seen as a magic cure for many problems of existing technology. Rothman raises potential 
issues about both CVS and serum screening that are relevant today- does the possibility 
of an early (and less traumatic) abortion mean that the tests might be used with less 
gravitas? Could they become a vehicle for sex selection?  
While our technological capabilities have increased greatly since 1989, the questions 
Rothman raised at that time are still relevant today. For instance, Rothman describes the 
decline in Tay Sachs research with increased use of amniocentesis. Before amniocentesis, 
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there was a lively research community dedicated to finding treatments and cures for this 
disease.  Rothman describes the great public pressure to find therapies and cures for this 
disease. After the gene for Tay Sachs was isolated and it became possible to screen for 
the disease and selectively abort affected fetuses, this research stopped and the focus 
shifted to screening and prevention programs. Rothman discusses how technology and 
change comes from social pressure and asks “where is the social pressure when a room of 
fifty Tay Sachs babies is replaced by fifty individually grieving women” (Rothman, 1989, 
p. 231)? In 2012, we take a “screening and prevention” approach to many more 
conditions, many of which are significantly less severe than Tay Sachs. Rothman makes 
reference to a cure for the painful condition of Tay-Sachs, but we could consider this 
warning also applicable to other types of support for people with disabilities. From where 
will the social pressure for increased support and acceptance for people with disabilities 
arise when these people are less visible in society? 
2.7.3 Rayna Rapp (USA, Anthropology). 
Rayna Rapp undertook a nine year ethnography of genetic counseling in New York City 
which resulted in her 1999 book Testing Women, Testing the Fetus.  One of the most 
important ideas she discusses concerns the effect of a patient’s race, language, age, 
socioeconomic status, and religion on the prenatal counseling session. Rapp found that 
counselors consciously or unconsciously alter their discourse, explanations, and 
information to match their perception of the patient in front of them. Counselors are 
forced to make quick judgments about the scientific literacy and education level of a 
patient that sometimes result in explanations that are too simple or complex for the 
patient to understand. Rapp also discusses the use of metaphor as an important tool for 
tailoring scientific explanations to a particular patient. She found that genetic counselors 
used several stock metaphors to describe things such as genes, DNA, and testing. The 
metaphor they used for each individual patient appeared to depend on the initial judgment 
made about the patient’s education and scientific literacy level. Patients were never asked 
explicitly about their level of education which at times resulted in misjudgments and sub-
standard patient care. Rapp notes that metaphors don’t always translate through language 
and culture and that when genetic counselors used metaphor they sometimes gave false 
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ideas to patients. For instance, she found that a disproportionate number of Spanish 
speaking women understood amniocentesis as a needle through a woman’s belly button 
into the baby’s umbilical cord (Rapp, 1999, p.83). She explained this misunderstanding 
as a result of an inappropriate metaphor for Spanish speakers and a cultural disconnect. It 
is interesting to note that most other research about genetic counseling and the 
presentation of prenatal screening from this time period do not mention cultural or 
socioeconomic variables relevant to the experience, This thread has been picked up in 
later work:  (Bhogal & Brunger, 2010; Browner et al., 2003; Hunt & deVoogd, 2003; 
Hunt & de Voogd, 2005;  Hunt, de Voogd, & Castañeda, 2005; Teman, Ivry, & 
Bernhardt, 2011).  
2.7.4 Carole Browner and Nancy Press (USA, Anthropology). 
Carole Browner and Nancy Press have produced a wide range of work about prenatal 
screening together and separately (Browner et al., 2003; Browner et al., 2003; Browner & 
Press, 1996; Browner et al., 1996; Browner et al., 1996; Markens, Browner, & Press, 
1999; Markens et al., 2010; Markens et al., 2010; Press et al., 1998;  Press & Browner, 
1995; Press & Browner, 1997; Root & Browner, 2001).  Much of this work focuses on 
the experience of Latinas in the southwestern United States, although a few of their 
articles concern American women generally.  In their 1997 article about the acceptance of 
prenatal screening, Press and Browner (1997) found that the attitude of the health care 
practitioner was of great importance when predicting whether or not women would 
accept prenatal screening. In clinics that had great support and pressure towards patient 
acceptance of prenatal screening, acceptance rates were double the national average. 
Genetic counselors, nurses, and doctors were observed as tending to downplay the risk of 
prenatal screening and concentrate on the physical test rather than the emotional and 
ethical implications. They directed patient attention to the fact that the Maternal Serum 
Alpha Fetoprotein (MSAFP) test was a blood test and often grouped this screening test 
with other routine prenatal blood tests for anemia or diabetes. In many cases, pregnant 
women did not understand what they were being tested for, much less ideas of risk status 
and the consequences of receiving a high risk result. Browner and Press (1995) suggest 
that there is pressure on health care professionals to ensure a high uptake of prenatal 
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screening tests among their patients, due to a climate of medical malpractice suits. 
Physicians may wish to protect themselves from “wrongful birth” and “wrongful life” 
suits (Cowan, 1993) by providing all the information possible, even if it is not wanted. In 
another study, Browner and Press found that women’s stated opinions about disabled 
people were often in direct opposition to their decisions about whether or not to abort a 
fetus with a genetic condition that would cause disability (Press et al, 1998). In their 
study of serum screening in California, Browner and Press found that HMO-employed 
health professionals went out of their way to secure “compliance” with the test, often 
assuming consent unless a patient indicated explicitly that she did not wish to have the 
test done (Press & Browner, 1994). These health care providers used language that was 
very persuasive as well as conversational tactics to direct patient attention to the logistics 
of the test rather than other issues.  Women were informed that MSAFP screened for 
vague conditions such as “birth defects in the baby” or that prenatal screening “shows us 
how your baby is developing” without information about specific conditions or the 
physical or emotional implications of raising a child with those conditions (Press & 
Browner, 1991). Press and Browner are very critical of this stance and have written a 
number of articles in opposition to the techniques used by the counselors they studied 
(Press & Browner 1992, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1998, Browner & Press 1995). 
2.7.5 Theresa Marteau (United Kingdom, Health Psychology). 
Theresa Marteau is a health psychologist who has conducted a prolific amount of 
quantitative and qualitative research on prenatal screening, focusing on the topic of 
informed decision-making. Marteau's early work describes a dire state of decision-
making in the United Kingdom.  For instance, Marteau and her colleagues (1992) taped 
102 consultations between patients and obstetricians or midwives.  They found that most 
consultations focused on the procedural information about the test and that little specific 
information was given about the conditions the test screened for, the meaning of negative 
and positive results, or the limitations of the test (false positives, false negatives, 
conditions not tested for). On only two occasions (of 102 interviews) were women 
informed that a negative test result does not mean that the fetus would be unaffected.  In 
over half of the consultations, women were not asked to make a decision to choose the 
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test, but were told it was a routine test.  Marteau attributes the hospital’s 90% uptake rate 
to the fact that women were provided with incorrect and misleading information, or that 
important information was often omitted. This uptake rate is astounding, considering 
Rapp (1999) found hospitals with an uptake rate as low as 30%. Another Marteau 
publication (Smith, Slack, Shaw & Marteau, 1994) suggested that incorrect and 
misleading information provided to women may be a result of a lack of knowledge about 
prenatal screening and testing by the health professionals counseling about these tests. 
Inadequate knowledge to counsel about prenatal screening and testing has also been 
found amongst British and Australian physicians. (Sadler, 1997;Tyzack & Wallace, 
2003).  
Smith, Shaw and Marteau (1994) found that counseling usually focuses on the procedural 
nature of the test and neglects counseling components. They attribute the high uptake of 
screening tests to the inadequate provision of information. In their study of 353 pregnant 
women offered serum screening for Down Syndrome, it was found that after counseling, 
most women did not understand that: most positive test results are false and women will 
often have unaffected babies, negative test results do not guarantee a unaffected baby, 
about 5% of women are recalled for further, more invasive testing. Only 38% of women 
understood that the test being offered was for Down syndrome (Smith et al, 1994). 
Supported by both her own empirical research and a review of existing literature, 
Marteau (1995) found that prenatal screening/testing programs are rife with issues of 
poor understanding, anxiety, and with false reassurance.  Marteau's career has focused on 
improving the state of informed decision-making in prenatal screening and testing 
(Marteau & Dormandy, 2011). To this end, Marteau has examined ways of promoting 
and measuring informed decisions. 
Marteau has examined the efficacy of different ways of presenting information (Loeben, 
Marteau & Wilfond, 1998; Marteau et al, 2000; Michie, Lester, Pinto & Marteau, 2005) 
including an empirical study of non-directiveness. She found  that directive statements 
were prevalent in the genetic counseling visits observed, particularly when counselees 
were of lower socioeconomic status or judged by counselors to be highly concerned. 
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Neither counselors, counselees nor the standardized rating scale concluded that these 
sessions were conducted in a non-directive way (Michie et al, 2005). 
Marteau, with colleagues Susan Michie and Elizabeth Dormandy, have offered an 
influential definition of informed choice as one which is "based on relevant knowledge, 
consistent with the decision-maker's values and behaviourally implemented" (Marteau, 
Dormandy & Michie, 2001 p.99). They developed a multi-dimensional validated measure 
to determine how often decisions about prenatal screening can be characterized as 
informed (Michie, Dormandy & Marteau, 2003; Marteau & Dormandy, 2001; Marteau, 
Dormandy & Michie 2001). This measure has been cited over 200 times, and used in 
screening contexts such as breast cancer (Sepucha, Ozanne, Silvia, Partridge, & Mulley, 
2007), colorectal cancer (McCaffery, Wardle, & Waller, 2003), cardiovascular risk 
(Marteau & Kinmonth, 2002). Marteau is still actively publishing in this area; her recent 
work has examined the role of ambivalence to making a decision about prenatal 
screening (Dormandy et al., 2006; Sapp et al., 2010). 
2.7.6 Recent contributions to the literature. 
The scholarly legacy left by Lippman, Browner & Press, Rapp, Rothman and Marteau 
continues to inform current work about prenatal screening. This literature is reviewed in 
each of the four manuscripts (Chapter 5-8), so in the interests of avoiding repetition, an 
additional review is not included here. Prevailing themes in this literature include an 
emphasis on promoting autonomous choice (Seavilleklein, 2009; Williams et al., 2002b; 
Williams, 2006) by examining the ways information is provided by clinicians (Bhogal & 
Brunger, 2010; McKenzie, 2004; Pilnick et al., 2004;  Pilnick, 2008); patient education 
materials (Dahl et al., 2006; Fox, 2006; Sanderson, Wardle, & Michie, 2005; Stapleton, 
Kirkham, & Thomas, 2002); decision-making processes (Dahl et al., 2011; Gagnon et al., 
2010; Legare et al., 2011; Schwennesen et al., 2010; St-Jacques et al., 2008);  and the 
experiences of women deciding about prenatal screening in particular social contexts 
(Cavanagh, Mathews, & Crane, 2007; Ekelund et al., 2008; Gottfreðsdóttir & Árnason, 
2011; Gourounti & Sandall, 2008; Hodgson et al., 2010; Hunt & deVoogd, 2003; Park & 
Mathews, 2009a; Park & Mathews, 2009b; Teman et al., 2011; van Berkel & van der 
Weele, 1999).   
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2.8 Conclusion 
The context of prenatal screening in Canada has changed significantly since 2007 with 
the introduction of the SOGC guidelines (Summers, 2007), with prenatal screening now 
being offered to all pregnant women, rather than just those over the age of 35. This 
guideline assured consistency across Canada. The literature indicates there are some 
significant problems with the values that predicate prenatal screening, the process in 
which it is introduced, and the choices that are offered. There are significant implications 
to the lives of women, children, and people with disabilities. By investigating the way in 
which prenatal screening is currently taking place, the aim of this research is to gain 
insight into current practices, and to explore avenues for improving women’s experience, 
as well as  the education and future practices of health care practitioners in this important 
area. 
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3 Epistemological and Theoretical Perspectives 
3.1 Introduction  
Continuing with the metaphor of the bricoleur (Levi-Strauss, 1962) introduced in Chapter 
1, in this chapter I set the stage for my bricolage, describing the foundational knowledge 
that informs my approach and my choice of tools for this project. In this research, I have 
engaged with two epistemological perspectives, constructionism and critical social 
theory, and the theoretical lens of feminist bioethics. I begin by describing the way I 
understand constructionism, the critical social theories I engage with, and the points of 
congruency between the two.  I then outline the work of several scholars who have 
influenced my approach to feminist bioethics, and contributed to the way I think about 
prenatal screening. 
Switching metaphors, I conceptualize my epistemological and theoretical approach as 
combining different lenses to see something unique, something which was perhaps 
visible, but out of focus in each individual lens. Bateson (1979) describes binocular 
vision as the confluence of two different but compatible perspectives which, when used 
together, have the ability to create new understandings. To expand upon the metaphor, 
each lens of a pair of binoculars has a particular scope, or field of focus, which shows the 
object of the looker’s gaze in a particular way. An individual lens may bring particular 
objects into focus while obscuring others. When both lenses are combined, a different 
scene comes into view, a scene which is more than the sum of what was seen through 
each individual lens. I use the metaphor of “lens” here to describe the influence that a 
collection of theoretical perspectives has on the way I see the world.  
3.2 Epistemological Underpinnings: Constructionist and 
Critical Perspectives 
3.2.1 Constructionist. 
There is significant confusion and conflation surrounding constructivist and 
constructionist perspectives. Within both the ivist and the ionist categories there are many 
different iterations. Briefly, the distinction between ivist and ionist theories can be 
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summarized as follows: constructivism most accurately describes "epistemological 
considerations focusing exclusively on the ‘meaning-making activity of the individual 
mind’"; constructionism  "is used when the focus includes ‘the collective generation [and 
transmission] of meaning’” (Crotty, 1998, p.58). These perspectives do not exist in 
isolation, but can be conceptualized as existing upon a continuum, with those focused on 
subject-centered meaning making (meaning making activity of the individual mind) at 
one end, and socially centered meaning making (social generation of meaning) at the 
other (Crotty, 1998).   
Constructionism is not defined by clear cut boundaries, especially since it has been 
adopted by several different disciplines and has evolved in several directions at once 
(Gubrium & Holstein, 2008). Weinberg (2008) defines social constructionism as an 
attempt to demonstrate “how certain states of affairs that others have taken to be eternal 
and/or beyond the reach of social influence are actually products of specific 
sociohistorical and/or social interactional processes” (pg. 14).  The way that these 'states 
of affairs' are produced by sociohistorical and social interactional processes, to a large 
extent in the absence of the intent or consciousness of the individual, is the one of the 
main epistemological claims of social constructionism.  Constructionism focuses on 
discourse and interaction as some of the methods through which meaning is produced in 
society. Discourse is a key term in constructionist theory and one which has many 
meanings; I understand discourse in the Foucauldian sense. Mills (2003) emphasizes the 
multiple and sometimes contradictory ways that Foucault uses the word “discourse”. One 
of the most widely cited definitions is found in The Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault, 
1972), and that is the definition I choose to work with. Foucault (1972) defines discourse 
as a group of institutionalized statements (including any type of utterance) about a 
particular topic (or object) that function socially by forming that topic. A discourse is a 
regulated group of statements that can combine with other discourses in predictable ways. 
There are  
rules which lead to the distribution and circulation of certain utterances and 
statements … but rather than seeing discourse as simply a set of statements which 
have some coherence, we should think of a discourse as existing because of a 
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complex set of practices which try to keep them in circulation and other practices 
which try to keep other statements out of circulation. (Mills 2003, pg. 54)  
According to Blood (2005), discourse, or group of statements is the manifestation of 
thought into language and can both transmit and produce power, defining the ways we 
can talk or think about a topic (or object), and therefore defining the truth of that topic (or 
object). Discourse shapes and constrains our ways of understanding the world, by acting 
as a system that structures our perceptions of reality. By understanding Foucault’s 
conception of the way that discourse operates, we can see that social construction (as it 
uses the methods of discourse and interaction- or the social process of discourse) can be 
used as a way to effect social change, especially by challenging authoritative accounts of 
the way the world is in order to foster participation in effecting change (Gergen, 1999). 
One of the seminal texts on social construction, The Social Construction of Reality, by 
Berger and Luckmann (1966), declares that “language used in everyday life continuously 
provides me with the necessary objectifications and posits the order within which these 
make sense and within which everyday life has meaning for me” (pg. 22). Social 
construction also holds that discourse affects and is affected by social relationships, 
structures, and organization (Gergen, 1999). Through this statement, Gergen emphasizes 
the collective nature of meaning generation, through language and other social processes. 
The emphasis on the importance of discourse is particularly strong in psychological 
accounts of constructionism (Gergen, 1999; Hibberd, 2005), and postmodern (Saussure, 
1983), and poststructuralist (Foucault, 1977) uses of constructionism. Sociological 
accounts of constructionism focus more on social interactions and processes (Gubrium & 
Holstein, 2008). 
“Social processes” can be a vague and confusing term, perhaps best explained by Fish 
(1990). Crotty (1998) quotes Fish (1990) declaring that all objects are made through 
society and convention, rather than simply found. There are social institutions and 
conventions in which we are already embedded and through which we make meaning 
(constructivist) and meaning is made through us (constructionist): “these institutions are 
the source of the interpretive strategies whereby we construct meaning” (Crotty 1998, pg. 
53). 
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From a social constructionist perspective, humans are understood to use meaning made 
by the social world and to interact with the world as it makes meaning through them, 
therefore the historical and social context of the world is revealed as important in this 
meaning-making activity (Crotty, 1998). From a social constructionist perspective, 
people do not make meaning by interacting with each and every phenomenon, they are 
born into a world full of cultural meaning and people come to make their own meaning 
through meanings and discourses that already exist (Crotty, 1998). Crotty (1998) offers a 
summary of this perspective: 
We enter a social milieu in which a ‘system of intelligibility’ prevails. We inherit 
a ‘system of significant symbols’. For each of us, when we first see the world in 
meaningful fashion, we are inevitably viewing it through lenses bestowed upon us 
by our culture. Our culture brings things into view for us and endows them with 
meaning and, by the same token, leads us to ignore other things. (p.54) 
Crotty warns against the misconception that the social in social constructionism refers to 
the type of object that has meaning (for example, that a rock cannot be socially 
constructed). He clarifies that it refers to the way meaning is made (perhaps the rock 
itself was not made through social construction, but the way we understand what that 
rock is, what it can do, and how it can be used is socially constructed).  For example, 
objects in the natural world have meaning that is made socially, and it is the social aspect 
which leads us to a particular interpretation of these objects, guiding our interpretation to 
emphasize and ignore certain other aspects.   
3.2.1.1 Hacking’s (1999) constructionism. 
Canadian philosopher Ian Hacking (1999) has written a persuasive text that asks the 
following critical questions of constructionist theory: What is socially constructed? How 
far does social construction stretch? Are there different types of social construction?  
Hacking identifies that most constructionist scholars start with the meaning, or definition, 
of social construction but do not ask what the point of social construction is. By 
interrogating the purpose of social construction,  Hacking has created a version of social 
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constructionism that is readily applicable to critical research.  Hacking states that most 
social constructionist statements are based on local claims. A local claim is a claim about 
the constructed nature of a specific thing (X).  Local claims may be influenced by 
overarching claims, but their point is to raise consciousness about something specific (X).  
They are (in principle) independent of each other. For instance, an individual could 
support the local claim that workplace gender roles are socially constructed, but refute the 
claim that starvation, or the boy scouts, or gravity is socially constructed.  Hacking points 
out that it is a very different kind of social construction that sees danger as socially 
constructed than that which sees reality or women refugees as socially constructed.  He 
thinks it is possible to see concepts as socially constructed, but objects as not constructed.  
That is not to say that the meaning, use, connotation, feeling etc. of the object is not 
constructed, just that the object itself is not constructed. Hacking cautions that most 
constructionists conflate the object with its meaning.  
Hacking makes the astute observation that most people who use social construction want 
to show the arbitrary nature of a specific thing (X) as a starting point to criticize, change, 
or destroy.  They might employ a social constructionist approach to recognize that X is 
taken for granted or established by the order of things, and then further use a 
constructionist approach to uproot this opinion of X as inevitable,  hoping to change the 
way that people think about X or the way in which X operates in the world. Within this 
observation, Hacking also notices that people seem to have grades of commitment to 
social construction, but there is little room in traditional constructionist theory to identify 
different levels of commitment.  Commitment to social construction may be assessed by 
asking “what are we saying when we say X is socially constructed?” Hacking suggests 
that depending on our level of commitment to constructionism, we may be stating one or 
more of the following: X is taken for granted; X appears inevitable; X is not determined 
by the nature of things; X is not inevitable; X is quite bad as it currently is; X would be 
better if it was done away with or radically transformed. Hacking then expands this 
theory to include several different types of social construction.  
Hacking's vision of social construction describes a perspective filled with infinite small 
differences, with the universalist notion of social construction on one end of the 
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continuum and what I will term “partial construction” on the other. Within this 
continuum he identifies 6 stances: Historical, Ironic, Unmasking, Reformist, Rebellious, 
and Revolutionary (Hacking, 1999, p. 19).   
3.2.1.2 How I understand constructionist theory. 
Within Hacking’s work I am able to find an increasingly sure foothold for my own 
constructionist stance.  I identify with the “Unmasking” type of social constructionism. 
Within this type of constructionism,  I do not seek to refute ideas (necessarily) but to 
unmask them by exposing the function they serve, to strip them of their false appeal or 
false authority.  Hacking identifies that some “Unmasking” constructionists may also 
(although not necessarily) be “Reformist” constructionists. Reformist constructionism 
believes that X is quite bad. They have no idea how to live without X but by 
understanding that X is not inevitable, they can modify some aspects of it to make it less 
objectionable. While I identify mainly with the Unmasking stance, I also appreciate 
aspects of Reformist stance, particularly the hope to modify aspects of X. 
I situate myself in a constructionism that recognizes the power of discourse and social 
institutions to shape the meanings that people live within. In order to recognize that 
discourse and institutions can have a real effect, one must embrace a certain amount of 
what I have termed “partial world construction” after the writings of Hacking (1999) and 
Harris (2008). From Harris' (2008) objective sociological constructionism (OSC),  I take 
the aspect which emphasizes that an individual’s understanding of her life, her self, and 
her world is influenced by the power exercised through social institutions, formal or 
informal. I draw from social constructionism an emphasis on the importance of discourse 
as the vehicle through which one articulates the parameters of her world and herself. I 
believe, like OSC thinkers, that these constructions have the power to effect real change; 
that family relationships are real, not just the “putative interpretations of relationships” 
and that many people experience the forces of racism, classism, ageism, and sexism as 
changing their realities, and not just their perception or interpretation of what is real. 
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3.3 Critical Social Theoretical Perspective 
My critical social theory perspective is at the nexus of several inter-related topics: the 
ways in which medicalization, normalization and risk function as forms of social control 
which are intrinsically related to Foucault’s ideas of power/knowledge and 
governmentality. It is important to note that Foucault’s conceptual ideas overlapped 
considerably with one another, and continued to evolve throughout his life, as did the 
interpretations and applications of his work. Most of the writers I draw upon to 
understand the topics of medicalization and risk are indebted to Foucault. I begin by 
introducing the topic of medicalization before providing an outline of the main 
Foucauldian concepts that inform this work. This ordering was chosen to provide context 
for my explanation and interpretations of Foucault. I will then move on to discuss various 
ideas of risk. Throughout this section I provide explicit links between prenatal screening 
and the ideas I am engaging with. While headings have been added throughout as an aid 
to the reader, it should be noted that the ideas are inter-linked and the  divisions made by 
the headings are somewhat artificial.  
3.3.1 Medicalization. 
 Following a review of the literature, Morgan’s (1998) definition of medicalization 
remains my favourite, for its simplicity and impact. Morgan starts with a standard 
definition by one of the seminal thinkers on the topic, Peter Conrad. Conrad and 
Schneider (1980) see medicalization as the unintentional or intentional expansion of the 
domain of medical jurisdiction. Morgan politicizes the term, declaring that successful 
medicalization involves a culture that supports “the legitimacy of using medical concepts, 
theories, and discourses to describe medicalized life phenomena and the acceptance of 
the use of medical interventions to 'treat' them" (pg. 85). This may not seem overtly 
political, however the ensuing explanation of the dialectic nature of the process of 
medicalization completes this definition. Morgan sees medicalization as necessitating a 
dialectical relationship between micro-institutionalizations (through self management and 
doctor-patient relations), macro-institutionalizations, and societal conceptualizations.  In 
short, medicalization is not something that is simply imposed on people by the institution 
of medicine. Medicine does not expand its jurisdiction through a creeping invasion of 
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territory as conceptualized by Zola (1972). Morgan makes the point that people must 
accept or acquiesce to the new jurisdiction that medicine proposes for itself, thereby 
becoming implicit in the process of medicalization. As an example of this implicitness, 
sometimes people request increased medical surveillance, or medical definitions of 
formerly non-medical problems.  Conrad and Schneider (1980) discuss several examples 
of this, such as the lobby for alcoholism to be classified as a disease. I view Morgan’s 
definition as political because I read Foucault’s conception of bio-power, 
governmentality, and normalization into the idea that people must accept, acquiesce, and 
even request participation in this new jurisdiction of medicine. I see her definition as 
related to social construction because of her emphasis on the dialectical nature of the 
relationship between the individual and the institutions, and between institutions. 
Morgan’s definition of medicalization also emphasizes the way that social forces can 
create new needs, opinions, and discourses at the level of the individual. Morgan also 
recognizes that not all people, indeed, not all women, are medicalized to the same extent- 
other social forces shape the relationship between an individual and the institutions of 
medicalization. 
Morgan posits that there are three contextual conditions that successful medicalization 
requires: First, the domain (e.g. sexual satisfaction) /process (e.g. menopause) /topic (e.g. 
alcoholism) currently becoming a medicalized problem must be defined in medical terms 
through assimilation into medical paradigms or theories. This problem must be 
describable through medical discourse. Second, medical authorities must be seen as the 
only legitimate authorities in terms of having knowledge and control over the problem. 
They must have the means to apply this knowledge to the medically defined problem.  
Third, there must be widespread acceptance of the dominant medical conceptualization of 
this problem. This process of successful medicalization has the effect of transferring “the 
locus of pathology from society to the individual” (Figlio, 1983, p. 232 as cited in 
Wilkerson, 1998). As medicalization becomes more politicized (by transferring 
responsibility from society to the individual), social roots of problems are obscured. 
Prenatal screening provides an example of this. As screening technology advances, the 
responsibility for the support of individuals with disabilities moves from society (in terms 
of supportive housing, health care, recreation) to the individual (responsibility of mother 
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to prevent individual with disability from being born). The onus placed on women to 
detect and abort fetuses with disabilities may obscure the responsibility of society to help 
all people live to their full potential.  
By discussing the context, process, and interactions which necessitate successful 
medicalization of a domain, process, or topic, Morgan demonstrates the many levels upon 
which medicine’s social control may operate. This is in contrast to definitions offered by 
Zola (1972), and Conrad and Schneider (1980) who view medicalization as a 
contextually opportunistic colonization or Wilkerson (1998) who describes 
medicalization as a conscious affront against women in an effort to exert control. More 
nuanced discussions of medicalization involve descriptions of why women  pursue 
medicalization. Again, there are multiple layers  to this question. Some theorists describe 
the benefits of medicalization- it offers legitimacy to a perceived problem, efforts and 
resources to solve the problem, and social acknowledgement of the problem (Conrad & 
Schneider 1992). Conrad and Schneider (1992) see medicine’s capacity for social control 
as a way to “secure adherence to social norms using medical terms to minimize, 
eliminate, or normalize” (p. 242). Others discuss the way social control operates twice: 
once to convince a person she has a problem and then again to convince her that medicine 
is the answer (Lock, 2001).  Kathryn Pauly Morgan conceptualizes an even more 
complicated approach. The processes  of medicalization do not just operate on people, 
but are also  put into motion by people. Her idea of how micro (i.e. medicalized 
subjectivity, the gaze) and macro (i.e. social, economic, political, symbolic forms) 
institutional factors interact with medicine  echoes the social constructionist tenet that 
society shapes and is shaped by its members (socially constructed knowledges) and the 
Foucauldian idea that power is exercised by enabling people to act in order to constrain 
them (Foucault, 1978).  Morgan (1998) sees the “ordinary life world” (p.87) as shaping 
and as shaped by conceptualizations of medicine, macro-institutional effects, micro-
institutional effects (through self management and through doctor-patient relations). All 
of these institutions shape each-other as well as the “ordinary life world”. 
 In The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault (1973) discusses how social control was at one time 
exerted through the church, upon the soul. Foucault suggests that as the social power of 
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church began to decline, medicine filled the void of power by exerting control over the 
body. Foucault contends that medicine exerts control over the body through disciplinary 
tactics: by regulating its forces and operations, as well as the economy and efficiency of 
bodily movements. Conrad (2007) describes several contextual forces that promote 
medicalization: a decline of religious influence; a rise in scientific authority; a rise in 
trends toward individualism, technological solutions, and humanitarian concern.  As the 
authority of scientific knowledge increased, knowledge was re-defined as that which is 
measurable, objective, irrefutable, and neutral. Medical authority increased concurrently 
due to claims based on a similar epistemic base. Instrumentation was a large part of the 
authority of this knowledge. After all, the scientific paradigm holds that instruments 
cannot lie. Instruments also appeal to the desire for observable and measurable 
knowledge popularized by science (Wilkerson 1998). Foucault (1973) states that 
medicine’s normative moral authority is located in its epistemology, and that knowledge 
about the body is both the effect and a condition of the exercise of power (Foucault, 
2003).  
But what is the relationship between medicalization and prenatal screening? As 
medicalization has normalized and promoted prenatal screening, the implications, 
purposes, and practices of pregnancy have changed. As prenatal screening becomes more 
normalized and therefore more frequent, social support and acceptance for people with 
disabilities has become increasingly rare. Taylor (2008) notes that  an increasing amount 
of money, time, technology, and effort has been spent incorporating technology into 
finding (and aborting) fetuses with disabilities. Comparably, very little time, effort, and 
money has been spent ameliorating social inequalities that demonstrably produce similar 
health problems.  
Medicalization has a curious affect on issues such as the ones mentioned above. When 
problems become subsumed into the institution of medicine, they are removed from 
discussion amongst ordinary citizens in the public realm, and become part of the medical 
realm, where only  people with medical authority may discuss or critique them (Conrad 
& Schneider, 1992). I think this has two potential effects. First, there are few ways for 
citizens to express opinions about what they think is acceptable medical practice or 
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behaviour. Would citizens choose widespread prenatal screening? We don’t know since 
there has never been public debate because  the topic is in the realm of medical authority.  
Second, are individual women able to choose what they want to do? Some might say yes, 
since prenatal screening is an optional procedure that incorporates an informed decision-
making process. 
3.3.2 Normalization.  
 I appeal to the notion of normalization when considering these questions. Normalization 
can be understood here in two ways: normalization of the screening test and 
normalization of ways of being. Considering normalization of the screening test, Susan 
Sherwin (2001) states that women are well conditioned to comply with medical advice 
and direction about their pregnancies. This ideology of compliance is hard to resist 
because it is built upon the discourse of protecting the unborn child. Women who may 
not wish to have prenatal screening, or other types of medical intervention, may feel 
obligated to participate.  Sherwin (2001) questions the autonomy2 available to a woman 
considering ultrasound. She finds that the normalization of the technology places an 
enormous burden of proof on those who do not want to participate. Each use of the 
technology consolidates its “necessity” and the power and control of those who provide 
it.  Seavilleklein (2009) makes a similar point about normalization: “the very offer of 
screening, however it is framed, may create a perceived need for testing, especially when 
screens have been selected and implemented by the medical system; this decision 
establishes screening as a legitimate use of scarce medical resources and thereby 
surreptitiously underlines its importance” (p. 75). Sherwin (2001) also argues that the 
technology medicine uses to examine the fetus distances the mother from her pregnancy. 
The constant testing may create anxiety. This distance and anxiety has the effect of 
making the mother more reliant on her physician, increasing the sense of dependence and 
minimizing reproductive autonomy. 
                                                 
2
 See the literature review for a lengthy discussion of different conceptions of autonomy in prenatal 
screening 
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Concerning normalization of ways of being, medicine’s inclination to measure and 
compare people has created a body of numerical information that defines normal as 
average. This allows medicine to compare people based on whether or not their traits fall 
in or outside of the norm. If they are outside, they are encouraged (or coerced) to engage 
in treatment or practices which bring them closer to the norm (Lupton, 1999a). The 
Human Genome Project has intensified this idea of “normal”. By mapping the human 
genome, scientists have produced a definition of “genetically normal”. Unfortunately, no 
one individual meets that baseline norm- individual genomes show infinite variations. In 
other words, we are all deviants (Lock, 2001). If one questions whether any of us are 
genetically “normal”, a challenging question is raised: What gives any  institution the 
authority to declare particular genetic compositions as better or worse than others?   
The notion of risk is intrinsically linked to normalization- for example, genetics does not 
always explicitly refer to “normality” or “deviation”, but uses the idea of risk to express 
this concept (Waldschmidt, 2005). “High-risk” people are those singled out as requiring 
expert knowledge and surveillance in order to become normal.  Lupton (1999a) sees two 
kinds of medical risk: clinical risk (deviation from characteristics observed in case 
studies) and epidemiological risk (deviation from observations of patterns identified with 
associated risk factors). These two types of observable risk serve to make risk calculable 
and governable, therefore making them problems that require action. This is the way that 
normality as risk is seen to govern women- by inciting them to take action to prevent risk.  
Any deviation from the statistical norm means that woman is high-risk, abnormal, and in 
need of medical surveillance. In prenatal screening, risk distribution is continuous, with 
no sharp definition of what is normal and what is high-risk (Waldschmidt, 2005). 
Notably, in pregnancy there is no “no-risk” category - all pregnant women are seen as at 
some level of risk and in need of expert surveillance.  The more prenatal screening tests 
are introduced, the more intensified discourses of risk become and the more choices a 
woman must make (Lupton, 1999a). These new tests exert a subtle (and sometimes, not-
so-subtle) pressure on women to conform by participating in the tests.  
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3.3.3 Foucault's governmentality & bio-power. 
It is impossible to discuss medicalization, normalization, and risk without talking about 
the ideas of Michel Foucault. I will introduce Foucault by talking about his idea of risk as 
a component of governmentality and then move on to provide a brief synopsis of how 
Foucault’s idea of governmentality informs his notions of risk, normalization and bio-
power. Finally, I discuss the ways in which these concepts are related to prenatal 
screening.  
Governmentality is a concept developed most fully during Foucault’s lectures at the 
College de France (Burchell et al, 1991). Governmentality is the basis of the technologies 
through which we become subjects, through which we police others and are policed 
ourselves. In this way, governmentality is an attitude associated with governance of self 
in order to allow the governance of others- it creates subjects in order to control them. 
The word “police” is very important- Foucault gave this word more meanings than we 
typically associate it with in English, and defines it relative to the sublimation of the 
individual into the social entity (see Barker, 1998 for a full explanation).   
 Foucault’s construction of risk as a method of governmentality, as discussed in his 1978-
79 lectures at the College de France, is particularly relevant to risk in prenatal screening 
(Foucault, 2008). He contends that risk is formed by expert knowledges that provide 
guidelines and advice by which populations are governed. They do this by comparing 
things against norms and training people to conform with these norms (and thus be 
rendered productive). Central to this theory is the idea of normalization (Foucault, 1978). 
Foucault’s normalization is a form of social control whereby norms are constructed and 
those who adhere to those norms are rewarded while those who deviate are punished. 
Normalization and governmentality are enacted by technologies of mass surveillance, 
monitoring, observation, and measurement. They help maintain disciplinary power, by 
ensuring that people discipline themselves and each other, creating productive and docile 
bodies (Foucault, 1977). Normalization and governmentality are also seen to construct 
understandings of bodies in space and time and use these understandings as a disciplinary 
tool. From this Foucauldian perspective, risk is understood as a disciplinary strategy of 
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regulatory power by which populations and individuals are monitored and managed 
(Lupton, 1999b). 
Foucault’s concept of normalization can be used to understand the appeal of prenatal 
screening. Foucault sees two possible ways for power to act: negatively (juridico-
discursive) through repression or positively (bio-power), through enablement and self-
surveillance.  Foucault has used the term “juridical” to describe negative power in a way 
that draws attention to its relation with the law and law enforcement. This type of power 
forbids, prevents, and restrains. It “is poor in its resources, sparing of its methods and 
monotonous in the tactics it utilizes, incapable of invention, and seemingly doomed 
always to repeat itself … the power to say no” (Foucault, 1978, p.85). Foucault sees the 
second type of power (bio-power) as more interesting and more effective because it can 
overcome the paradox that paralyzes juridical power. Juridical power is paralyzed 
because of a paradox in its function: it is incapable of doing anything except rendering its 
target also incapable of doing anything.  Bio- power is an agent of transformation in 
human life, bringing life and bodily mechanisms into the realm of knowable, calculable 
things (Foucault 1978). This causes life, the body, and bodily mechanisms to be subject 
to power (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). The knowledge and measurability of life is central 
to the idea of normalization through medicalization. As human science developed, bodily 
mechanisms began to come under the control of the institution of medicine. Medicine 
measured, counted, calculated, and then formed ideas of “normal” which allowed it to 
appraise, hierarchize, judge, and draw a line between acceptable and unacceptable ways 
of being, beginning the process of normalization. Foucault saw normalization as the 
“outcome of a technology of power centered on life” (Foucault, 1978, p. 144). According 
to Foucault (2003), normalization can only function through knowledge; knowledge is 
both an effect and a condition of the exercise of normalizing power.  In a series of 
lectures given a year after the publication of The History of Sexuality (Vol 1), Foucault 
expanded on his ideas of normalization as an exercise of power that is linked to 
intervention and transformation (Foucault, 2003). He makes clear that, in his view, what 
is normal is not linked to any kind of natural law or principle of intelligibility, but is 
entirely socially constructed. Normalization does not make a clear distinction between 
those who are normal or abnormal, instead it works by making a series of fine and 
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constantly observed differences between individuals who are normal and those who are 
not.  
Foucault (1978) stated that the success of power “is proportional to its ability to hide its 
own mechanisms” (p. 86) and by this measure, bio-power succeeds admirably. By 
engaging with the process of normalization, bio-power works through enablement and 
coercion and through self-surveillance. Bio-power enables citizens to act in order to 
constrain them (Tremain, 2005). In contrast to the operation of negative juridical power 
(excluding, banishing, marginalizing, repressing), normalization fashions, observes, 
knows, includes, forms knowledge, functions through production, distributes according to 
individual capacities  and is linked to a series of mechanisms that secure formation, 
investment, accumulation and growth of knowledge (Foucault, 2003).  Normalization 
does repress, but only as a secondary effect (Foucault, 2003). 
Governance through normalization (bio-power) is an important idea to feminists. 
Although Foucault is widely criticized by the feminist community for failing to 
differentiate between the way that bio-power and normalization have operated differently 
on male and female bodies, his ideas have been taken up and furthered by feminist 
scholars. In many cases, ideas which are credited to Foucault were published in different 
forms in feminist literature prior to his work (Bordo, 1994). Bordo (1994) believes that 
the reason why bio-power produces and normalizes bodies is to serve prevailing relations 
of dominance and subordination. While Foucault (1977) denies the centralization of a 
power that is used to subordinate certain subjects more than others, stating that power is 
not held by any one group or person, but acts on and through all people - it is not 
authoritarian, conspiratorial, or orchestrated,  Bordo emphasizes the idea that people and 
groups are positioned differently within fields of power, stating that “no one may control 
the rules of the game, but not all players on the field are equal” (Bordo, 1994, p. 232).   
Tremain (2005) sees practices of bio-power as central to the emergence of the disabled 
subject. Normalization and medicalization of human life have “created, classified, coded, 
and controlled social anomalies by which some people are divided from others and 
objectivized” (Tremain, 2005, p. 6). As measurement of human function gave way to 
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statistics, people became individualized through practices of division, classification, and 
ordering around a norm. Individuals came to identify themselves in relation to this norm, 
thereby making themselves subjects to this bio-political form of government.  
Following this idea, prenatal screening might be conceptualized by some as a method of 
governmentality that may encourage subjects to normalize themselves (and their unborn 
children). Prenatal screening may create resistance to difference and encourages subjects 
to do what is necessary to engage in societal normalization. The practice of prenatal 
screening may be cloaked in the rhetoric of “choice”, autonomy, and reassurance 
(Lippman, 1991; Seavilleklein, 2009). Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) point out that belief 
that one is resisting repression (by acting autonomously and making choices) actually 
supports domination and normalization by hiding the real workings of power.  This 
rhetoric of choice is a strong example of the way that citizens may be governed through 
enabling action in order to constrain (Tremain, 2005). In this way, the “choice” presented 
by prenatal screening may also be seen as a risk to the health of women, children, and 
people with disabilities (Lippman, 1991). Prenatal screening may also be viewed as 
related to Foucault’s idea that statistical normality is a form of government. The whole 
idea of risk status is based on statistical normality, stratified by age. Value judgments of 
standard deviation and definitions of the mean (Waldschmidt, 2005) have become the 
basis for decisions of risk, further diagnostic testing, and pregnancy termination. 
3.3.4 Risk. 
Lupton (1999a) sees pregnant women as surrounded by a “complex network of 
discourses and practices directed at the surveillance and regulation of the body” (p. 59) 
that intensify as they become more noticeably pregnant. Lupton links this risk discourse 
to Foucault’s (1978, 1991) conceptions of apparatuses of bio-politics in neo-liberal 
societies and efforts on the part of the state and other agencies to discipline and normalize 
citizens, to render them docile and productive bodies. Lupton (1999b) develops this 
argument further, to compare realist, weak, and strong constructionist conceptions of risk.  
Neo-liberalism is a modern political philosophy which aims to transfer control from the 
state to the private sector, ostensibly for an improved (free market) economy.  
Concerning health policy, neo-liberalism proposes a sort of constructivist governance- 
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proposing to make health directly accessible, through strategic (as opposed to 
naturalistic) policies and defining “health” not as an absolute concept but a series of 
measurable targets (Osborne, 1997).   
Strong constructionist conceptions of risk stem from Foucault. This viewpoint sees risk 
as socially and culturally created. Nothing in itself is a risk, but according to risk 
discourse, everything has the possibility to be risky. Risk is not embedded in an 
individual; it is a combination of a number of factors that produce the likelihood of an 
action being deemed unacceptable by social norms. Risk does not exist in reality, only in 
the culture that created it. Risk discourse is a central component to ensure social order.  
Lupton  discusses the way in which pregnant women are positioned in a network of 
surveillance, monitoring, measurement, and expert advice. This surveillance is enacted by 
authorities, members of the public, and  women  themselves as they self-monitor and self-
regulate in order to achieve norms created by knowledges of risk. The web of 
surveillance becomes clear when the regulation of pregnant behaviours is considered in 
terms of rules about diet, smoking, alcohol consumption and exercise. Lupton sees 
pregnant women as vulnerable to these governing surveillance strategies because to resist 
is to declare that one does not care about her own health and welfare or that of her fetus. 
In fact, many women demand more access to medical surveillance, including an 
increased number of ultrasounds to “alleviate anxieties and fears that the fetus is healthy” 
(Lupton,1999b, p. 90). This is an illustration of how medicalization requires the 
participation of its subjects. To refine Conrad and Schneider's (1980) colonization 
metaphor, medicalization does not conquer new territory with weapons, or when the 
native inhabitants are sick or sleeping, but rather tempts the inhabitants with new ideas 
and technologies, encouraging them to invite these items into their homes, extol their 
virtues to their friends and families,  and thereby create a niche and re-shape the daily 
lives of the inhabitants to the point that they no longer recognize the ideas and 
technologies as new or foreign.   
Lupton’s ideas of risk contribute to an understanding of why women engage in prenatal 
screening, why society supports prenatal screening without question, and the difficulty 
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women may have resisting societal norms by questioning medical methods of 
surveillance, monitoring and measurement.  
O’Byrne and Holmes (2007) take Lupton’s idea of risk even further by examining the 
way that risk operates in Plato’s The Good Citizen. O’Byrne and Holmes understand risk 
to be constructed through, among other ways, discourses, with definitions continually in 
flux to allow mechanisms of control to be synchronized with activities that are ‘risky’ to 
the society.  This is applicable to prenatal screening, where words such as “birth defect” 
create a discourse of what types of children are acceptable to society and what types are 
unacceptable and ‘risky’.   
One major criticism that feminist scholars raise with respect to Foucault is that by  
treating male and female bodies as the same, he does not problematize the gendered 
nature of power and  does not recognize that they have different relationships to 
institutions. Although Conrad (2007) sees medicalization as only marginally more active 
on female bodies, most authors in this area view medicalization as much more controlling 
to female bodies (ex. Bordo, 1994). Bartzky (1998) states that each woman lives her body 
as seen by another, an anonymous patriarchal other (p. 34) and that medicalization has 
more impact on women’s bodies as a result of this. Foucault is also criticized for the lack 
of agency he attributes to individuals. Many medicalization scholars see individuals as 
operating with the institution rather than being operated on, congruent with Foucault’s 
bio-power, but as in the discussion at the beginning of this section, it is often unclear if 
“operating with” is through acquiescence or agency (ex. Conrad & Schneider, 1992; 
Morgan, 1998; Reissman, 1998). Regardless of these criticisms, Foucault is a main 
contributor to theories of how medicalization acts as social control.  
3.3.5 Congruencies between critical and constructionist 
perspectives. 
If we accept  the constructionist assumption that what we understand about our world is 
not arbitrary and that we can fashion our own future by the ways we describe, explain, 
and represent the world (Gergen, 1999), we can see that constructionism invites us to re-
think our reality, to question the current traditions, practices, and “ways of doing”. 
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Critical constructionism asks us to pay special attention to the claims of those who 
purport to be objective and neutral.  Gergen invites us to ask ourselves the following 
questions: What are the repercussions of these ways of talking? Who gains? Who is hurt? 
Who is silenced? What traditions are sustained? Which are undermined? How do I judge 
the future we are creating? (Gergen, 1999, p. 62). These questions have informed my 
standpoint and my thinking on prenatal screening and the ways in which prenatal 
screening is discussed in various venues. 
Hosking (2008) sees critical questioning and constructionism to be congruent, reasoning 
that they can work together because constructionist theories “implicitly embrace 
metatheoretical assumptions that center a singular real-world reality (the assumption of 
ontology) and sharply distinguish this real-world reality from knowledge about it (the 
assumption of epistemology)” (p. 671).  This may be part of the confusion Hacking 
(1999) identifies in constructionist authors. What is the ontological belief and what is the 
epistemological belief? I believe the existence of an empirical,  real-world ontology and a 
constructionist epistemology is possible and that this combination can produce the 
possibility of critical constructionist questioning.  When I use my binocular critical-
constructionist lens, I must recognize the way that I am constructing what I see and 
acknowledge that the process of research is intrinsically linked with the product- there is 
no separation between the two.  
3.4 Theoretical Lens 
3.4.1 Feminist bioethics.  
It is well understood that feminism is not a singular or unitary theory, but rather a large 
and amorphous collection of ideas. The feminist work that I engage with to inform my 
theoretical lens is that of Abby Lippman, Susan Sherwin and Dorothy Smith. The work of 
these women is not necessarily fully congruent, but neither is it contradictory. The 
commonalities that I draw together  to compose my theoretical lens include a focus on 
everyday experience and the value of social justice for women and other marginalized 
groups.  
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The work of Abby Lippman has been described at length in Chapter 2, so is only briefly 
revisited here, to highlight the aspects which inform my theoretical lens. Lippman does 
not explicitly claim to be a theorist, but her body of work on prenatal screening suggests 
that she adopts a theoretical lens which equates ethics with social justice in everyday life. 
Lippman works within the constructionist paradigm to examine the way that dominant 
cultural constructions of concepts such as motherhood, gender, disease, disability affect 
the everyday lives of women, children, and people with disabilities. While she does not 
name her particular constructionist influences, she defines how and what she sees as 
constructed. In the following passage, she explores the construction of biological disease: 
Despite their biological reality, human diseases, disorders, and disabilities – the 
objects of prenatal screening- are not just physical or physiological states with 
fixed contours. Rather than being merely “out there” awaiting our discovery, they 
are social products with variable shapes and distributions that we fashion, 
interpret, and give meaning to via our beliefs, attitudes, values, and interests. 
Western biomedicine is our ethnomedicine, and it does not describe a pre-existing 
biological reality. Particular social and cultural assumptions (Wright & Treacher, 
1982) influence the scientific researchers who give the biological processes of 
observed diseases particular forms through their diagnostic labels and causal 
attributions. Those forms vary across different human groups and at different 
periods of time. How the processes are counted, defined, and studied, and how 
people are assigned to the categories created is necessarily context-specific, 
reflecting how those with power at any particular historical time construct a 
particular physiological or physical condition as a problem. (Lippman, 1994, 
p.12)  
When assumptions, discourse, and values are predicated on dominant knowledge, how 
can members of oppressed groups navigate institutional structures in a way that allows 
them to make their own choices and live in the way they want? For instance, would 
prenatal screening be needed for “reassurance” if dominant knowledge had not already 
“decided that certain women were at risk and that the condition for which the risk existed 
warranted diagnosis before the baby with it was born” (Lippman, 1994, p.16)?  Phrased 
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another way, where is individual choice when all the given options are constructed by 
someone or some institution that does not share the conditions that predicate the lives of 
the individuals being offered the choice? “Continuing a pregnancy when the fetus has 
been found to have Down syndrome cannot be considered a real option when society 
does not truly accept children with disabilities or provide assistance for their nurturance" 
(Lippman, 1994, p.19). Lippman sees the social world as stratified along lines of gender, 
race, class, and (dis) ability. When using this lens to study prenatal screening, a critical 
examination of the potential for reinforcing inequities and inequalities in health is 
important, as these inequities affect the way that choice can occur.  
Many choices are just not open to many women, in particular to those women 
who are kept poor, those with disabilities, racialized women, lesbians and so on 
(see Roberts, 1997). Seeing choice as gender (class, race, or otherwise) neutral 
hides the operations of power that construct choices, reaffirms existing privileges 
in society and, in general, glosses over the many differences between women that 
matter (Wolf, 1999). It ignores how access to economic and social resources is 
essential to freedom of choice and how freedom of choice cannot exist without 
secure social justice, what Petchesky (1993) calls the “conditions without which 
rights cannot be realised in practice”. It renders invisible the persisting absence of 
social justice for women. (Lippman, 1999b, p.282) 
Canadian philosopher Susan Sherwin (1992, 1998; McLeod & Sherwin 2000) has 
influenced my thinking through her conception of relational autonomy as an essential 
element of feminist bioethics. I have discussed relational autonomy at length in Chapter 
2. Elements of Sherwin’s theory which are useful for my theoretical lens include an 
acknowledgement of the way that power differentials between physicians (medical 
institution) and women may influence the decision making processes of women engaging 
with the medical system. The individual context and circumstances of a person greatly 
affect the options available to her- with this recognition, we can see that for some 
women, choosing to engage in prenatal screening and abortion may never be a truly free 
or autonomous choice. For others, who have more power and resources in the form of 
wealth, social status, and education, the choices presented by prenatal screening and 
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abortion may be closer to her own choices. For Sherwin, individual and societal context 
is essential to conceptions of autonomy. On a macro level, historical and political 
contexts influence bureaucratic decision makers which affect scientific and governmental 
funding agendas, therefore affecting the information and options women are required to 
use to make decisions about prenatal screening. For example, on a macro level context, 
our cultural emphasis on individualism can disguise elements at the source of decisions 
and problems, and fail to acknowledge the interconnected nature of power in society.  
Canadian sociologist Dorothy E. Smith informs my theoretical lens through her 
standpoint theory, which demands attention to contextual factors in order to promote 
social justice. Smith explicitly states that her theory is not a theoretical construct, but a 
place to begin inquiry (Smith, 1993). Smith’s work is useful not just as a place to begin 
inquiry but also as a lens through which every day practices can be considered and 
examined.  
Smith (1987) has, on occasion, been subsumed into the category of feminist standpoint 
theory (e.g. Naples, 2003), however Smith (1993) protests that her notion of standpoint is 
very different from Harding (1986) and contemporaries. For Smith, standpoint is an idea 
that aids in building a sociology of women’s lived experience. She uses it to explore how 
power dynamics are organized and experienced in the context of women’s everyday 
lives, paying specific attention to how social relations are embedded in this context. 
Smith provides a framework for conceptualizing community (women or other oppressed 
groups), starting with an active knower who is connected to others in particular, 
identifiable ways (Smith, 1992; Naples, 2003). However, this method does not privilege 
the knower, but rather shifts the ground of knowing to the social field. Smith (1992) sees 
knowledge as socially organized, therefore “never an act or an attribute of individual 
consciousness” (p. 91). Smith’s (1987) method of inquiry is concerned with the 
examination of “abstractions” and the ways in which these are combined with concepts 
and knowledge to become socially organized practices. Making these practices visible 
also makes visible the ways in which we participate in these practices and incorporate 
them into our own knowledges (Smith, 1993).  
107 
 
Smith (1990b, 1990a) has written about ways in which texts can act to organize social 
action, and can function to reveal the ways in which bureaucrats and institutions seek to 
organize social action. Using the metaphor of the text as a “crystal which bends the light 
as it passes through” (Smith, 1990b, p. 121), Smith suggests that the text can be seen as 
aiding social organization. “The operative part of a social relation is activated, of course, 
by the reader but its structuring effect is its [the text’s] own” (p. 121). By examining texts 
we can gain access to the “ontological ground of institutional processes which organize, 
govern, and regulate” (p. 122) society- although we may not normally acknowledge this, 
due to our habituation to texts. Through a close examination of texts we can also examine 
the ways in which facts are constructed to serve the purposes of particular groups, usually 
to the detriment of another group. “A fact is constructed in a definite institutional context, 
and its organization reflects that context. An inner coherence is established between the 
actuality thus represented and the statements that can be made about it” (Smith, 1990a, p. 
78). 
3.5 Conclusion 
Through a bricolage of critical and constructionist theories, my research questions the 
taken for granted notions of prenatal screening in an attempt to critically question the 
meanings and understandings of this test, and the ways in which they reflect the 
meanings and understandings of our broader society. With a focus on the individual 
situated location of women being offered and making a decision about whether or not to 
participate in prenatal screening, I seek to contribute to knowledge which explains and 
informs some of the opportunities and challenges they may face. 
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4 Methodology and Methods 
4.1 Introduction 
In the first part of this chapter, I outline the reflexive approach I use with Kathy 
Charmaz's Constructivist Grounded Theory, discuss the congruency between 
constructivist and constructionist visions of grounded theory, and address the issue of 
why I chose a grounded theory approach to the research. In the second part, I provide a 
detailed account of the methods I used for the three linked studies. 
4.2 Part 1: Methodology 
4.2.1 Reflexive research. 
Instead of treating reflexivity as a component of the methods section of this project, I 
consider it to be part of the methodology, necessary at each stage of the research process. 
The move towards reflexive methodologies is popular within feminist research, as it 
recognizes the “shifting positionalities of the researcher and participants ... [and] offers 
the opportunity for raising new questions, engaging in new kinds of dialogue, and 
organizing different kinds of social relations” (Hesse-Biber & Piatelli, 2007). 
Considering feminist research to be reflexive research allows many different kinds of 
methodologies, both quantitative and qualitative, to find a home in feminist scholarship- a 
famously broad and variable field. 
Reflexivity is an evolving topic, used and defined in many different ways. Since the 
purpose here is not to conduct a literature review on reflexivity, I outline the way I use  
the term and set aside other possible ways of considering it, not because they are without 
merit, but rather because this is outside the scope of this project. Loosely, I use reflexivity 
to mean positional reflexivity  (Koch & Harrington, 1998; Macbeth, 2001), or an 
examination of the social and individual contexts of researcher and participant as a means 
to deconstruct “dualities of power and anti-power, hegemony and resistance, and insider 
and outsider to reveal and describe how our representations of the world and those who 
live there are indeed positionally organized” (Macbeth, 2001, p. 38). The purpose of this 
kind of reflexivity is to seek “a critical understanding of ordinary worlds by reference to 
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larger but unnoticed arrangements and conditions” (Macbeth, 2001, p. 40). I think 
reflexivity is also important in considering the ways in which an individual’s position 
affects the way knowledge is constructed, and how the everyday world is interpreted, 
related to, and moved within.  
Sharlene Nagy Hesse-Biber and Deborah Piatelli (2007) outline the purpose of reflexive 
research: 
The purpose of research is not to validate a Truth, but to enable different forms of 
knowledge to challenge power. Multiple truths and diverse knowledges become 
the actual product of research when the subjectivity, location, and humanness of 
the knower are included. (Hesse-Biber & Piatelli, 2007, p. 498) 
Koch and Harrington (1998) discuss academic reflexivity as providing the opportunity to 
consciously consider how, why, and when research decisions are made, and how these 
decisions affect the research process and product. They encourage researchers to “sign-
post” their writing with reflexive decisions, allowing readers to engage with the 
viewpoints of both the researcher and participants to decide if the research is plausible. 
Feminist reflexivity goes farther than this, interrogating not just personal and cultural 
views the researcher holds, but also how and why these viewpoints came to be, and the 
broader significance of this for how knowledge is generated. Taylor and White (2000) 
ask researchers to broaden this conscious consideration of how research decisions are 
made to consider how knowledge is generated; they call for researchers and practitioners 
to explicitly acknowledge the particular types of knowledge they use to make sense of 
situations and events, and to consider how various types of knowledge may be culturally 
constructed (Taylor & White, 2000). 
Dorothy E. Smith (Smith, 1974;1987) invites feminist researchers to take a step farther 
back, to acknowledge our particular standpoint as individuals, and to consider how that 
standpoint affects the way we interact with the world (and the way the world interacts 
with us). She says that it behooves researchers to think about the individual standpoints 
of the participants in the research, and to engage with these individuals rather than 
observe them from an outside position. According to Smith (1987), this consideration of 
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standpoint is important because nothing (no academic discipline) and no one (no 
researcher) can avoid being situated, so Smith (1990b) calls for research that 
acknowledges that situatedness and builds it into our methodological and theoretical 
strategies. Smith (1987) highlights the ways in which the researcher affects her data: she 
“is and must be an active participant in constructing the events she treats as data”  (Smith, 
1990b, p. 13). The ways in which the researcher constructs the data is one of the focuses 
of reflexive thought. This echoes Bourdieu’s instruction that critical theorists must 
examine their own relation to the research object, reflecting the scientific gaze back on 
themselves (Bourdieu 1993 in Hesse-Biber & Piatelli, 2007). 
Smith’s methodology, like all reflexive research, challenges the unquestioning production 
of “objective” knowledge (Hesse-Biber and Piatelli, 2007).  Smith’s goal  (1987; 1990a; 
1990b; 1993; 1997) is to elucidate a method of social research that is reflexive about the 
everyday experiences of people’s lives, and that asks what are the facts, how did they 
become facts, and how does factual knowing occur. This situated line of questioning 
requires a “dizzying change in perspective” (Campbell, 2003, p. 11) in pursuit of the goal 
of interrogating how people make sense of the world, and how particular meanings are 
constructed. Smith (1974; 1987) proposes to change the relationships between the 
researcher and the object of knowledge, creating a new relationship based on direct 
experience of the everyday world; she asks how else do individuals interpret information 
and events, if not through their direct experience? Reflexive research begins with the 
researcher’s original and immediate knowledge of everyday life (what Smith terms an 
'insider’s' approach), and moves to an exploration of what passes beyond everyday life 
and how that particular way of understanding is deeply implicated in how everyday life is 
represented (Smith 1974, pg. 12).  
An insider’s strategy takes concepts, ideas, ideology, and schemata as dimensions 
and organizers of the ongoing social process that we can grasp only as insiders, 
only by considering our own practices ... Taking up critique-as-inquiry or inquiry-
as-critique as an insider adds a further dimension [to inquiries of knowledge of 
the relations and apparatuses of ruling]. Inquiry becomes an essentially reflexive 
critique. For the relations explored here can be grasped only as we are insiders 
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participating in them. At the same time, in exploring them we bring into view not 
just our actual practices of thinking, reasoning, reading, making sense of 
accounts, and so forth, but the actual social relations we participate in by doing 
so. In this way, as insiders, relations that our own practices are embedded in can 
be made explicit and examinable through inquiry. ( Smith, 1990a, p.202-204) 
By approaching research from this angle, it is possible to link everyday subjectivities 
with underlying institutional structures (Doran, 1993). When approaching research in a 
way that inquires into the “way things work”, the actualities of our everyday social 
practices become visible and research becomes a necessarily reflexive activity: “critique 
is investigation and investigation is a reflexive critique, disclosing practices we know and 
use ... disclosing how our practices contribute to and are articulated with the relations that 
overpower our lives” (Smith 1990a p.204). 
In light of these perspectives, the challenge becomes how to incorporate reflexivity into 
research in a concrete way. Hesse-Biber & Piatelli (2007) have created a unique method 
to increase researcher reflexivity adapted from Conner & Bliss-Moreau’s  (2006) 
experience sampling, of which I have adopted in an adapted form  to increase my own 
reflexivity as a researcher. Experience sampling is a technique to document subjective 
experience in the moment, and over time. Participants are reminded through various 
technological means to stop and record their subjective experience based on questions 
offered by the researchers. Conner & Bliss-Moreau (2006) maintain that this resolves 
temporal issues such as lapses in memory or the loss of emotion when experiences are 
measured at a later date, or when a participant is asked to recall how they felt at a certain 
time. Hesse-Biber & Piatelli (2007) call this technique reflexive sampling. Reflexive 
sampling involves periodic reminders throughout the project for the researcher to “check-
in” with herself about how things are going. By using a reflexive diary, tape recorder, or 
notes on a portable data device, key questions can be answered at pre-determined times. 
These reflections can be used for reflexive thought later. Hesse-Biber & Piatelli (2007) 
suggest some of the key questions one might answer, including questions about 
researcher and participant standpoint and positionality, relationship with participants, 
attentiveness to difference, and reflexive interrogation of data. Since I am not doing field 
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research, but collecting interview data in discrete chunks, I chose to use several events as 
markers to engage in reflexivity. I wrote a reflexive journal entry after conducting each 
interview, during or after transcribing each interview, when insights occurred to me 
during coding, and after each round of coding.  I recorded my reflexive journal entries in 
the form of emails in to special research memo e-mail account and through handwritten 
entries in a research notebook. I have included an example of a typical journal entry as 
Appendix 1. 
This technique was helpful because I have a hard time remembering to interrogate myself 
and my data without what Brookfield (1998) calls a critical incident, or what Smith 
(1987) terms a “point of rupture” (p.49)  between my personal experience and social 
forms of consciousness. When I am working away and things are going well, it is hard to 
remember to stop and analyze. Sometimes writing these entries was difficult, and felt 
forced. This was especially the case later in data collection, when I felt like I was 
repeating some of the same ideas again and again. At other times, I was compelled to 
write and wrote freely. In practice, I found that my reflexive journal and analytical 
memos blended together, with many areas of overlap. I found these journal entries 
helpful in tracing analytical ideas through their progression and identifying possible 
topics for manuscripts. For instance, after transcribing Carrie's interview, I wrote a 
journal entry about the possible theme of information-seeking:  
Transcribing this interview made me think that there's a real possibility for a 
paper about what information women would want in order to make a decision 
about prenatal screening, what they would find helpful in the pamphlet, when they 
want the pamphlet etc. For instance, there have been a number of women mention 
they would want to get the pamphlet before talking to the doctor so they 
understand a little bit about what they're going to be offered and they can ask 
questions at that time, rather than getting all the information at once and having to 
make a decision without a chance to think about, it ask questions and then think 
about it again. ... A lot of the women are asking the why questions: why would I 
want to get this test?  Why would I not want to get this test? what can I do with 
the information?  Structuring the pamphlet to answer these questions might be 
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helpful...  What is the test, why would I want to get it, why would I not want to 
get it, what what will the test tell me, what can I do with that information.  I think 
that these questions would be helpful. 
This idea catalysed a focused code for "information" and that coding produced the 
findings for manuscript 3, Chapter 7. More information about this analytical process is 
described in Figure 3, section 4.3.5.8. 
4.2.2 Constructivist grounded theory. 
The methodology of grounded theory was developed in the 1960’s by Glaser and Strauss 
(1967) in an attempt to support and systematize the field of qualitative research. 
Grounded theory is a research approach that is used to inductively develop  theory based 
on qualitative data, with all theoretical concepts extracted directly from the data and not 
imported from other theories or analyses (Walliman, 2005). Glaser and Strauss’s 1967 
work was revolutionary because it blurred the line between theory/research and data 
collection/analysis, and challenged the prevailing view of qualitative research as without 
rigor (Charmaz, 2000). Glaser and Strauss (1967) provided some of the first written 
guidelines for conducting qualitative research, which had previously been taught through 
a mentoring system (Charmaz, 2000).  
Since its origin in the work of Glaser and Strauss, grounded theory has moved through 
many theoretical orientations as different scholars have taken it up and made it their own. 
The theoretical framework used in this study is constructivist grounded theory as 
formulated by Kathy Charmaz (Charmaz, 2000; 2004a; 2004b; 2005; 2006; 2008).   
Charmaz’s constructivist grounded theory differs from the more traditional objectivist 
formulations of grounded theory in a few key ways. Constructivist grounded theory 
(CGT) recognizes that both the researcher and the research participants create data 
through their interactions. CGT researchers claim that what is discovered “arises from the 
interactive process and its temporal, cultural, and structural contexts” (Charmaz, 2000, p. 
524). This is different from objectivist grounded theory (OGT), which builds on the 
assumptions that what is observed is independent from the observer. OGT attempts to 
120 
 
achieve reliability and validity through description, analysis, and prediction. CGT does 
not attempt to develop generalizable truth, but recognizes the importance of the 
subjective interpretation of the individual and how that subjective interpretation is always 
evolving and always influencing interpretation of the data. Charmaz urges a move away 
from the didactic and prescriptive guidelines for grounded theory as espoused by Strauss 
and Corbin (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) towards a methodology that is flexible, with 
emergent and interactive guidelines (Charmaz, 2000). 
Grounded theory is, above all, inductive. It starts with the data, with individual cases, 
stories, observations- the more variety in the data, the better! These data are analyzed 
systematically using a series of categories and codes. These codes emerge from the data, 
they are not taken from pre-existing hypotheses or prior studies. Charmaz recommends 
line by line coding, encouraging the examination of each minute piece of data as the best 
way to find potential significant pieces of information. After some initial coding, themes 
and categories can be identified. It is then time to go back and re-code, with these new 
insights. Slowly but surely, theory starts to arise from the data, which leads back to more 
data collection. As the next data are analyzed, new insights will emerge, making it is 
necessary to go back to the first bit of data with these new insights in mind. Grounded 
theory is an iterative process, new data reveal more to be studied and more things to 
examine (Charmaz, 2004a). Throughout this process, the researcher engages in memo 
writing, or taking notes about thoughts that occur during the analysis. Charmaz describes 
memo writing as helping to “elaborate processes, assumptions, and actions that are 
subsumed under your code” (Charmaz, 2004a, p. 511).  
4.2.3 Constructionist approach to grounded theory. 
I am working with the constructivist positioning  of grounded theory as formulated by 
Charmaz (2000; 2004a; 2004b; 2006; 2008). In the following section, I make the case 
that Charmaz’ constructivist grounded theory is congruent with a constructionist stance.  
To understand the similarities and differences between constructivism and 
constructionism, it is useful to conceptualize the two concepts as existing upon a 
continuum of perspectives (Crotty, 1998). Constructivisim focuses on the ways in which 
individuals construct meaning, and constructionism focuses on the ways in which 
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meaning is shaped by social, political, and discursive factors beyond the individual 
(Crotty, 1998).  
Holton (Holton, 2007)sees the search for a paradigm as futile, and counterproductive, 
believing that grounded theory can “transcend specific boundaries of established 
paradigms to accommodate any type of data sourced and expressed through any 
epistemological lens” (pg. 268). I do agree that grounded theory fits into multiple 
paradigms, but I think it is necessary for each researcher who uses GT to explicitly state 
the paradigm s/he is working within, and his or her epistemological viewpoint, as this 
will strongly shape the questions that researcher asks, the way s/he approaches 
participants, the way in which data analysis is undertaken and carried out,  and the 
themes that “emerge” from the data. In short, the researcher’s epistemological and 
ontological assumptions shape the research process, the interpretation of the data 
collected, and the themes or theory that may be the outcome of a grounded theory project.  
Charmaz almost always titles her work “constructivist” grounded theory (Charmaz 2000; 
2004b; 2005; 2006; 2008), but her methodology is also congruent with a constructionist 
stance. In this section I will examine direct and indirect epistemological statements 
Charmaz has made and argue that her work is congruent with Hacking’s (Hacking, 1999) 
vision of social constructionism.  
Constructionism and constructivism are often confused and conflated, but there is also 
room for congruence between the ideas. Charmaz’s iteration of grounded theory has not 
escaped this tendency. For example, in his criticism of Charmaz’s constructivist 
grounded theory, Glaser (2002) consistently conflates the terms “constructionist” and 
“constructivist”, sometimes in the same sentence. A quick search of the research database 
Google Scholar retrieves 300 more hits for “Charmaz AND constructionist” than for 
“Charmaz AND constructivist”- this may indicate that Charmaz’s grounded theory is 
being used for constructionist research, that the two terms are commonly conflated, or 
that the terms may legitimately represent an area of overlap. It may also represent a 
general trend in the social sciences towards constructionist rather than constructivist 
research.  
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On occasion, Charmaz does use the constructionist label. For instance, Charmaz (2005) 
describes her work developing grounded theory “as a social constructionist method” (p. 
509), and as imbuing “grounded theory with social constructionism” (Charmaz, 2008, p. 
401). She explicitly renames her previous work (Charmaz 2000; 2004a; 2006) as 
“distinguishing between a social constructionist and an objectivist grounded theory” 
(2008,  p. 398). Despite this, in most of her work she maintains the “constructivist” label.   
4.2.3.1 Charmaz’s explicit definitions. 
Charmaz (2006; 2008) explicitly defines her personal version of constructivism, in two 
very different contexts. Charmaz (2006) is a glossary entry in a methodological manual, 
and Charmaz (2008) is a footnote explanation about why a chapter on CGT is a relevant 
inclusion to The Handbook of Constructionist Research. In the first, Charmaz defines 
constructivism as:  
A social scientific perspective that addresses how realities are made. This 
perspective assumes that people, including researchers, construct the realities in 
which they participate. Constructivist inquiry starts with the experience and asks 
how members construct it. To the best of their ability, constructivists enter the 
phenomenon, gain multiple views of it, and locate it in its web of connections and 
constraints. Constructivists acknowledge that their interpretation of the studied 
phenomenon is itself a construction. (Charmaz, 2006, p. 187) 
In a footnote to a chapter for the Handbook of Constructionist Research, Charmaz (2008) 
explains her reasons for equivocating between constructionism and constructivism. She 
states she is framing her work using “the more general rubric of social constructionism” 
(p. 409) to find a better fit with the theme of the book. Charmaz states that her version of 
constructivism holds that “people make their worlds but do not make them as they please, 
rather, worlds are constructed under particular historical and social conditions that shape 
our views, actions, and collective practices” (p. 409), which I see as useful to scholars 
working from a constructionist stance. Charmaz then cites other 
constructivist/constructionist grounded theory authors (including herself, Adele Clarke 
and Anthony Bryant) who locate their epistemological roots in sociological social 
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constructionism. Later in this article, in the main text of the chapter, Charmaz (2008) 
gives an important reason for sticking with constructivism: incongruent to her vision for 
grounded theory, she notes that “20th century constructionism treated research worlds as 
social constructions, but not research practices” (p. 398).  
These definitions give me room to work with Charmaz’s methodology within a 
constructionist paradigm congruent with Hacking (1999)'s vision of constructionism,  
which I suggest is congruent with the way Charmaz defines her vision of constructivism- 
it realizes the constructed nature of research practices and research worlds, it holds that 
there is a real world which is interpreted in different ways depending on the ways in 
which the interpreter has been shaped by her social, historical, and cultural context while 
still granting the interpreter agency to shape her own view of the world within that 
context, making explicit the situated location of the interpreter’s context/standpoint. 
4.2.3.2 Charmaz’s implicit definitions. 
In addition to explicit definitions, Charmaz implicitly describes the constructivist 
epistemology that informs Constructivist Grounded Theory in many publications. Some 
of these epistemological statements may be seen as consistent with a constructionist 
approach. For example,  Charmaz (2006) sees texts as both individually and socially 
constructed: “people construct texts for specific purposes and they do so within social, 
economic, historical, cultural, and situational contexts. Texts draw on discourses....” (p. 
15).  This is congruent with constructionism if emphasis is placed on the way that the 
individual constructs texts  and is shaped unknowingly by discourse, as opposed to 
focusing solely on the individual's conscious construction within that context. Charmaz 
(2006) states that a “CGT approach means learning how, when, and to what extent the 
studied experience is embedded in larger and often, hidden positions, networks, 
situations, and relationships.” (p. 131). This statement is quite congruent with 
constructionism, although Charmaz brings it back to constructivism in the next sentence, 
focusing on the individual knower: “Subsequently, differences and distinctions between 
people become visible as well as the hierarchies of power, communication, and 
opportunity that maintain and perpetuate such differences and distinctions.  A 
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constructivist approach means being alert to conditions under which such differences and 
distinctions arise and are maintained” (p. 131). 
Implicit statements show that the epistemological tenets of grounded theory can be 
interpreted through a constructivist or constructionist lens. Examining these statements 
shows that there is room to do constructionist work with Charmaz’ constructivist 
grounded theory. Constructivist grounded theory is, in many ways, consistent with 
Hacking’s (1999) vision of social construction. 
4.2.3.3 Epistemological congruence between Charmaz and 
Hacking (1999). 
I propose that Hacking’s  “unmasking” and “reformist” types of social construction 
identified earlier are in many ways congruent with Charmaz’ constructivist grounded 
theory. In Charmaz (2005), a paper advocating CGT as a research method of social 
justice research, Charmaz details questions in critical social justice inquiry that CGT is 
well suited to answer (pg. 513-514); many of these questions are central to the 
“Unmasking” type of social construction, exposing ideas to examine what function they 
serve, thereby stripping them of false appeal and authority (Hacking, 1999).  For 
example, Charmaz (2005) lists some questions relevant to social policies and practices 
that are directly applicable to my examination of the policies and practices of prenatal 
screening.  
What are the rules, both tacit and explicit? Who writes or enforces them? How? 
Whose interests do the rules reflect/ From whose standpoint? Do the rules and 
routine practices negatively affect certain groups or categories of individuals? If 
so, are they aware of them? What are the implications of their relative awareness 
or lack of it? To what extent and when do various participants support the rules 
and the policies and practices that flow from them? When are they contested? 
When do they meet resistance? Who resists and which risks might resistance 
pose? (Charmaz, 2005, p. 514) 
With these questions in mind, I use Charmaz’s Constructivist Grounded Theory within 
the constructionist perspective identified by Hacking (1999). 
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4.2.4 Why grounded theory? 
Charmaz (2005) inspired me to think about the ways in which CGT inspires critical 
questioning about social justice issues, considering the standpoint of the researcher and 
participants. This congruence of purpose suggested an effective method for investigating 
my research questions. When reading the work on metaphor analysis, I also noted an 
echo of grounded theory. Both Rigney (2001) and Schmitt (2005) think of metaphor 
analysis as revealing insights that can be categorized conceptually to reveal an underlying 
theory. By examining the metaphors used in a particular culture, it is possible to develop 
a theory about the way an issue is understood by members of that cultural group.  
This insight led me to work towards developing a grounded theory project with a 
theoretical sensitivity to metaphor. I believe Charmaz would support the theoretical focus 
on metaphor, because she encourages researchers to “pay careful attention to 
respondents’ language” (Charmaz, 2004a, p.505) including metaphor (Charmaz, 2006). 
Charmaz also encourages the adoption and creation of new methods, provided they are 
used to support a transparent analytic process (Charmaz, 2008).  I am encouraged by 
Charmaz’s invitation to stretch grounded theory to adapt it to my own needs and goals 
(Charmaz, 2006). Concerning metaphor, I am indebted to the work of Lakoff & Johnson 
(1980), who consider metaphors to be a socially contained way of structuring reality 
which function by organizing and shaping the way the world is understood.  
4.2.5 Social construction, grounded theory, metaphor, and 
reflexivity. 
The choice of Charmaz’s constructivist grounded theory was carefully considered.  I was 
intuitively drawn to it because of my own constructionist leanings, but I was wary of the 
relativism that constructivism can carry (Boghossian, 2006). I find relativism 
inappropriate as an ethical framework and my ethical tendencies made me feel uneasy 
about adopting what may be perceived as a relativistic methodology.  I draw on a critical 
feminist lens and Hacking’s form of social constructionism to overcome the problems 
relativism may pose.  
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 Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) ideas of metaphor seemed congruent with social 
constructionism to me, and there is support in the literature for this link. Gurney 
(1999)has outlined a number of ways in which metaphor is a crucial component to the 
social construction of reality. First, metaphor both constrains and enables social 
creativity. It implies a way of thinking and seeing that affects an individual’s relation 
with the world. Second, the metaphors used in a particular group define and hold that 
social group together, by building and maintaining a shared culture. Sometimes these 
cultural metaphors become so familiar that their original meaning is lost- they become a 
sort of “shorthand for common-sense social relationships” (Gurney, 1999, p. 1716). 
Third, metaphors can be inherently political. The selection of metaphors a person makes 
is very significant in the way that they exercise forms of power and resistance. In this 
way, metaphors do ideological work (Cresswell, 1997). Fourth, metaphors are 
conceptualised within a framework of rhetoric. Appeal to metaphors, aphorisms, and 
social maxims add a moral quality to speech, by implicitly expressing values. They 
associate common sense (as socially constructed, of course) with morality and prejudice 
(Gurney, 1999).   
I also noted echoes of Foucault in Gurney’s third point, which is expanded upon in 
Cresswell’s 1997 work. The focus on the ways in which power and resistance are 
exercised to shape reality supports both my critical feminist and constructionist leanings. 
Gurney’s fourth point reminded me of the ancient pre-Socratic Greek philosophers (such 
as Gorgias) and the importance they placed on influential power of carefully chosen 
language to make a rhetorical point. To these scholars, the content of a message could be 
less influential than the way the message was communicated.  
Constructionist grounded theory is congruent with an analytical sensitivity to metaphor. 
Charmaz has explicitly addressed the use of metaphor as a unit of exploration (Charmaz, 
2000) and as a powerful tool for analysis and writing of grounded theory work (Charmaz 
2006; 2008).  Charmaz (2008) asks us to “interrogate taken-for-granted metaphors”  and 
invokes Martin (1999)’s instruction for feminist researchers to find the sleeping 
metaphors in science and “awaken them”. 
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Sleeping metaphors wield power precisely because they remain tacit: They shape 
the text and, moreover, our conceptions of the realities it addresses. Such 
metaphors shape what we see and how we see it and contain hidden reasons that 
explain, justify, and perpetuate why we see it that way.  (Charmaz, 2008, pg. 450) 
The relationship between my 
theoretical perspectives (feminist 
bioethics, social constructionism) 
and methodological perspectives 
(reflexivity, grounded theory, 
metaphor) is exemplified in this 
quote.  
4.3 Part 2: Methods 
4.3.1 Study design.  
In this research project my purpose  
was to investigate the process of 
prenatal screening in light of the 
2007 Society of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists of Canada (SOGC) Clinical Practice Guideline (Summers, Langlois, 
Wyatt, & Wilson, 2007), which mandated that non-invasive prenatal screening must be 
offered to all Canadian women . As stated in the SOGC guideline, non-invasive prenatal 
screening can take several different forms, and due to geographical differences and 
resource disparities, SOGC has refrained from endorsing one particular type. Eligible 
types of prenatal screening are those which meet the SOGC’s minimum standard for 
detection rate (> 75%) and false positive rate (< 3% in the first trimester,  < 5% in the 
second trimester) (Chitayat et al, 2011). According to Chitayat et al (2011), eligible tests 
(see Figure 1) are First Trimester Screening (FTS), Quadruple Serum Screening (Quad), 
Integrated Prenatal Screening (IPS), IPS without inhibin A, and Serum IPS. In this 
project, the term "prenatal screening" refers to any or all of these different options.  
Figure 1: Eligible Types of Prenatal 
Screening According to SOGC Guideline 
Test Markers Trimester 
FTS NT, β-hCG, PAPP-
A, MA 
1 
Quad AFP, uE3, β-hCG, 
inhibin A, MA 
2 
IPS NT, PAPP-A, AFP, 
uE3, β-hCG, inhibin 
A, MA 
1&2 
IPS -inhibin A NT, PAPP-A, AFP, 
uE3, β-hCG, MA 
1&2 
Serum IPS PAPP-A, AFP, uE3, 
β-hCG, inhibin A, 
1 & 2 
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4.3.2 Research question. 
The primary research question of this thesis is: “From the perspective of women under 
the age of 35 in their first pregnancies, seeking prenatal care from a family physician, 
how is the process of choosing to participate in prenatal screening enacted in light of the 
new SOGC guidelines?”. This guiding question informed my choice to collect data from 
three different sources: policies and guidelines, patient education materials, and pregnant 
women. The three types of data were chosen to respond to different elements of the 
process of choosing whether or not to participate in prenatal screening:  
1) How do prenatal screening patient education materials portray concepts 
related to prenatal screening? 
2) How do policies and guidelines shape the offer of prenatal screening? 
3) How do women use information when making a decision about whether or not 
to participate in prenatal screening?  
With these three sub-questions in mind, I undertook three mini studies, all of which are 
united by their relation to the main research question about choosing whether or not to 
participate in prenatal screening. First, regarding patient education materials, written 
information about prenatal screening may be used by some women to inform themselves 
prior to making a decision. These materials may be provided by a physician or found 
through a different venue, for instance, passed along by a friend or relative or searched 
out on the internet. A close examination of publicly available prenatal screening public 
education pamphlets was important to examine some of the types of information women 
receive in the process of making a decision. Second, since processes of prenatal screening 
in the context of family medicine are shaped by policy, I searched for and analysed 
policies that are relevant to the presentation and process of prenatal screening. Finally, I 
interviewed women about their thoughts and experiences navigating the process of 
prenatal screening.  I asked women currently going through the process of prenatal 
screening about their experiences so far, including how they came to make a decision 
about whether or not to participate. 
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4.3.3 Study #1: How do prenatal screening patient education 
materials portray concepts related to prenatal screening? 
The first study involved a metaphoric textual analysis of publicly available prenatal 
screening patient education material (see manuscript one, Chapter 5). The methods of this 
study are briefly described in the published manuscript, and elaborated in more detail in 
this section.  
4.3.3.1 Inclusion/exclusion criteria. 
Written material included in the study met the following inclusion criteria: 
1) Publicly available through health care providers, public health agencies, or 
online. 
2)  Available in English.  
3) Aimed at an audience of women considering prenatal screening.  
4) Produced by an organization that might be considered authoritative by 
women. 
5) Addresses prenatal screening.  
6) Available free of charge.  
7) Any English language material which does not meet these criteria but is 
provided by a family physician or other health care provider to a participant. 
8) Any English language material mentioned by a participant, authored by an 
authoritative source, and relevant to the Canadian context, even if not 
produced in Canada. 
Materials which are aimed at professionals, written by a non-Canadian organization, or 
those which address only prenatal testing were excluded. Peer-written sources or 
materials which did not readily identify their author were omitted.  
I was hoping to broaden my sample of patient education materials during the interview 
process, by explicitly asking interview participants if their health care providers had 
given them any written materials and then collecting and analyzing these materials. I was 
also prepared to include written material that was not given by a health care provider, if a 
woman found and used a source that was of a type that might be given by a health care 
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provider (i.e. not a peer-written source).  I was more flexible with the inclusion criterion 
(#8) for the sources participants mentioned, anticipating that  women might, for instance, 
find an American pamphlet online.  
I intentionally structured the inclusion and exclusion criteria so the publication date of a 
pamphlet was irrelevant, reasoning that if the pamphlet is currently available or is being 
circulated at the time of data collection, it should be eligible for inclusion. This inclusion 
criterion proved relevant, as one interview participant was given an out-of-circulation 
pamphlet by her doctor. This pamphlet, entitled "Prenatal Screening: It's your choice", 
was produced by the Ontario Maternal Serum Screening Committee. I had collected it 
before it was removed from circulation for another project, and included it in the sample  
when the participant mentioned it by name. 
Interview participants mentioned accessing many sources of information that I do not 
consider formal patient education materials. For example, many women talked about 
reading popular books, participating in online pregnancy forums, and engaging with peer-
written sources (e.g. blogs). While these are interesting sources of information, close 
analysis of this type of written material is outside of the scope of this project. I noted the 
information sources mentioned by women and considered the variety of these sources in 
analysis, but did not seek to closely examine these sources.   
4.3.3.2 Data collection. 
I collected Canadian prenatal patient education written materials as a means to investigate 
how prenatal screening is explained and portrayed to women. Before conducting 
interviews, I collected an initial sample of patient education materials as a way to gain an 
understanding of the variety of materials available to women in Ontario. During 
interviews, I asked each participant if they had received any written material from their 
prenatal health care provider, and if they could remember the title or other identifying 
information about the material. I intended to add new written materials to the sample as 
they were mentioned by interview participants. While I predicted that my sample of 
written material would grow during the interview process, this was not the case. 
Participants mentioned finding information online and being given many pamphlets, but 
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most had discarded the pamphlets by the time of the interview and few were able to recall 
identifying details about those pamphlets.Thus, collection of written patient education 
materials was limited to the initial sample I gathered through an online search. 
The sample of public education materials included materials developed by professional 
colleges related to obstetrical care in family medicine (e.g. SOGC), local health care 
institutions (e.g. Northwestern Ontario Regional Genetics Program), academics working 
on this topic (e.g. June Carroll et al’s (2007) Genetics Education Project), advocacy 
organizations for people with disabilities (e.g. Canadian Down Syndrome Society), and 
industry  sources that profit from selling the materials for prenatal screening tests (e.g. 
Warnex Laboratories).  
4.3.3.3 Data analysis. 
When analysing patient education materials, I was guided by the inductive principles of 
grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006). After a quick code and a focused code (Charmaz, 
2006 see further explanation in the section addressing analytical techniques used for 
participant data), I identified metaphors and figurative language as an important aspect of 
the information provided by these materials, and chose to focus further analysis on this 
aspect of the data. Analysis of metaphor and figurative language evolved into an 
approach we called  Metaphoric Textual Analysis (Vanstone & Kinsella, 2010), informed 
by the work of Lakoff and Johnson (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a; 1980b), Schmitt (2000; 
2005) and Charteris-Black (Charteris-Black, 2004). Metaphoric Textual Analysis (MTA) 
is an approach which combines the inductive strategies of grounded theory (Charmaz 
2006) to critically reflect on the various interpretive messages and ideological strains that 
may be present in the text, based on the explanations offered by Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980a, 1980b) as to the ways in which metaphors are fundamental to the ways in which 
a person in a particular historical social location understands the world. 
I began analysing metaphors and figurative language using a word by word coding 
strategy (Charmaz, 2006) to identify key concepts.  Schmitt (2000; 2005)suggests a word 
for word analysis of metaphors to establish a lexicon of metaphoric concepts. This is 
congruent with Charmaz’s focus on creating codes as the data are studied (Charmaz, 
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2004a), and her instruction to “interrogate taken-for-granted metaphors” (Charmaz, 2008, 
p. 444) as a way to strengthen analysis and writing. I then segmented texts into 
metaphoric parts “by means of anchoring examples and an operationalisation of the 
concept of metaphor” (Schmitt, 2000). These units of analysis, the metaphoric parts,  
were examined for fit into larger conceptual categories (Schmitt 2000, 2005; Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980a). In order to give analytic consideration to the informational impact  of 
the metaphor, including implicit messages and ideological stances that may be embedded 
in particular metaphors, I engaged with the process of critical reflection as ideology 
critique  (Brookfield, 1998; 2009). I used this particular approach to critical reflection as 
a way to alert myself to potential ways in which ideologies  might be operating in patient 
education materials. This recognition was the first step in gaining insight into the ways in 
which patient education materials might help produce what Joe Kincheloe has called "a 
meta-awareness of the way consciousness is constructed" (Kincheloe, 2008, p. 218).  
While engaging in this analytic process, which was iterative, messy, and at times 
overwhelming, I came to recognize that the process of critically reflecting on potential 
ideologies at work through metaphor was similar to what Strauss and Corbin (1998) 
describe as the "flip-flop" technique for comparison of theoretical categories in their 
explanation of Comparative Analysis. Strauss and Corbin (1998) describe Comparative 
Analysis in two ways: the first involves comparison of object/object or incident/incident, 
and the second is a comparison of theoretical category. For the first, comparison can help 
differentiate features and define one object from another. For the second, comparison can 
“bring out possible properties and dimensions when these are not evident to the analyst” 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p.94). Theoretical comparison can be done via the “flip-flop” 
technique, or through the use of systematic comparison. The “flip-flop” technique 
involves turning a concept inside out, asking how it might be different, or what might 
change if it was different in a certain way. This description mirrors the process I engaged 
in to think critically about possible implications of metaphor and figurative language.  
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4.3.4 Study # 2: How do policies and guidelines shape the 
offer of prenatal screening? 
In the second study, I examined the existing policy and guidelines on prenatal screening, 
two Clinical Practice Guidelines published jointly by the Society of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists of Canada and the Canadian Council of Medical Geneticists. These 
guidelines were considered with regards to their relevance to the offer and presentation of 
prenatal screening, in order to suggest an alternative approach to the proposed counseling 
model (manuscript two, Chapter 6).  
4.3.4.1 Inclusion/exclusion criteria.  
The inclusion criteria for this study were broad, encompassing any policy document that 
affects the way that prenatal screening takes place in Canada.  Excluded documents 
include private policies (for instance, clinic-specific policies) and policies from other 
countries not officially adopted by a Canadian agency. I also excluded policy statements, 
suggestions, and reports that originate from a source that does not have direct influence 
over how services are provided (e.g. academic articles). Also, documents that were not 
available to me as a member of the public were necessarily excluded. 
4.3.4.2 Data collection. 
The purpose of collecting policy documents was to examine the ways in which they 
shape the implementation of prenatal screening. I used various tools to find relevant 
policy documents, including policy databases and search engines (both academic and non 
academic). When this search failed to yield many results, I contacted relevant 
organizations by telephone and e-mail, to ask if they had any relevant policy documents. 
The following resources were searched: 
Table 3: Search strategy 
Databases: 
CMA Infobase National Guideline Clearinghouse 
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UpToDate 17.1 Genetic Resources Ontario 
MedLine (limit publication type to 
“guideline”) 
Google Scholar 
Contacted the following professional or governmental organizations via e-mail, website, or 
telephone: 
- Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
- Canadian College of Medical Geneticists 
- College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario 
- College of Family Physicians of Canada 
- Canadian Association of Genetic Counselors 
- Ontario Ministry of Health and Long Term Care 
- Health Canada 
 
 
Few relevant policies and guidelines were found. The Society of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists of Canada, in conjunction with the Canadian College of Medical 
Geneticists had produced a clinical practice guideline governing prenatal screening 
(Summers et al, 2007). These groups released another clinical practice guideline 
concerning prenatal screening in July 2011 (Chitayat, Langlois, & Wilson, 2011). I did 
not find any other policies or guidelines, despite inquiries to each professional college. I 
did find several policies that were peripherally relevant, such as policies relevant to 
abortion produced by the Canadian Medical Association (CMA, 1988) and Society of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists of Canada (Davis, 2006) or the Ontario Health Insurance 
Plan schedule of benefits for physician services. 
4.3.4.3 Data analysis. 
Due to the lack of policy documents retrieved, I decided not to undertake an inductive 
grounded theory analysis. Instead, I approached the analysis conceptually, examining the 
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ways in which the literature on the process of prenatal screening was congruent with or in 
conflict with the ideas suggested by Summers et al (2007) and Chitayat et al (2011). 
Using the counseling instructions in these policy documents, I conducted a literature 
review and examined the implication of these instructions in light of literature on 
relational autonomy, informed decision-making, non-directive counseling, and shared 
decision-making. 
4.3.5 Study #3: How do women use information when making 
a decision about whether or not to participate in prenatal 
screening? 
The third study involved interviews with women who had recently been offered prenatal 
screening, but had not yet received results (if they chose to participate). When 
interviewing these women, I asked about their thoughts, opinions, and experiences of the 
offer and presentation of prenatal screening and their considerations and  decision-
making processes when making a choice about whether or not to participate. The results 
of this third study are addressed in manuscripts 3 and 4, Chapters 7 and 8. 
4.3.5.1 Inclusion/exclusion criteria. 
To be included in the study, participants met the following criteria: 
1) Fluent English speaker. 
2) First pregnancy. 
3) Under the age of 35 at expected date of delivery. 
4) Receiving initial prenatal care from a family physician. 
5) Had not yet received results from prenatal screening (if participating). 
Exclusion criteria include: 
1) Women who had previously been pregnant. 
2) High risk pregnancy that may affect the way prenatal screening is offered or 
understood (self-defined). 
3) First discussion of prenatal screening with a health care provider that is not a 
family physician (unless the provider worked under the direction of a family 
physician, for instance, a nurse working in the office of a family physician). 
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Most women seeking prenatal care from a family physician will have low risk 
pregnancies, as high risk pregnancies are usually referred to an obstetrician or maternal 
fetal medicine specialist. I chose not to include women with high risk pregnancies in this 
project because they may be offered prenatal screening in a different way, or have 
different considerations when considering the offer.  
When I corresponded with a women to schedule an interview, I mentioned eligibility 
criteria, including "low-risk" pregnancy, letting each women self-identify her personal 
level of risk. I decided to let women self-identify rather than imposing additional 
exclusion criteria because there is no clear medical definition of “low risk”. In a seminal 
paper on the topic of defining risk in pregnancy, Wilson and Schifrin (1980)  define low 
risk as “a patient not considered high risk”, or a patient not carrying a “pregnancy with an 
increased risk of a poor outcome” (p. 653). Inconsistent definitions and assessment of 
risk continue to be a problem. Stahl and Hundley (Stahl & Hundley, 2003) categorized 
women as high or low risk using several different assessments from Germany, Scotland, 
and the Netherlands. There was little consistency between the assessment tools and many 
women were classified differently between measures.  Jordan and Murphy (2009) remind 
us that “the validity of most scoring tools is undetermined and the benefit of prenatal risk 
scoring systems remains undocumented” (p. 192). 
4.3.5.2 Participant sampling & recruitment. 
I arranged to interview women after they discussed prenatal screening with their family 
physician, but before they received results (if they decided to participate) or before they 
reached 21 completed weeks gestation (if they decided not to participate). The timing of 
the reception of results may vary from woman to woman, and is partially dependent on 
the type of test chosen. The 2007 and 2011 SOGC Clinical Practice Guidelines (Summers 
et al, 2007; Chitayat et al, 2011) present several different options for prenatal screening, 
on the understanding that geographic limitations and resource differences throughout 
Canada make the endorsement of one type of screening impossible. Practitioners are 
invited to use any test that meets the minimum diagnostic standards and screens for the 
“most common clinically significant fetal aneuploidies” (Summers et al, 2007, p. 147). 
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Each component of screening can take place over a range of gestational dates, making it 
difficult to establish concrete gestational dates for recruitment.   
Figure 2: Optimal Timing of Screening and Diagnostic Tests 
 
Source: Chitayat et al, 2011; Evans et al, 2007; Wald et al, 2003; Wilson et al, 2005; 
Most women who participate in prenatal screening will receive their results in the second 
trimester, after the serum screen is analyzed. The blood and urine for the serum screen 
should be collected between 15-21 completed3 weeks (Wald et al., 2003), but the earlier 
in this time period the samples are collected, the  more chance a woman will have to 
make a decision about pursuing diagnostic testing and/or pregnancy termination. 
Allowing time for collection, analysis, and scheduling of a follow up appointment, 
                                                 
3
 “completed” week means the 6th day of that week. Weeks are counted from the date of the woman’s last 
menstrual period. 
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women who participate in a form of IPS will most likely receive their results sometime  
after 16 completed weeks. Some women may participate in first trimester screening only, 
or contingent screening and receive their results much earlier (Chitayat et al, 2011). 
4.3.5.3 Participant sampling. 
The sample began purposefully, with three participants recruited online and through word 
of mouth. These initial interviews and data analysis informed purposive sampling 
completed at the first London-Middlesex Health Unit Prenatal Fair, where an additional 
seven participants were recruited. Simultaneously, an additional participant was recruited 
from an online advertisement and another through word of mouth from a personal 
contact.  After these twelve participants were interviewed and the data was analysed, 
theoretical saturation was near, but additional women were sought to shed light on the  
theoretical properties of declining screening or having a lower level of education. One 
additional participant was recruited online and three additional participants were recruited 
from the London-Middlesex Health Unit Prenatal Fair for a total sample of 16 
participants. Recruitment ceased at this time, as theoretical saturation had been met. 
Charmaz (2006) describes theoretical saturation as the time when “gathering fresh data 
no longer sparks new theoretical insights, nor reveals new properties of these core 
theoretical properties” (p. 113), and advises researchers who believe they may have 
reached theoretical saturation to go back and recode earlier data to try and define new 
leads in order not to foreclose analytic possibilities and end up with a final analysis that is 
superficial.   
4.3.5.4 Purposeful sampling. 
I used purposeful sampling to identify participants who had recently received the offer of 
prenatal screening but had not yet received results (or chosen not to participate). 
Purposeful sampling is often confused with theoretical sampling (Coyne, 1997). Indeed 
the use of theoretical sampling necessitates a purposeful sample to begin (Glaser, 1978), 
as it is impossible to sample theoretically before categories have been formed through 
analysis (Charmaz, 2006). Patton (1990 as cited in Coyne, 2003) describes purposeful 
sampling as a way of selecting “information-rich cases for study in-depth … those from 
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which one can learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the research” (pg. 
169). Glaser (1978) further describes the initial sample as taken from groups which the 
researcher believes will “maximize the possibilities of obtaining data and leads for more 
data” (pg. 45). Women were purposefully sampled through 
• Word of mouth referrals from personal contacts and former participants who 
pass flyers (Appendix 3) to their contacts. (2 women) 
• Recruitment posters (Appendix 3) at places young women frequent- fitness 
centres, grocery stores, drug stores, community gathering places. (0 
respondents) 
• Online pregnancy forums.  (4 women) 
• Attendance at the prenatal fairs run by the Middlesex-London public health 
unit. These fairs occur monthly and are aimed at women in the first 16 weeks 
of pregnancy. (10 women) 
Since participants self-selected participation in this study, I predicted that the sample 
would likely be composed of women who had thought deeply about prenatal screening, 
those with strong interests in related topics (i.e. disability rights, anti-abortion), or those 
seeking more information. I reasoned that women who are happy with the process and 
have no questions about it might be less likely to volunteer to be part of the study, 
although they are an important group to include. This prediction was true for the women 
recruited online, but some women recruited at the Prenatal Fair seemed to be satisfied 
with their experience and not have particularly strong thoughts or opinions about the 
topic.   
4.3.5.5 Theoretical sampling. 
In addition to purposeful sampling, I also used theoretical sampling. Theoretical sampling 
shaped the recruitment of new informants in order to elaborate and refine the developing 
categories (Charmaz, 2006). This was achieved by focusing recruitment on the emerging 
categories and my evolving understanding of the developing theory (Glaser, 1978). 
Through theoretical sampling I aimed to recruit women who chose not to participate in 
prenatal screening. As analysis evolved, women with lower levels of education and those 
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who were considering pregnancy termination in the event of a high-risk result were 
sampled theoretically through the use of screening conversations with potential 
participants. This methodological decision is discussed further in Chapter 9. 
4.3.5.6 Data collection. 
I conducted semi-structured interviews with sixteen pregnant women. Each woman was 
interviewed once. While Charmaz (2006) thinks it may be important to return to 
participants during analysis, if emerging categories require more questioning, in this 
project a second interview was not possible. The interview focuses on the presentation of 
prenatal screening and intentionally omits discussion of actual results; by the time the 
interview data was analyzed, participants would have likely received the results of their 
test, which may affect the way they remember or consider the initial presentation of the 
test.   
4.3.5.7 Design of the interview guide. 
Charmaz (2006) emphasizes the importance of a well constructed interview guide in 
order to produce rich data for analysis by guiding the participant to reflect on their 
experiences. The questions of the interview guide should be constructed to fit the 
participant’s experience, while at the same time exploring the interviewer’s topic of 
interest. By keeping the interview guide short and open-ended, the interview can become 
more conversational and the interviewer can respond to the information the participant is 
giving, probing some points for more information (Charmaz, 2006). 
While the structure of the interview guide remained consistent between interviews, sub-
questions changed throughout data collection to reflect my evolving understanding of the 
developing theory at the time of the interview. New sub-questions were oriented towards 
expanding or elaborating existing categories (Appendix 4). 
4.3.5.8 Data analysis. 
I inductively analyzed data with the aim of developing theory about the process of 
making a decision about participating prenatal screening from the perspective of pregnant 
women. Charmaz (2006) sees coding strategies as flexible, provided the research includes 
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an initial code which eventually progresses to a focused code. The purpose of the initial 
code is to develop a coding plan; the focused code will identify core categories.  I refined 
these ideas further into theoretical categories, with multiple, iterative rounds of coding 
wherein emerging insights fueled additional analysis and data collection. 
Quick Code: A “quick code” necessitates textual data. For the interview data, analysis 
began with transcription in order to perform a “quick code” (Glaser, 1978; Charmaz, 
2006), a fast open code used to keep the researcher’s mind open to the possibilities of the 
data by using codes which are “provisional, comparative, and grounded in the data” 
(Charmaz, 2006, p. 48). Charmaz (2006) thinks an initial quick code helps the researcher 
remain receptive, and sparks new ideas.  
Line by Line Coding:  After the initial “quick code”, line by line coding of each 
transcript (Charmaz, 2000; 2004a; 2006) was completed using literal, theoretical, and 
metaphorical codes that are active. Glaser (1978) suggests that coding with gerunds (a 
noun derived from a verb, usually ending in –ing) is helpful because these active words 
allow the researcher to identify processes.  
Focused Coding:  Focused coding is used to make relationships and connections 
through some of the commonly occurring or significant codes identified in the initial 
process.  This stage of coding requires decision making about what initial codes are 
analytically significant, or what codes may contribute to the formation of categories.   
Theoretical Coding: Theoretical coding  took place after the completion of focused 
coding (Glaser, 1978), to examine the relationship between focused codes. This can help 
with formulating an initial theory. Glaser (1978) has identified possibilities for theoretical 
coding families (ex. causes, context, identity-self, means-goals). Charmaz (2006) 
cautions that although theoretical coding can assist with precision and clarity, theoretical 
codes must fit your data and substantive analysis- they should be suggested from earlier 
coding. Researchers cannot simply choose one of Glaser’s theoretical coding families and 
apply it to the data. 
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As an example of how coding categories were formed, Figure 3 is a diagram detailing the 
way in which coding evolved for the third manuscript, Chapter 7. This diagram includes 
different levels of coding and analytical questions which inspired the next round of 
coding. 
 
 
Figure 3: Example of Iterative Evolution of Coding 
 
4.3.6 Memo writing. 
I engaged in memo-writing throughout the entire research process to address reflexive 
and methodological considerations. Memo-writing is often seen as the intermediate step 
between coding and writing about the theory for presentation or publication (Glaser, 
1978), but Charmaz (2008) thinks this conception of memo-writing understates the 
importance of the process. Charmaz (2006; 2008) sees memo writing as an integral part 
of grounded theory, allowing the researcher to trace ideas and categories as they develop, 
and providing a framework for exploring, checking and developing ideas.  Memos were 
recorded in two ways- as loose notes when needed around specific pieces of data, and as 
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a journal to record my feelings and progress about the project, data, and discoveries. 
Charmaz (2008) recommends the following strategies for using memos effectively:  
1) Title the memos for easy sorting and storage 
2) Write memos throughout the process 
3) Use memos to define, delineate, and compare codes 
4) Include the relevant data right in the memo 
5) Outline the consequences of the code/category 
6) Note gaps in the data and conjectures about these gaps 
I managed the research memos throughout the project by opening a research-specific e-
mail account, where I could e-mail myself memos (written or dictated). This format 
allowed me to search the memos and, if needed, to circulate them to my advisory 
committee and record their responses. I also uploaded these memos into my data 
management software (N-Vivo), so I could link them directly to the data. I wrote memos 
after conducting each interview, transcribing each interview, coding each interview, and 
during each round of coding. I also wrote memos about the process of the research. 
4.3.7 Methodological decisions. 
As I have discussed earlier in this chapter, I have been committed to a reflexive approach 
to the research process, and to thinking carefully about possible implications of the 
methodological decisions I have made throughout the project. 
1) I chose to collect and analyze the textual data before the interview data. In part, this 
decision was theoretical, as a way of informing myself about the context in which 
prenatal screening takes place in Canada and familiarize myself with some of the material 
and terminology that my interview participants might encounter. Since it is easier to go 
back and re-examine texts, or change search criteria for texts than it is to re-interview 
participants, I wanted to go into the participant interviews with as much understanding as 
possible. There was also a logistical part of this decision: the use of textual data did not 
require research ethics permission or involve a long phase of recruitment.  
2) I chose to recruit participants in multiple ways, by posting online ads through 
classified ad sites (kijiji.ca, craigslist.ca) and online pregnancy forums; posting ads in 
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local businesses and community gathering sites; using social networks to recruit via word 
of mouth; attending the London-Middlesex Health Unit Prenatal Fair. I didn't receive any 
responses from the classified ad sites or from physical posters. I received a handful of 
responses from online pregnancy forums. I received several word of mouth referrals, but 
only two resulted in interviews. Others were excluded before an interview because they 
miscarried or because they were not receiving prenatal care from a family physician. I 
recruited most participants through the Prenatal Fair, where I had set up a table with 
recruitment posters and letters of information. I spoke to all participants directly and if 
they agreed to be contacted, I collected their contact information and e-mailed or phoned 
at a later date to arrange an interview.  
I chose to use multiple recruitment methods because I wanted to reach women who 
weren't "information-seekers", but those who might see the poster or ad while living their 
day to day lives, rather than looking for information on pregnancy. I had ads out for about 
a month before I attended a prenatal fair, and had received little response. The word of 
mouth referrals meant that I was referred to women who shared news of their pregnancy 
very early on; these women may have been more likely to decline prenatal screening or 
not be considering pregnancy termination in the event that a condition was found 
(Rothman, 1989). Of my final participant pool, 14 of the 16 women were recruited 
through ads on a pregnancy related site or at the Prenatal Fair. These women may be 
more active in seeking information about pregnancy than others. With that said, as 
discussed in manuscript four, there was one woman (Lucy) who chose not to seek 
information about prenatal screening and two women (Farah and Nadia) who chose to 
stop seeking information. All of these women were recruited through the Prenatal Fair,  
suggesting that perhaps attendance at the Prenatal Fair did not necessarily correlate with 
an interest in actively seeking information about prenatal screening. 
All participants were self-selected volunteers and so perhaps were more interested than 
average in research, or in the topic of prenatal screening. No honorarium was offered for 
participating. Participants  were offered the choice to be interviewed in person or over the 
phone; most preferred to be interviewed over the phone (nine of 16 women), even those 
who were recruited in person (seven out of ten women), perhaps reflecting convenience.  
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For those who were interviewed in person, I offered the option of a public place of their 
choosing, the public library, their home or my office (in London or Hamilton).  Two  
chose to be interviewed in their home, one in my office, one in a public library, and one 
in a coffee shop. Four of these interviews were longer than average, perhaps because we 
established better rapport, perhaps because there were few distractions, or perhaps 
because agreeing to meet somewhere indicated higher interest and a higher commitment 
of time to the interview.  The women with the shortest interviews were all interviewed 
over the phone, all recruited at the Prenatal Fair, and all participating in prenatal 
screening. Compared to the other participants they had average level of education, were 
average age, had some but not extensive knowledge of people with disabilities. These 
women may reflect participants that don't have particularly strong thoughts or feelings 
about prenatal screening who may not have responded to an online ad, but agreed to do 
an interview when personally recruited. 
3) I chose not to do a second interview or any form of member-checking because I was 
interested in capturing thoughts and opinions about prenatal screening before the woman 
had received any of her results (if participating). I reasoned that the results a woman 
received might colour her thoughts about the prenatal screening test, such as creating 
reassurance from anxiety in the event of a low-risk result.  At the time of the interview, 
women who were participating in prenatal screening were on average 15.6 weeks 
gestation (range:11-20 weeks). It is possible to receive results as early as 16 weeks along, 
which gave a very small window for transcribing and analyzing data in time for member-
checking. At the time of the interview, some women had the results appointment 
scheduled within days, making member-checking impossible for this group. I did not 
want to collect member-checking data from some but not all women, or to self-impose a 
timeline which would place pressure to conduct the analysis very quickly, meaning I 
might miss something important, or not be able to engage deeply with the analytical 
process. Instead of member-checking with the participant who provided the data, I 
decided to query future participants about emerging themes, and incorporate participant 
response to the evolving analysis in this way.  There was also an ethical element to the 
decision not to return to the participants for member-checking: with the possibility that 
some women may receive high-risk results, I did not want to re-open the conversation 
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about making a decision to participate in prenatal screening, which may potentially cause 
emotional stress, or heighten existing emotional stress. 
4) For the patient education material collection, I chose to restrict my data collection to 
Ontario or Canadian sources, in order to reflect the material that my participants were 
most likely to encounter. This means that I would include material published by a 
national organization (such as the SOGC) but not a provincial organization from outside 
of the province (for example an Alberta based public health unit).  I left flexibility in the 
inclusion criteria to include any pamphlet or material mentioned by a research 
participant. I chose to exclude books and websites, in order to keep the data collection 
focused and to remain within one genre of information. These inclusion criteria decisions 
were made to reflect the information that would be most likely be available to the 
interview participants in the study, but allow flexibility to account for the broad 
availability of information online. Many health organizations make their patient 
information publications available online, where they can be accessed by a broader 
population. Presumably any patient information materials I could find online can be 
accessed by my research participants. During data collection, about half of the women 
revealed that they were given patient information materials from their physicians. Only 
one could provide the title of the pamphlet, the others had discarded, forgotten, or 
misplaced their pamphlets.   
4.4 From research questions to manuscripts: the 
evolution of the research 
Grounded theory is a methodology which is useful when not much is known about a 
topic, as it aims to start by collecting broad data which will be continually refined 
through ongoing analysis throughout data collection (Charmaz, 2006). I started with one 
overarching research question and three sub-questions, aimed to address the three types 
of data I planned to collect. In the process of data collection and analysis, the questions 
were refined, to respond to the type of data available (in the case of the policy 
documents) and the evolving categories being identified through data analysis (all three 
types of data).  An additional round of refining the research questions  took place while 
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drafting each manuscript; in order to respond to what the data was saying and the 
particular story emerging from each data set.  
Manuscript one (Chapter 5) responds to the first research sub-question, "How do 
prenatal screening patient education materials portray concepts related to prenatal 
screening?".  I began this study by reading through patient education materials in 
order to gain an understanding of the type of information women may receive when 
choosing whether or not to participate in prenatal screening. As I was reading, 
particular terms and words started to jump out at me. The experience of reading the 
patient education materials was transformative, and may be considered a critical 
incident (Brookfield, 1998) or a "struck-by" moment (Cunliffe, 1999). At the time I 
was reading this material, I was deep in the literature, as necessitated by the 
requirements of my program. I was aware of some literature about potentially 
prejudicial terms about disability, such as "handicap", but what I noticed when I read 
was that the tone of some documents was persuasive, rather than informative. These 
two thoughts, about the potential of language to be prejudicial and persuasive, 
inspired me to think more deeply about word choices and the impact that they may 
have on women. I started to read more about theories of metaphor and the 
constructive power of language to shape and constrain understandings of the world, 
and of possibilities (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). At the same time, I was examining 
policy documents, and I became aware of the imperative for "non-directive" 
counseling in the SOGC clinical practice guideline (Summers et al, 2007). The story I 
chose to tell about these data addressed the ways in which theories of metaphor 
disrupt the notion that communication can be non-directive.   I closely examined the 
language and metaphors in the patient education materials to reflect upon ways in 
which they might be suggestive, persuasive, or otherwise directive of a particular way 
of thinking about pregnancy, disability and motherhood. 
Manuscript two (Chapter 6), began with sub-question two, "How do policies and 
guidelines shape the offer of prenatal screening?". When I wrote this research 
question, before I had conducted an in-depth search for policy documents, I imagined 
that I would find many different types of policy documents from different health 
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professions involved in prenatal screening (family physicians, obstetricians-
gynecologists, midwives, genetic counselors), different levels of government 
(provincial health insurance agencies, local health integration networks, funding 
formulas) and potentially some policy in the grey literature, from advocacy groups 
concerned with pregnancy, public health, or disability.  When I started to search, I 
found that this was not the case. Beyond the SOGC guideline which catalyzed my 
interest in this project (Summers et al, 2007), there was very little publicly available 
policy on prenatal screening. However, the policy that did exist was extremely 
important, precisely because there wasn't a lot of other guidance for health care 
professionals counseling about prenatal screening. From my initial literature search, 
one aspect of the SOGC guideline stood out as particularly important: non-directive 
counseling. This was interesting to me, because it indicated that the SOGC stood 
firmly behind the notion that screening should be the choice of the individual woman, 
and that they did not conceptualize it as some sort of population "health" issue.  I was 
also interested to note that the mention of non-directive counseling and informed 
decision-making merited only a brief mention, suggesting that physicians were 
assumed to be well acquainted with the pragmatic aspects of facilitating informed 
decision-making through a process of non-directive counseling. Yet, from my prior 
literature review I was familiar with a large body of evidence suggesting that this was 
not the case. At this point, I started to consider  how to represent my findings in a 
manner that would be appealing and helpful to clinicians. From regularly reading the 
Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology Canada, I knew that if I wanted to address this 
clinical audience, I had to write a policy or literature review piece, rather than a 
qualitative research piece  (see section 9.8.1 for more information), but this fit well, 
as they were the only group producing policy about prenatal screening.  With this 
understanding, and having identified non-directive counseling as a particular element 
of interest, I focused my study on this topic. This study examined SOGC policy 
directives, in light of the literature on non-directive counseling and other models of 
counseling for informed choice, to suggest an alternative to non-directive counseling, 
and to provide some detailed ideas for clinicians to consider regarding the ways in 
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which counseling to support informed decisions might take place in the specific 
context of prenatal screening.  
Manuscripts three and four (Chapters 7 and 8) both evolved from the third research 
sub-question, "How do women use information when making a decision about 
whether or not to participate in prenatal screening?". The data that I collected from 
women about their experiences of being offered and making a decision about whether 
or not to participate in prenatal screening were so rich that it would be impossible to 
tell all of the stories that I saw within these data.  During the iterative process of data 
collection and analysis, I quickly identified the concept of "information" as an 
important analytical construct, and pulled all mentions of "information" from the rest 
of the data, in order to consider the different ways in which women talked about this 
idea. This became manuscript three, through the iterative process of coding described 
in Figure 3, in the Data Analysis section (4.3.5.8). I observed that the literature on 
informed decision making constructed the idea of what it was to be "informed" in a 
very particular way, relying heavily on statistical and biomedical understandings. 
From Sherwin (1998), I understood that the social construction of rationality and 
being informed may contribute to problematic aspects of traditional conceptions of 
autonomy (for more detail see section 2.5).  With this in mind, I approached the data 
with the question of what information the women reported as important for their 
decision-making process about participation in prenatal screening. I wrote the first 
draft of the manuscript to portray these findings, however later then refined the 
categories to tell the story of what information women require in a manner which 
could be beneficial to clinicians, who are a significant source of information for 
women.  
In the fourth manuscript (Chapter 8), I examined the interview data as a whole, to 
consider the broader processes described by women as they talked about how they 
came to make a decision about participating in prenatal screening. In this manuscript I 
propose a grounded theory model which describes the whole process, portraying how 
women indicated that information was sought, received, and interpreted as they 
worked towards making a decision.  
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4.5 Conclusion 
This research examined the question of how the process of prenatal screening is enacted 
in Ontario in light of the 2007 SOGC guidelines, from the perspective of young women 
in their first pregnancy. This question was examined using an inductive grounded theory 
approach, and drew on data from three different sources: patient education materials, 
policy and guidelines, and pregnant women. In this chapter, I described the 
methodological approach (constructionist grounded theory) and the particular methods 
adopted for this study. In Chapter 9, I explore some of the connections between the 
different types of data and discuss the ways in which these three data sets enable a fuller 
understanding of the process of prenatal screening. 
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5 Critical Reflection and Prenatal Screening Public 
Education Materials: A Metaphoric Textual Analysis4 
 
“In most cases, what is at issue is not the truth or falsity of a metaphor, but the 
perceptions and inferences that follow from it and the actions that are sanctioned 
by it. In all aspects of life, not just in politics or in love, we define our reality in 
terms of metaphors and then proceed to act on the basis of the metaphors. We 
draw inferences, set goals, make commitments, and execute plans ... by means of 
metaphor” 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a p.158) 
5.1 Introduction 
This paper presents a study of prenatal screening educational materials that uses 
metaphoric textual analysis as a means of critical reflection to examine implicit messages 
in educational resources. An assumption of the study is that metaphoric language is 
important because it shapes our understanding of the world. Lakoff and Johnson (1980a, 
1980b) suggest that metaphors are used every time an abstract idea is discussed; they 
allow abstract ideas to be understood by comparing them to concrete ideas. This 
comparison highlights certain similarities, and disguises or de-emphasizes differences. 
Metaphors may also have the effect of creating similarities where none exist. The 
acceptance of metaphoric language without examination means an acceptance of the 
similarities with the comparative object which shapes the way an object/idea is 
conceptualized, discussed, and used.  
In 2007, the offer of prenatal screening was expanded. Previously, maternal age (>35 
years) was the main criterion when offering testing; after Society of Obstetricians and 
                                                 
4
 A version of this chapter has been published: Vanstone, M. & Kinsella, E.A. (2010). Critical Reflection 
and Prenatal Screening Public Education Materials: A Metaphoric Textual Analysis. Reflective Practice, 11 
(4), 451-467. 
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Gynecologists of Canada Clinical Practice Guideline (Summers, Langlois, Wyatt & 
Wilson, 2007), prenatal screening will be offered to all pregnant women in Canada. 
When instructing physicians to offer prenatal screening to all women, Summers et al 
(2007) explicitly state that counseling about this issue should be non-directive, promote 
choice, and be respectful of the needs and quality of life of people with disabilities. This 
study draws on metaphoric textual analysis to examine whether the written public 
education materials available to Canadian women are consistent with these aims. 
This paper begins with a brief examination of prenatal educational materials in the 
context of prenatal screening in Canada. This is followed by an explanation of the 
methodology and analytical approaches of the study. Findings from the prenatal 
screening public education pamphlets are presented, and highlight the figurative and 
metaphoric language identified in the educational resources.   
The discussion considers the ways in which prenatal screening education pamphlets may 
communicate subtle directives to women, and offers suggestions for the design of non-
directive prenatal screening educational materials. In addition the discussion considers 
the ways in which metaphoric analysis can foster critical reflection and reveal insights 
important for the design of educational materials in health care.  
It is important to note that discussions of prenatal screening can be morally charged due 
to their inherent relation to politicized and ethically contested ideas about disability and 
abortion. When educational materials are cast as “non-directive” or neutral, it may be 
difficult for patients, practitioners and educators to recognize the ideological assumptions 
embedded within. The authors of this paper do not wish to make moral or ethical 
judgments with respect to the findings, but rather to illuminate the issue so that those who 
design health education materials and those who use them may be better informed. 
5.2 Background 
This study began with a feeling of dissonance experienced while reading prenatal 
screening educational pamphlets.  The power of the language within the pamphlets was 
striking: specificities about “problems”, “diseases”, “defects” that could be detected 
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through “simple”, “quick”, blood and ultrasound tests, “allowing” women to “make 
decisions” about “ending the pregnancy”, or “providing reassurance” about a “healthy 
baby”.  Reading these pamphlets was a critical incident (Brookfield, 1998) or a critical 
vibration (Holloway, 2002) that prompted reflection about the implicit messages about 
pregnancy and disability communicated in prenatal screening educational materials.  
Holloway (2002) describes a critical vibration, or feeling of dissonance/frustration, as 
“The Scream”, which acts as a call to theoretical reflection5 from the opposition and 
struggle of everyday life. The Scream may take different forms: an inarticulate mumble 
of discontent, tears of frustration, a scream of rage, a feeling of unease, of confusion or of 
longing. Whether the dissonance we feel arises from direct or indirect experience, 
Holloway states that this is the starting point of reflective thought- not reason, not 
rational philosophizing, but dissonance and opposition.  Holloway’s critical vibration 
encapsulates the feeling and process of critical reflection that led to the study. 
One of the tenets of prenatal screening/testing discussions in Canada is non-directive 
counseling (Summers et al, 2007). Despite this clear guideline, the pamphlets appeared to 
use directive language cloaked in the guise of “choice” (Lippman, 1991).  Intensive 
reading revealed common metaphors and conceptual systems of metaphor that promoted 
prenatal tests as a way to “reassure” women about “healthy” babies and find “defective” 
fetuses in time for “termination of the pregnancy”. The prevalence of this directive 
message was unsettling and fostered critical reflection on the ways that certain common 
metaphors promote particular ideological messages. 
5.3 Prenatal Screening Educational Materials 
5.3.1 Prenatal screening in Canada. 
Prenatal screening is a probability calculation based on a number of factors. The 
calculation shows the chance that a fetus has some sort of aneuploidy, including an open 
                                                 
5
 Holloway does not connect this term with traditional Reflective Practice scholarship and related terms, 
although there is an echo of critical reflection in his description of the purpose and operation of theoretical 
reflection. 
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neural tube defect (e.g. spina bifida), chromosomal anomaly (e.g. Down syndrome), or 
physiological anomaly. There are many accepted variations of prenatal screening tests, 
depending on the resources of the geographical area in which the test is performed, and 
the time at which the woman presents for prenatal care (Summers et al, 2007). Generally, 
prenatal screening involves an ultrasound and maternal blood test. The results of these 
tests are used with the woman’s age to calculate a probability of fetal aneuploidy. 
Prenatal screening tests are not definitive, but are a non-invasive way of determining a 
probability. If the probability of aneuploidy is judged to be high, the woman can choose 
to engage in an invasive testing technique (such as chorionic villus sampling, or 
amniocentesis) that will provide a definitive result.  The invasive tests have risks of 
miscarriage, bleeding, malformation, and amniotic fluid aspiration (Brambati & Tului, 
2005; Farrell et al, 1999) so they are not used unless a non-invasive test establishes a 
probability of aneuploidy that is worrisome for the woman.  There is no cure or treatment 
for most of the aneuploidies detected by prenatal screening, and women who receive a 
positive screen for aneuploidy have the options of abortion, adoption, or increased time to 
prepare to raise a child with this condition.  
In 2007, prenatal screening policy in Canada changed significantly. A 2007 Clinical 
Practice Guideline issued by the Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists of Canada 
(Summers et al, 2007) mandated that prenatal screening must be offered to all pregnant 
women, in a non-directive way that promotes informed consent and choice (p. 147). 
Summers et al (2007) also specify that prenatal screening should be offered in a way that 
“shows respect for the needs and quality of life of persons with disabilities” (p. 147). The 
opportunity to access prenatal screening can be an important choice for Canadian women. 
However,  the offer  of prenatal screening and ensuing decisions require careful 
consideration. 
5.3.2 Prenatal public education pamphlets. 
 Public education pamphlets are used widely in medical screening programs (Fox, 2006) 
and are highly valued by women considering prenatal screening as a preferred way of 
obtaining information, second only to discussions with their physician (Dahl, Kesmodel, 
Hvidman & Olesen, 2006). However, the tone of information, word choice, and balance 
161 
 
of content provided can effect the way that patients make decisions about whether or not 
to engage in prenatal screening (Bryant et al, 2001; Dahl et al, 2006; Loeben, Marteau & 
Wilfond, 1998).  
Dixon-Woods (2001) discusses the discourse embedded in patient information pamphlets. 
She finds that most pamphlets are written from a “patient education” perspective, a 
discourse which characterizes patients as incompetent, passive, and forgetful. These 
pamphlets seek to educate patients in order to “bring patients’ knowledge into line with 
what is medically ‘correct’” (pg. 1419) and to ensure compliance with biomedical 
priorities. Raffle (2001) discusses the way screening pamphlets are used to encourage 
uptake of screening, rather than provide information to encourage choice.  A recent 
review of the literature about patient education pamphlets reveals that they are used to 
save time in a medical consultation, achieve cost-benefits for the health care system, and 
as a substitute for expensive professional time (Dixon-Woods, 2001). Dixon-Woods 
(2001) theorizes that a contrasting discourse to “patient education” pamphlets is “patient 
empowerment” pamphlets. Patient empowerment pamphlets aim to provide information 
as a means of empowering patients to make informed choices, rather than correcting them 
or persuading them to acquiesce to biomedical priorities.  
5.3.3 Prenatal screening educational materials and non-
directive language 
The process of decision making around prenatal screening has been well studied in 
Britain, the USA, and Australia. Current public education materials about prenatal 
screening and testing in these countries have been critiqued for: requiring literacy levels 
above that of a general audience (Freda, Damus & Merkatz, 1999); insufficient 
information to make decisions about testing (Shepperd et al, 2006); negative tone (Bryant 
et al, 2001; Loeben et al, 1998); omission of information (Van den Heuvel et al 2008); 
and language that may be viewed as prejudicial (Hodgson, Hughes & Lambert, 2005). 
Public education materials with these issues are problematic with respect to the goal of 
facilitating non-directive counseling and informed choice as necessitated by the Clinical 
Practice Guideline governing this procedure (Summers et al, 2007).  
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Many studies address the explicit information included in the pamphlet, such as the 
balance of information (Bryant et al, 2001), number of positive and negative descriptive 
statements about conditions tested for (Loeben et al, 1998), or content of information 
provided (Dahl et al, 2006). Previous studies often mention the affect that word choice 
can have on the perception of particular conditions and decision making, however such 
studies do not investigate particular words and their implicit messages. 
Non-directive counseling, which involves providing sufficient and comprehensive 
information in a neutral fashion in order to encourage the client to make an informed 
choice, is one of the original tenets of genetic counseling (Fine, 1993; Weil, 2003). 
Although long considered the “norm” in genetic counseling practice (Burke & Kolker, 
1994) some authors argue that non-directive counseling may be impossible to fully 
achieve (Anderson, 1999; Bartels, LeRoy, McCarthy & Caplan, 1997; Cunningham-
Barley & Kerr, 1999; Williams et al, 2002). Others wonder if it is even desirable 
(Anderson, 1999; Benkendorf, Prince, Rose, Fina & Hamilton, 2001; Caplan, 1993; 
Clarke, 1994; Gervais, 1993; Weil, 2003) as it may prevent the client from accessing the 
full value of the counselor’s professional knowledge and expertise. Nonetheless, the 
current guidelines (Summers et al, 2007) advocate non-directive counseling as an 
imperative to prenatal screening counseling; the central concern of this study is to 
analyze the pamphlets with attention to implicit messages that may be directive. 
In light of this review, the questions of the current study are: What are the primary 
metaphors and figurative expressions embedded within PNS educational pamphlets 
available to pregnant women in Canada? What does critical reflection on these metaphors 
reveal about implicit messages embedded within the educational materials? What are the 
implications for the design of future prenatal screening health education pamphlets?  
5.4 Metaphoric Textual Analysis 
This study, one component of a larger grounded theory study about the process of 
prenatal screening, used a textual analysis technique we have called Metaphoric Textual 
Analysis, informed by the work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980a, 1980b), Charteris-Black 
(2004), and Schmitt (2000, 2005).  A metaphor is a linguistic device that describes one 
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(abstract) idea by comparing it to another (concrete) idea (Lakoff  & Johnson 1980a). For 
example, when an ultrasound image is described as a “picture”, the abstract idea is the 
interpretation of sonic data to create a visual image. This is described in terms of a 
concrete idea (a picture is a visual image that is not the interpretation of sonic data). This 
visual metaphor is extended when we speak of an ultrasound letting the mother “see” the 
baby; the word “see” is a metaphor because no visual information is used, a literal 
description would be that an ultrasound lets the mother see a visual image compiled from 
a mechanical interpretation of sonic/aural data.  This level of literal detail can be 
cumbersome; the metaphor facilitates understanding by comparing the abstract idea to a 
concrete one. However, when a comparison is made certain similarities are highlighted 
while differences are de-emphasized. This emphasis/de-emphasis may direct a particular 
understanding of the abstract idea. 
Metaphoric textual analysis is an approach that analyzes metaphors within textual 
material in order to critically reflect on various interpretive messages, and ideological 
strains within the text. Such an approach is based on the assumption that metaphors are 
fundamental to how humans understand the world (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a), and that 
different levels of reflection may be engaged through metaphoric thought (Charteris-
Black, 2004). An examination of metaphoric systems can help to reveal particular 
ideologies which may inform that system (Charteris-Black, 2004; Lakoff 2002). 
Metaphor can also be used to prompt reflection (Kinsella, 2000), examine unstated 
opinions and assumptions (Charmaz, 2006), uncover bias created by provision of 
unintentional information (Kitzinger, 1999), and to foster insight into the way an 
individual or society systematically organizes the world (Lakoff &  Johnson, 1980a). 
Metaphor has been used in critical textual analysis to reveal ideologies (Fraser, 2006; 
Lule, 2004; Martin, 1984, 1987, 1991; Sontag, 1978; Taylor, 1998, 2008) and has been 
developed into an analytical technique (Schmitt 2000, 2005).  
5.4.1 Assumptions about metaphor . 
More than just a linguistic flourish, metaphor is a way of thinking and persuading 
(Charteris-Black, 2004). Metaphor acts as an interpretive bridge between abstract and 
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concrete ideas, thus structuring the way we conceptualize the world (Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980a). Metaphor creates particular boundaries around the way we can think about and 
interact with a particular topic. Lakoff and Johnson (1980a, 1980b) explain how the way 
we conceptualize a concept systematically influences the way that concept takes place, 
the way we think about that concept, the way we interact with that concept. Metaphors 
also act to fill gaps in a lexicon; this may be semantic, accommodating changes in a 
conceptual system, or pragmatic, conveying specific intentions of the speaker (Charteris-
Black, 2004). Many metaphors are conceptually related. Lakoff and Johnson (1980a) use 
the example of Argument Is War; there are multiple metaphors about arguing that 
compare it to battling (e.g. attack a position, indefensible, strategy, new line of attack, 
win, gain ground etc.) These expressions form a systematic way of talking (and thinking) 
about arguing; they also shape the way we enact arguing, as an adversarial process where 
there is a winner and loser, attacks, counter attacks, defences etc.  How might our 
interpretations be different if we thought and spoke about argument in terms of 
metaphors of dancing?  Dancing metaphors may encourage consideration of  the co-
operative and artful aspects of arguing, ideas which are hidden or de-emphasized when 
describing argument with the metaphors of war. 
Metaphor influences understanding in a way that may give false impressions of 
physiological systems that may lead to incorrect notions of the body, anatomy, and 
medicine (Banks & Thompson, 1996), change treatment decisions  (Martin, 1984), affect 
the understanding of cellular processes (Brown, 2003; Martin, 1991), and even change 
the path of investigation and conceptualization of DNA and genetics (Kay, 2000).  
5.5 Critical Reflection 
Metaphoric textual analysis invokes a process of critical reflection on the implicit 
messages and ideological stances that may be embedded within the metaphors used in the 
text. It questions the taken-for-granted meanings of the language used, encouraging these 
meanings to be challenged and reconsidered. Critical reflection is a term with multiple 
meanings that has been used across several disciplines. In this project we engaged with 
the idea of critical reflection as ideology critique (Brookfield, 1998, 2000, 2005). This 
approach to critical reflection focuses on becoming aware of the ways in which an 
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ideology affects social relations by imposing particular assumptions and belief systems 
(ideologies) which encourage, support, and maintain particular ways of viewing the 
world (Brookfield, 2000, 2005). Critical reflection is the first step to ideology critique, 
encouraging recognition of the ways ideology operates in the world. Critical reflection 
helps produce what Joe Kincheloe calls “a meta-awareness of the way consciousness is 
constructed” (2008, p. 218), in this instance through language. Such a recognition aids in 
the identification and analysis of the way we work in the world and the way the world 
works in us (Kincheloe, 2008).  
Critical reflection is based on the idea that decisions and actions originate from a 
consideration of the broader moral, ethical, political and historical context (Yost, Sentner 
& Forlenza-Bailey, 2000) with a focus on ends as well as means (Zeichner, 1981). 
Critical reflection is focused on “helping people come to an awareness of how an 
[ideological system] shapes social relations and imposes - often without our knowledge - 
belief systems and assumptions” (Brookfield, 2000, p.36). Ideology critique aims to 
reveal hidden insights about the nature of the “taken for granted” world (Brookfield, 
2000). In short, critical reflection informs the methodology of the current study in a 
number of ways. First, critical reflection allows taken-for-granted meanings in the public 
education pamphlets to be questioned and different possible interpretive understandings 
to be explored.  Second, critical reflection draws attention to implicit ideological 
messages in the public education materials, and the actions these messages propose.  
 
5.6 Texts: Inclusion Criteria 
Thirteen prenatal screening public education pamphlets were included in the study (Table 
4). The following inclusion criteria were used to identify texts in the study: publicly 
available; available in English; aimed at women considering prenatal screening; written 
for an Ontario or Canadian audience; major focus is prenatal screening (although texts 
which also discuss prenatal testing were eligible); available free of charge; available 
online. Pamphlets aimed at professionals, written by a non-Canadian organization, or that 
address only prenatal testing were excluded. Inclusion and exclusion criteria did not 
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address the date of publication of the pamphlet; if the pamphlet was available at the time 
of the search, it was eligible for inclusion.  
Table 4: Prenatal screening patient education pamphlets 
Author Title URL 
Canadian Down 
Syndrome Society 
Prenatal Testing and 
Down Syndrome 
http://www.ahsc.health.nb.ca/prenatal 
screening/pamphlet.htm 
Early Prenatal Risk 
Assessment Program 
First Trimester Combined 
Screening (FTS) 
http://www.earlyriskassessment.com/Porta
ls/0/FTS%20Information%20Brochure_v2
.pdf 
Genetics Education 
Project 
For Women and Their 
Families .... A guide to 
understanding prenatal 
screening tests 
http://www.barriemidwives.com/info/Pren
atal-
Screening_A_Guide_to_Understanding.pd
f 
Mt. Sinai Hospital Integrated Pregnancy 
Screening (IPS) 
http://www.mountsinai.on.ca/care/pdmg/te
sts/ips 
Ontario Ministry of 
Health and Long 
Term Care 
Ontario Prenatal Screening http://www.health.gov.on.ca/english/publi
c/program/child/prenatal/ 
Ontario Multiple 
Marker Screening 
Program 
Ontario Multiple Marker 
Screening Program 
http://tbh.net/programs_&_services/matern
ity_centre/ontario_multiple_marker_scree
ning.pdf 
Ontario Maternal 
Serum Screening 
Committee 
Maternal Serum 
Screening: it’s your choice 
http://www.lhsc.on.ca/programs/rmgc/mss
/pamphlet.htm 
Ontario Maternal Integrated Prenatal http://www.lhsc.on.ca/programs/rmgc/mss
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Serum Screening 
Committee 
Screening (IPS): it’s your 
choice 
/pamphlet.htm 
Northwestern Ontario 
Regional Genetics 
Program 
Integrated Prenatal 
Screening (IPS): Pamphlet 
http://www.tbdhu.com/NR/rdonlyres/286B
4AC5-E2D0-4FFC-B7F0-
DE83E576BBD8/0/integratedprenatalscre
eningbrochure.pdf 
Northwestern Ontario 
Regional Genetics 
Program 
Prenatal Screening and 
Testing Options 
http://www.tbdhu.com/clinics/genetics/gen
etics+pamphlets.htm 
Northwestern Ontario 
Regional Genetics 
Program 
Integrated Prenatal 
Screening (IPS): Fact 
Sheet 
http://www.tbdhu.com/NR/rdonlyres/A792
B615-AC33-42DF-91B6-
59CD2DAE8BA5/0/integratedprenatalscre
ening.pdf 
Society of 
Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists of 
Canada 
Prenatal Diagnosis: Public 
Education Pamphlet 
http://www.sogc.org/health/pdf/prenatal_e.
pdf 
Warnex Medical 
Laboratories 
Prenatest: Prenatal 
Screening Test 3rd 
Generation 
http://www.warnex.ca/docs/prenatest.en.p
df 
The educational pamphlets were obtained through an online search of health care 
agencies, professional colleges, advocacy groups, industry groups, and government 
programs operating in Ontario, Canada. Search strategies were limited to public search 
engines in order to locate educational material that is accessible to the public. A list of 
search terms is included in Table 5.  
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Table 5: Search terms (each +Canada, +Ontario) 
Prenatal screening pamphlet  Screen positive, down 
syndrome  
Maternal serum screening 
Integrated pregnancy 
screening 
Integrated prenatal 
screening 
Prenatal screening, 
brochure 
Should I get prenatal 
screening? 
Prenatal screening test Prenatal screening, patient 
education 
Prenatal screening, patient 
information 
 
 
5.7 Analysis  
Schmitt’s (2000, 2005) Systematic Metaphor Analysis, based on Lakoff and Johnson’s 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory, was adopted to guide the analysis of this study. The 
analysis began with an initial review of each pamphlet; metaphors, figurative, and 
questionable language were circled. The metaphors and figurative language were then 
identified using a word by word coding strategy (Schmitt, 2000, 2005), and grouped both 
across and within individual pamphlets. This grouping facilitated the identification of key 
conceptual metaphors that established a lexicon of metaphoric concepts.  Each conceptual 
metaphor system, or series of conceptually related metaphors, was used for interpretive 
and reconstructive analysis. Various possible interpretations of each conceptual metaphor 
system were then considered using critical reflection.  
5.7.1 Metaphors of prenatal screening. 
The metaphoric textual analysis of the pamphlets identified many examples of metaphors 
reflected both in figurative language and in particular discrete metaphors. Some of the 
most salient examples are included below as illustrative examples. The quotes are drawn 
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from the prenatal screening educational resources identified earlier, and identified by 
resource number.    
5.7.2 Figurative language. 
Figurative language is a term that refers to a word, or group of words, which do not have 
a literal definition (denotation), or which has a connotation that may add layers of 
meaning. For example the word “embryo” does not have a concrete definition- the 
progression between a blastocyst/embryo/ fetus is defined idiosyncratically (Nisker, 
Baylis, Karpin, McLeod & Mykitiuk 2009). Figurative language in this study was found 
to be: neutral or suggestive, non-directive or directive, clear or indirect, and able-ist or 
oriented toward disability rights. 
5.7.3 Neutral versus suggestive terminology. 
Neutral terminology is difficult to achieve in prenatal education materials, as seemingly 
neutral words such as baby and fetus carry implicit assumptions. One pamphlet used 
neutral terminology by adopting the word “pregnancy” throughout. Six pamphlets 
consistently used the word “baby”, and two pamphlets differentiated between fetus/baby 
at the point of birth.  Other pamphlets used the term “fetus” or “embryo” to refer to an 
affected pregnancy or decision to abort, and “baby” or “infant” when promoting 
reassurance provided by the test, or the desire to have an unaffected child. This 
terminology can be suggestive in various ways. As an example, one can readily see that 
the phrase “your choice to abort your infant” has a different interpretive and emotional 
meaning than “your choice to abort the fetus”. Suggestive terminology was more evident 
in some pamphlets than others. For instance one pamphlet declared that a serum screen 
performed in the second trimester can “pick up approximately 60% of infants with Down 
Syndrome” (#2). The use of suggestive terminology such as baby/fetus can disrupt the 
goal of non-directive or neutral counseling, but it can also function ideologically. The 
ethically and morally charged nature of these words can communicate an ideological 
directive to the reader. A full discussion of the implications of the use of such morally 
charged words is beyond the scope of the current paper. 
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5.7.4 Non-directive versus directive language 
The language in the pamphlets could be seen to be directive to different degrees within 
the pamphlet. For instance, the meaning of the screening results can be quite directive of 
what should be done after receiving results.  A less directive way of describing results is 
to describe what they mean without a value judgment. For example, “screen negative 
means a lower chance of Down syndrome” (#8) is less directive than using a negative 
result to create a dichotomy between health in opposition to disability. This dichotomy is 
created when a negative result  is said to lead to “the birth of a healthy baby” (#7), 
“perfect baby” (#3), or “normal baby” (#9). Conversely, a result is less directive when 
described in terms of information currently available, without judgment about future 
possibilities. For example, describing a positive result as a higher chance of a “birth 
anomaly” (#1) is less directive than describing a positive test result in terms of a 
“severely affected baby” (#2). 
The way some of the pamphlets portray what the test offers to a woman (or couple) can 
be directive, for instance when the pamphlet implies how the woman will feel about her 
result.   Promising feelings of reassurance, choice, and control in the event of a negative 
screening result can direct women to participate in testing, i.e.  “normal results of 
prenatal screening are reassuring” (#7).  This language omits possible feelings of anxiety 
or worry the woman may experience if she receives a positive result from the screen. 
Many pamphlets omitted discussion of possible feelings and decisions to be made if a 
positive result is received, although one discussed this issue in great detail (#11). Less 
directive language would include specific information about decisions and plans that can 
be made in the event of a positive result, i.e. “prepare for the birth of a baby who may 
require additional care, opportunities for prenatal preparation and education of family 
members, choice to terminate the pregnancy” (#3). 
Another example of directive language was found in the word “risk” which was 
frequently used in the materials examined. When pamphlets describe the results as 
conveying a “risk”, this may be seen as implicitly directive because the word risk has a 
negative connotation. For instance, we don’t talk about someone having a risk of winning 
the lottery. A less directive word is one which conveys the likelihood of the results 
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without a value judgment, for example incidence (#8), chance (#11, 12), or probability 
(#8).  
5.7.5 Clear versus indirect language. 
Abortion is an integral concept to prenatal screening, since most of the conditions tested 
for do not have treatments, or cures. Prenatal screening is usually offered under the 
assumption that women can choose to have an abortion if they do not wish to give birth 
to a child with an aneuploidy. Many pamphlets fail to state this fact clearly, using vague 
phrases such as “make a decision about this pregnancy” (#5) or euphemisms like “choose 
whether or not to continue with pregnancy” (#2). Often the word “termination” is used, 
although Grimes and Stuart (2010) find this to be vague and confusing, since all 
pregnancies terminate eventually- in birth, miscarriage, or abortion.  Only one pamphlet 
used the word “abortion” (#11).  
A number of pamphlets do not address the issue of what to do with test results, or what 
choices are available beyond the opportunity to engage in further testing. When this issue 
is addressed, it is often set as a dichotomy: abortion or no abortion.  For instance, 
pamphlet #2 states that women should make the decision to participate in testing “after 
considering what they would do if the results suggested there was a problem”, although 
the pamphlet does not discuss any option beyond  “make a decision regarding continuing 
the pregnancy”. Pamphlets 3 and 11 give some alternative options after receiving a 
positive screening result, including adoption, preparation for the birth of a baby with 
special needs, and education of self, friends, and family members.    
5.7.6 Able-ist versus disability rights language. 
Many of the pamphlets analyzed for this project contained distinctly able-ist assumptions.  
Words such as “healthy”, “normal”, and “perfect” were placed in opposition to 
“difference” and “genetic condition”. Genetic conditions and physiological differences 
are described as “birth defects”, “problems”, and “abnormalities”. The screening tests are 
constructed as providing “reassurance”, and offering “choice”, allowing the 
mother/couple to “make decisions about how to proceed”.  Prenatal screening tests rarely 
detect conditions that can be ameliorated through therapy; most times the “choice” 
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offered is about whether to abort a wanted child based on a numerical “risk” that fetus 
may have a genetic condition or physiological difference. Disability rights advocates 
point out that prenatal screening frequently makes assumptions about “who” ie. able-
bodied, “normal”, “perfect” people, are of value to the world (Parens & Asch 2000). 
5.7.7 Metaphors 
The pamphlets were filled with metaphors, including metaphors that described biological 
and technological processes (e.g. test is performed, blood is collected, cross the barrier, 
rearrangement of pieces of chromosomes, genetic material, carry a baby), and 
administrative issues (the cost is covered, the test is provided for). Sometimes metaphors 
were used as euphemisms (losing the pregnancy, assuming the costs of a test that is not 
covered). Some words that we use as nouns are also metaphors (labour, delivery, 
miscarriage). A number of metaphors reflected strong “able-ist” ideological assumptions. 
Many of these metaphors occurred in multiple pamphlets. Three metaphors that dominate 
the field are presented below: birth defect, prenatal screening, and prenatal testing. 
5.7.7.1 Birth defect. 
Birth Defect is a commonly used metaphor that was frequently seen in the educational 
pamphlets. Such a metaphor may be seen as implicitly comparing a fetus to a defective 
product.   This metaphor may be interpreted as commodifying the fetus by emphasizing 
that something is wrong, useless, abnormal, flawed, or not functioning, that it is less 
valuable than similar “products” without a defect. “Birth Defect” may also be seen as 
comparing birth to production, reinforcing the idea of fetuses as products and mothers as 
producers. According to Rothman (1989), the commodification of conception implicitly 
places the blame for a birth defect on the mother- the “inept worker” (p.6).   
5.7.7.2 Prenatal screening. 
The metaphor prenatal screening, adopted as the dominant phrase by the medical 
community, may also be interpreted as participating in the Birth as Production 
conceptual system. Prenatal screening acts as “quality control”, separating wanted fetuses 
from unwanted. Screening is the process of examining a number of objects and sorting 
173 
 
them based on pre-determined criteria; keeping the good, and discarding the bad. Prenatal 
screening may be viewed as a metaphor for the process of sifting, of running material 
through a sieve (or screen), which catches some pieces of material and lets others fall 
through. Kress (2006) observes that in the “screen” metaphor “the sense of partitioning is 
strongly present; ... there is stuff on the one side that does not reach the other- and is not 
supposed to- the stuff on the one side is actively sorted so as to make it suitable for 
whatever uses there may be on the other” (pg 201).  When a baker screens, or sifts, flour, 
she places the raw material on the sieve and lets most fall through (fetuses without 
aneuploidy), but the size of the hole in the sieve (diagnostic criteria) catches the 
undesirable material (fetuses with aneuploidy), allowing it to be subject to further 
scrutiny and then discarded (aborted) if it is not up to a pre-determined standard.  This 
metaphor disguises the fact that the diagnostic criteria are arbitrary. While some people 
may consider Down syndrome to be a problem, others would not agree; the inclusion of a 
condition in a list of unspecified “birth defects” or “problems” does not allow individual 
women to think about particularities. The discourse has already decided particular 
conditions are a defective way of living, expressed by naming that condition a “defect”.  
5.7.7.3 Prenatal testing. 
Prenatal testing is also a metaphor, that may be seen as describing the procedure not as 
information seeking, but as information validating. A test is something that can be 
influenced: diligent test takers will pass, proving their knowledge, worth, or utility; 
negligent test takers will fail, proving their laziness, ignorance, or uselessness. A test is 
evaluated as pass/fail, and these are valued accordingly. By describing prenatal screening 
as a test, the true nature of the procedure may be seen to be disguised. A prenatal 
screening test seeks information, it does not validate the information provided by a 
woman. The woman being tested cannot do anything to influence the outcome, and her 
past actions have not affected the outcome in any way. By using the word test, 
responsibility for the outcome is placed on the mother. Although results from prenatal 
tests are described as positive/negative, ideological messages (as outlined in the rest of 
this paper) may implicitly communicate what the desired result should be; women may 
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internalize this and interpret the reception of desired result (negative for aneuploidy) as 
“passing the test”. 
5.8 Discussion 
Prenatal screening is now a routine part of prenatal care for pregnant women of all ages 
in the Canadian context (Summers et al, 2007). Education about this process and the 
consequent choices available to women is an important complement to clinical practice. 
Yet, critical reflection through metaphor analysis reveals that the language used within 
such educational material has not achieved the level of  neutrality necessitated by the 
requirements of non-directive counseling. Indeed subtle ideological messages may be 
seen to be conveyed through metaphoric and figurative language, and these messages 
may implicitly guide women in the choices they make about their pregnancies.  
Metaphor is an inextricable component of language, and so the presence of metaphor 
within the educational pamphlets is not in itself problematic. Rather, the analysis reveals 
that metaphors may contain ideological messages that appear so natural and self-evident 
that they may not be questioned, even though they may guide or influence women’s 
understandings, actions and choices. It is this dimension which is of concern. This 
implicit directive to conform to biomedical objectives is what Dixon-Woods (2001) 
refers to as “patient education” discourse and is prevalent in most of the pamphlets in this 
study. Some pamphlets, notably (#8 and 11), participate in a “patient empowerment” 
discourse, presenting comprehensive information without directives, so women can 
evaluate the information and decide how they wish to proceed. 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980a) contend that we are not aware of the ways that metaphors 
construct our conceptual system, because we react to that conceptual system 
automatically. The subversive potential of metaphor rests on the assertion that they are 
“so natural and so pervasive in our thought that they are usually taken as self evident” 
(Lakoff & Johnson 1980a p.29).  Recognition of the subversive power of metaphor calls 
to mind Foucault’s conceptualization of discourse. Foucault (1972) views discourse as a 
group of institutionalized statements (including any type of utterance) about a particular 
topic (or object) that functions to form that topic. A discourse is a regulated group of 
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statements which can combine with other discourses in predictable ways- there are “rules 
which lead to the distribution and circulation of certain utterances and statements … but 
rather than seeing discourse as simply a set of statements which have some coherence, we 
should think of a discourse as existing because of a complex set of practices which try to 
keep them in circulation and other practices which try to keep other statements out of 
circulation” (Mills, 2003, p. 54). Discourse is the manifestation of thought into language 
and defines the ways we can talk or think about that topic (or object), therefore defining 
the truth of that topic (or object) (Blood, 2005). By defining the truth of an object, 
discourse shapes and constrains our ways of understanding the world.  Unreflective 
acceptance of a particular discourse shapes the way we perceive reality. This study has 
used metaphoric textual analysis as a means to engage in critical reflection, and to 
question some of the taken-for-granted messages conveyed in prenatal screening 
educational material.  
Many of the pamphlets analyzed contained distinctly able-ist assumptions. This discourse 
promotes a particular conclusion or choice of action before any other information is 
established (i.e. information such as what is the condition, what is it like to live with that 
condition, what is it like to raise a child with that condition, what resources are available 
etc.). Conclusions are promoted through rhetorical features such as construction of the 
oppositions of normal/abnormal, health/disability, reassurance/worry, which create an 
idea of what type of person is valued, and construct the way that pregnant women can 
think about their future child. Discourses of choice and reassurance, and problems, 
decisions, solutions compose an internal logic of seek-detect-destroy. When a physician 
offers a test to “reassure” a new mother that her baby is “healthy”, how can she dispute 
the definition of healthy, or contest that reassurance may not be provided? 
One of the strongest assumptions present in the prenatal screening pamphlets is that 
people with disabilities are “defective”, and would be better off if they had never been 
born. An alternative idea, one mentioned in only one pamphlet by the Canadian Down 
Syndrome Society, is that people are differently abled. Just as society provides resources 
and support to average people in the form of public transportation, public education etc., 
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people with disabilities are entitled to similar support in order to promote healthy, 
productive lives (Wendell, 1996).  
One prevalent metaphor system revealed in the analysis was the notion of Birth as 
Production. Martin (1987), Katz Rothman (1989) and Taylor (2008) have described this 
metaphor as conceptualizing the fetus as product, mother as labourer, and doctor as 
manager. Taylor (2008) has extended this metaphor to show how prenatal diagnostic 
testing via ultrasound “represents a way in which doctor/managers try to make sure that 
fetuses, whose production they oversee, are of consistently high quality” (Taylor 2008 
p.119). Katz Rothman has named this “‘quality control’ on the assembly line of the 
products of conception, separating out those products we wish to develop from those we 
wish to discontinue” (Katz Rothman 1989, p.8). 
The metaphor of Birth as Production provides an example of the way metaphor can 
implictly shape our perception of reality  and our understanding of concepts. For 
example, when women are asked if they want to have a prenatal test on the basis of the 
information that “2-3% of babies born ha[ve] some type of major birth defect” (#2), they 
may consider the test differently than if asked if they want to participate in a screening 
test to tell “the CHANCE [original emphasis] of having a baby with Down syndrome, 
trisomy 18, or an open neural tube defect” (#11). The metaphor of “defect” is scary. It 
participates in the Birth as Production metaphor system by comparing a fetus to a 
manufactured product that doesn’t work, is faulty, mis-formed, should be sent back. This 
metaphor is misleading; persons living with Down syndrome or spina bifida may not 
think of themselves as defective.  However, by using metaphors that analogize a fetus to 
a defective manufactured product, the test becomes more desirable- the conceptual 
metaphor implies that prenatal screening is a “quality control” test, to find and eliminate 
products that are not made to a certain standard. This metaphor is subversive because it 
judges the value of people living with certain conditions, without naming those 
conditions so the reader can investigate and decide for herself.  
Implications for future prenatal screening public education pamphlets are simple to state, 
but may be difficult to achieve. Critical reflection on the figurative language and 
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metaphors used in this literature is essential. Educational writers are advised to critically 
interrogate the metaphors and figurative language used and the implicit messages that 
such language conveys.  What messages are being conveyed to women, both implicitly 
and explicitly? What assumptions about disability may be implicitly present? What are 
the beliefs, values and opinions of the writer and how are these portrayed through word 
choices? What ideological messages permeate the dominant discourses surrounding this 
procedure? How might information be conveyed that supports the aim of informed choice 
and non-directive counseling?  
5.9 Conclusion 
This project does not aim to abolish metaphors from public education literature, nor does 
it aim to demonize prenatal screening. Access to prenatal screening is an important 
resource for Canadian women. However, it is important that each woman receive 
thorough information in a sensitive manner, so she can carefully consider her feelings, 
opinions, and options. While many of the pamphlets analysed in this study include 
problematic language, some provide comprehensive information stated in simple, neutral 
terms. As non-directive educational materials that promote informed choice, the 
pamphlets published by Mt. Sinai Hospital and the Genetics Education Project were 
exemplary. They included comprehensive information and avoided many of the subtle 
ideological directives present in other materials.  
The universalization of prenatal screening in Canada (Summers et al, 2007) brings access 
to this procedure to a wider demographic of patients, but also provides instructions about 
how prenatal screening should be presented. Many of the metaphors currently used in 
prenatal screening patient literature do not support the counseling goals of non-
directiveness, informed choice, and respect for the needs and quality of life of persons 
with disabilities as mandated by the Clinical Practice Guideline governing this practice 
(Summers et al, 2007). A critical examination of the language in these pamphlets reveals 
a need for more careful attention to the language used in patient education materials with 
the aim to empower women to make an informed choice. This study shows how 
metaphoric textual analysis can be used as a means of critical reflection that reveals 
ideological assumptions in supposed neutral educational materials. The findings have 
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implications for the design of accurate and sensitive prenatal screening educational 
materials, aimed at empowering women to make informed choices.  
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6 Information-Sharing to Promote Informed Choice in 
Prenatal Screening in the Spirit of the SOGC 
Clinical Practice Guideline: A Proposal for an 
Alternative Model 6 
6.1 Introduction 
The 2011 Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists of Canada’s Clinical Practice 
Guideline “Prenatal Screening for Fetal Aneuploidy in Singleton Pregnancies”(Chitayat, 
Langlois, & Wilson, 2011) recommends that clinicians, most frequently physicians, 
nurses, and midwives, offer non-invasive prenatal screening for chromosomal anomalies 
and incomplete neural tube closures to every pregnant woman. The Guideline 
recommends that clinicians provide “understandable” information about the screening 
tests in a “non-directive” manner in order to “ensure informed decision-making”(Chitayat 
et al., 2011). This recommendation is consistent with the 2007 SOGC Guideline on 
prenatal screening for fetal aneuploidy (Summers, Langlois, Wyatt, & Wilson, 2007), 
encouraging each woman to evaluate her options and consider her preferred course of 
action in relation to her particular situation, experiences, and personal values (Chitayat et 
al., 2011; Summers et al., 2007). However, recent research in genetic counseling has 
raised concerns that non-directive counseling is neither possible (Kirklin, 2007) nor 
desirable (Weil, 2003; Williams, Alderson, & Farsides, 2002) and may not be the best 
way to facilitate informed choice (Elwyn, Gray, & Clarke, 2000; Kirklin, 2007; Weil, 
2003). We consider here whether non-directive counseling may unintentionally create 
obstacles to the SOGC Guideline’s goal of an informed counseling process leading to 
autonomous decision-making, and propose an alternative approach specific to the context 
of prenatal screening that combines aspects of informative (Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992)  
and shared models of decision-making (Charles, Gafni, & Whelan, 1997; Charles, Gafni, 
& Whelan, 1999; Charles, Whelan, & Gafni, 1999).  
                                                 
6
 A version of this chapter has been published: Vanstone, M., Kinsella, E.A., & Nisker, J. (2012). 
Information-sharing to promote informed choice in the spirit of the SOGC clinical practice guideline: A 
proposal for an alternative model. Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology Canada, 34 (3),  269-275.  The 
copyright of this article is held by the Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists of Canada (SOGC). 
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6.2 Prenatal Screening for Fetal Aneuploidy 
The process of prenatal screening requires pregnant women to make a decision that is 
qualitatively different from most other patient decisions because of the necessity to 
understand and integrate complex and value-sensitive concepts in a context where there is 
no single “right” decision. When deciding whether or not to participate in prenatal 
screening, a woman must consider the potential for additional decisions about diagnostic 
testing and pregnancy termination (Wilson et al., 2005), as well as psychosocial risks to 
herself (Parens & Asch, 2000; Press, Browner, & Tran, 1998; Rapp, 1999; Rothman, 
1993) that may arise. These concepts are considered in conjunction with the woman’s 
personal values and circumstances (Durand, Stiel, Boivin, & Elwyn, 2010; Markens, 
Browner, & Preloran, 2010). As prenatal screening requires women to make a type of 
decision that is different from most other medical procedures, it requires a type of 
decision-making process that is different from that suggested by traditional models of 
informed consent (Whitney, McGuire, & McCullough, 2004; Whitney et al., 2008) or the 
models of informative (Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992) or shared decision-making (Charles 
et al., 1997; Charles et al., 1999; Charles, Whelan et al., 1999; Emery, 2001).  
6.3 Informed Choice and Autonomy 
A narrow conception of autonomy may be problematic in light of the social and cultural 
contexts within which women make decisions about prenatal screening (Thachuk, 2007). 
Code (1991) and Sherwin (McLeod & Sherwin, 2000; Sherwin, 1992; Sherwin, 1998) 
posit that the way autonomous informed choice is enacted can be problematic for patients 
who do not fit the ideal of the autonomous decision-maker; the model of autonomous 
decision-making assumes patients to be self-sufficient, independent, articulate, 
accustomed to making decisions, and possessed of the resources necessary to allow a 
range of choices. In addition, physicians are assumed to have the time, knowledge, and 
communication skills to provide the patient with complex information, evaluate the 
patient’s comprehension of the information, and encourage the patient to make a decision 
based on her values and preferences, without regard for health care costs or legal liability 
(Sherwin, 1998). In many instances, these traits and circumstances of the ideal 
autonomous decision-maker and the ideal decision-facilitator may not co-exist. Thus, 
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pregnant women may not be in an ideal position regarding informed choice in 
considering prenatal screening. 
6.4 Non-Directive Counseling 
The SOGC Guideline’s recommendation for non-directive counseling when offering 
prenatal screening (Chitayat et al., 2011) is intended to encourage informed choice that 
reflects each woman’s individual values and circumstances. Non-directive counseling is 
one of the principal tenets of genetic counseling (Fine, 1993; Kolker & Burke, 1998; 
Weil, 2003; Wertz & Fletcher, 1989), and is important because it aims to promote 
autonomous informed decision-making (Weil, 2003). However, others have argued that 
for reasons of impossibility and undesirability, non-directive counseling may not be the 
best way to achieve autonomous decision-making (Elwyn et al., 2000; Fine, 1993; 
Kirklin, 2007; Petersen, 1999; Weil, 2003; Williams et al., 2002). There are many 
descriptions of non-directive counseling, each with their own particular nuances (Smets, 
van Zwieten, & Michie, 2007), and the SOGC Guideline does not identify a particular 
model of non-directive counseling or describe how this strategy should be used in the 
context of prenatal screening (Chitayat et al., 2011). The following sections will examine 
some of the arguments against the strategy of non-directive counseling, and propose an 
alternative approach to encouraging autonomous decision-making about prenatal 
screening.  
6.4.1 Is non-directive counseling possible? 
The capacity for non-directive counseling is constrained by the broader context in which 
prenatal screening is presented (García, Timmermans, & van Leeuwen, 2008; Smets et 
al., 2007). It has been argued that non-directive counseling may not be possible, given the 
barriers to dissolving the persuasive authority embodied in the offer of a medical 
procedure by a health care provider in an institutional setting (Weil, 2003), funded 
through a universal health care program (Hunt & deVoogd, 2003). In these 
circumstances, the offer of prenatal screening may imply a recommendation to accept 
prenatal screening, thus rendering the goal of non-directive counseling unachievable 
(Clarke, 1991). 
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The possibility of non-directive counseling may also be constrained by whether or not the 
counselor is able to identify and avoid directive elements (Kolker & Burke, 1998). For 
example, in a study of genetic counselors, it was difficult for the counselors to determine 
what verbal and non-verbal cues could be considered directive (Bartels, LeRoy, 
McCarthy, & Caplan, 1997). Further, directive cues may include commonly used 
terminology such as “abnormalities” or “risks” (Grant & Flint, 2007; Hodgson, Hughes, 
& Lambert, 2005; Parens & Asch, 2000). In addition, making the necessary choices of 
what information to present and how to present it can itself be directive (Brunger & 
Lippman, 1995; Kirklin, 2007; Rantanen et al., 2008; Weil, 2003; Williams et al., 2002). 
Further, clinicians may hold perspectives and opinions about prenatal screening that are 
different from their patients’, making neutrality difficult to achieve. This may be 
problematic (Cunningham-Burley & Kerr, 1999), because of the power and knowledge 
differential between patients and clinicians (Stacey, 1996; Summers, 1994). 
Seventy-two percent of genetic counselors (who have received training in non-directive 
counseling and are allotted longer periods of time to counsel patients than physicians) 
acknowledge that they sometimes counsel directively (Bartels et al., 1997). For example, 
clinicians have reported choosing to counsel directively when they perceived that their 
patients could not comprehend the information because of low education level, cultural or 
language differences, or low socioeconomic status(Bartels et al., 1997; Michie, Bron, 
Bobrow, & Marteau, 1997), when the clinician thought there was a “better choice” for the 
woman (Bartels et al., 1997), or when the woman was having trouble making a decision 
(Bartels et al., 1997).  
6.4.2 Is non-directive counseling desirable? 
Observational research on non-directive counseling sessions has found that practitioners 
counseling non-directively often do so by using indirect speech, such as “some people 
may want to…” when outlining various choices or considerations (Benkendorf, Prince, 
Rose, De Fina, & Hamilton, 2001). This strategy may lead to confusion on the part of 
women about whether or the information applies to them, and it does not invite women to 
state their values (Benkendorf et al., 2001). Genetic counselors have reported that non-
directive counseling constrains their ability to counsel actively and impedes their wish to 
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share the information that is most relevant to a particular woman (Weil, 2003). For 
example, a clinician who sees an incompatibility between a woman’s decision and her 
expressed values may wonder about incomplete or incorrect understanding and may wish 
to counsel more actively (Suter, 1998; Weil, 2003). Non-directive counseling may be 
even more challenging for practitioners who do not normally practise in a non-directive 
way, especially considering that in other circumstances (such as regulating blood sugar or 
controlling hypertension) non-directiveness may be seen as a problematic way of practice 
(Caplan, 1993; Williams et al., 2002). Time constraints in primary care medicine may be 
an additional obstacle to non-directive counseling(Greendale & Pyeritz, 2001).  
It has been argued that non-directive counseling may not be desirable because counseling 
in this way may omit discussion of controversial issues related to prenatal screening 
(Caplan, 1993), such as issues of disability or pregnancy termination (Caplan, 1993; 
Stacey, 1996). If a woman feels a sense of discomfort or moral distress, she may not be 
able to identify what issue is causing discomfort, which may prevent her from 
considering the source of that discomfort when making a decision (Anderson, 1999). In 
addition, counseling in a non-directive way may make it difficult for a woman to identify 
directive elements that may creep unintended into the counseling (Clarke, 1997). In this 
way, non-directive counseling may harbour unacknowledged directive elements and 
therefore may be more disempowering than a counseling model where directive elements 
are explicitly acknowledged so they can be considered by the woman (Clarke, 1994; 
Kessler, 1992; Kessler, 1997). Women may also perceive the option of prenatal screening 
as a medical directive, rather than a choice (Anderson, 1999), even if the information is 
presented in a non-directive manner. For example, 37.4% of Canadian women surveyed 
about their reasons for participating in maternal serum screening reported that they 
participated because my "doctor told me I should have the test” (Park & Mathews, 2009 
p.150). 
We propose an alternative model to non-directive counseling that retains the spirit of the 
SOGC Guideline’s emphasis on the imperative of informed decision-making by 
encouraging providers to counsel actively in a way that supports women to make their 
own informed choice about prenatal screening. 
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6.5 Proposed Alternative Model of Informative Decision-
Making and Shared Decision-Making 
To accommodate the specific circumstances of prenatal screening, we propose an 
alternative model of decision-making that combines aspects of informative decision-
making (Charles et al., 1999; Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992) and shared decision-making 
(Charles et al., 1997; Charles et al., 1999; Charles, Whelan et al., 1999)  (Table 6).  
 
 
Table 6: Proposed hybrid model for informed and autonomous decision-making in 
prenatal screening 
 
 
 
Non-Directive 
Counseling 
Informative 
Decision-
Making 
Shared 
Decision-
Making 
Proposed 
Hybrid Model 
Information-
sharing 
Clinician 
imparts 
objective, 
clinical, value-
free 
information  
Clinician 
imparts 
objective, 
value-free 
information 
Clinician and 
woman 
“exchange” 
clinical 
information and 
values 
Clinician and 
woman share 
clinical 
information, 
personal values 
(woman), and 
professional 
values (clinician).  
Deliberation Woman only; 
clinician 
cannot express 
opinion to 
avoid being 
directive 
Woman only; 
deliberation is 
simplified to 
“selection” in 
this model. 
Clinician and 
woman engage in 
interactive 
deliberation, 
suggesting and 
discussing 
treatment options 
and preferences 
Clinician 
counsels actively 
in a way that 
supports the 
woman to fully 
understand the 
information and 
its implications 
Decision-
Making 
Woman only Woman only Clinician and 
woman together 
Woman only 
* “Woman” may also include partner or anyone else the pregnant woman decides to 
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include in decision-making 
In informative models of decision-making (Charles et al., 1999; Emanuel & Emanuel, 
1992), the health care provider gives the patient scientific and clinical information and 
the patient deliberates and makes a decision on her own. In contrast, shared decision-
making (Charles et al., 1997; Charles et al., 1999; Charles, Whelan et al., 1999) promotes 
an exchange of clinical information and personal values from both patient and provider, 
leading to a shared deliberative and decision-making process.  
Shared decision-making was developed in the context of decision-making about life-
threatening illness (Charles et al., 1997), and while it has much to offer clinicians who 
counsel about prenatal screening (Elwyn et al., 2000; L. M. Hunt, de Voogd, & 
Castañeda, 2005; Legare et al., 2011), the value-sensitive context of prenatal screening 
requires careful consideration. Charles and colleagues (1997) conceptualize the process 
of SDM as comprising three stages: information exchange, deliberation, and decision-
making. Charles and colleagues also recognize the value of flexibility between SDM and 
an informative approach, stating that in practical use, clinicians may need to change 
frameworks midstream (Charles et al., 1999). We propose a particular hybrid model for 
the context of prenatal screening, recognizing that each stage depends on the one before 
and the end goal of counseling (encouraging the patient to make an autonomous, 
informed decision) must guide the clinician’s approach through all stages of the 
counseling session. 
Légaré and colleagues, who found that both pregnant women and family physicians are 
willing to participate in SDM when considering prenatal screening, call for more 
“theorization and development of strategies” to facilitate this process (Legare et al., 2011 
p.320). Our proposed hybrid model of decision-making in prenatal screening begins with 
the information-sharing phase of SDM, uses a particular hybrid of SDM and IDM in the 
deliberative phase, and ends with the decision-making phase of IDM (Table 6). Our 
model modifies “information exchange” from the model of Charles and colleagues 
(Charles et al., 1997) to “information sharing,” in order to explicitly acknowledge that 
information can be, but is not always, provided by both parties, and to reflect a 
collaborative approach. 
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6.5.1 Information sharing phase. 
The information-sharing phase of the hybrid approach follows the model of SDM in that 
information is shared between the pregnant woman and her obstetrical care provider, with 
each sharing both medical knowledge and values. Echoing Freire’s writing on 
education(Freire, 1993), Charles and colleagues (Charles et al., 1999) emphasize that 
patients are not 'empty vessels'  waiting to be filled up with technical knowledge. Rather, 
patients come to the clinician’s office with their own beliefs, values, fears, experience, 
and, often, medical knowledge from friends, family, or other sources. A woman’s 
individual perspectives on prenatal screening, parenthood, disability, and abortion will 
affect the way that she will interpret the information received from her clinicians, and so 
it is important that clinicians initiate conversations about values and perspectives, so that 
the information shared is more relevant to their patients. Bhogal and Brunger (Bhogal & 
Brunger, 2010) have written that it is important for clinicians to make an effort to be 
aware of their own perspective and to recognize the influence their personal and 
professional values may have on the ways they think and speak about prenatal screening 
and testing (Bhogal & Brunger, 2010). In SDM, health care providers attempt to be 
explicit about their values with patients (Charles et al., 1997; Charles et al., 1999; 
Charles, Whelan et al., 1999), and to recognize that their patients’ values may differ; 
clinicians using our proposed hybrid approach will be aware that they will later ask each 
woman to make her own decision and that providing extensive information about the 
clinician’s own values may unduly influence the woman’s decision. Nonetheless, 
clinicians using our proposed hybrid approach will keep their personal values in mind, 
and might wish to share values related to their clinical expertise and experience, 
especially when this perspective would assist in exploring the values or opinions 
expressed by the woman during counseling. For example, clinicians might acknowledge 
that, in their experience, prenatal screening can provoke anxiety, especially for those who 
are not sure what they would do in the event of a high risk result. This can be an 
opportunity to explore issues of anxiety, the time frame for receiving results, and feelings 
about interpreting uncertain results. Genetic counselors have acknowledged the utility of 
sharing their own values, calling for support and guidance about ways in which to do this 
productively (Bower, McCarthy Veach, Bartels & LeRoy 2002; McCarthy Veach, Bartels 
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& LeRoy, 2002; Weil, 2003) and arguing that patients can make use of the attitudes and 
opinions of their counselor without being unduly influenced (Kessler, 1997).  
6.5.2 Deliberation phase. 
In the IDM model (Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992), the patient has full control over 
deliberation and decision-making, and the clinician’s role is limited to providing 
additional information, if needed, or correcting misunderstandings. In SDM, the clinician 
is an active partner in deliberation, suggesting ideas and making recommendations. 
As in SDM, our proposed hybrid model envisions the clinician participating actively in 
the deliberation process. In contrast to SDM, clinicians using the proposed hybrid model 
will counsel actively without expressing any preference for a particular course of action. 
For example, the clinician may encourage a woman to think critically about the 
implications of particular courses of action and the ways in which her personal values 
may come to bear on these different choices (Jansen, 2001). In this way, the provider is a 
valuable participant in the deliberative phase, as a caring, informed individual who has 
some understanding of the patient’s values and a strong understanding of the possible 
implications of different courses of action.  
To illustrate the contrast, there is no deliberation phase in IDM; a clinician provides the 
information needed to make the choice, assesses the woman’s comprehension, and then 
asks her to deliberate without clinician participation (Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992). In 
SDM, the deliberation process involves interaction between the thoughts, opinions, and 
recommendations of the clinician and the patient (Charles et al., 1997; Charles et al., 
1999; Charles, Whelan et al., 1999). The SDM clinician may offer a recommendation and 
a rationale, while encouraging the patient to express and discuss reasons for her proposed 
course of action. The proposed hybrid model is distinct from SDM in that the clinician 
does not make recommendations but assists the woman in considering the available 
options and their possible implications, including how these options may fit or conflict 
with the patient’s values.  
194 
 
Of course, some women may prefer that their clinicians take a more or less active role in 
deliberation. For women who are clear about their values and desires, a prolonged 
deliberation process may not be necessary or desirable. Open communication about 
expectations of each other’s roles is necessary to engage in a process that is acceptable to 
all parties (Charles et al., 1997). Deliberation may also include other people the pregnant 
woman chooses to involve in her decision-making; Charles and colleagues (Charles et al., 
1999) recognize that a patient’s decision-making process often includes consultation with 
family, friends, or other health care professionals.  
6.5.3 Decision-making phase. 
At the time of decision-making, our proposed hybrid model follows the IDM model 
(Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992), which encourages a patient to make an autonomous 
decision about participation in prenatal screening that reflects her particular situation and 
values; it proposes that the patient makes the decision on her own, or in consultation with 
her partner or family (as she prefers), based on the information provided by the clinician. 
There is no role for the clinician in the decision-making process other than to support and 
facilitate the course of action chosen by the patient.  
Our proposed model further follows the IDM model, because this approach is more 
suitable than SDM for decision-making about prenatal screening given the uncertain 
nature of the results and the morally sensitive nature of the decision. In this type of 
situation, it is necessary that the provider not have an investment in the decision a woman 
makes. Prenatal screening is an example of a decision where clinician investment would 
“go beyond the boundaries of an appropriate clinical role because the provider might 
harm the patient by inadvertently steering her in a certain direction.”(Charles et al., 1999 
p.657) While the application of a clinician’s experience and knowledge to treatment 
decision-making may be appropriate in other situations, particularly those for which 
evidence-based guidelines suggest there is a “best” treatment (Charles, Whelan et al., 
1999) to achieve patient well-being (Charles et al., 1999), decisions about prenatal 
screening do not have one best answer or right way forward. They “are too personal and 
too devastating to be made by anyone other than the woman or the couple involved” 
(Summers, 1994 p.1690). 
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6.6 Conclusion 
The SOGC Clinical Practice Guideline on Prenatal Screening for Fetal Aneuploidy 
encourages each woman to make her own decision, informed by comprehensive 
information about the screening tests and reflective of her personal situation and values. 
Rather than non-directive counseling as the best model to serve this goal, we propose a 
hybrid approach that combines informative decision-making and shared decision-making 
in a strategy to encourage pregnant women and clinicians to discuss prenatal screening in 
a way that promotes informed choice based on a woman’s particular circumstances and 
values. We recognize that the hybrid approach may impose additional requirements on 
clinician time, but we believe it will assist clinicians in supporting women to make 
informed choices regarding prenatal screening. 
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7 Pregnant Women’s Self-Identified Information 
Requirements When Deciding to Participate in Non-
Invasive Prenatal Screening 7 
 
7.1  Introduction 
The provision of information to facilitate informed decision-making is recognized by 
professional practice guidelines in many countries, such as Canada (Chitayat, Langlois, & 
Wilson, 2011), the United States (ACOG practice bulletin no. 77: Screening for fetal 
chromosomal abnormalities.2007), the Netherlands (Health Council of the Netherlands, 
2006), the UK (UK National Screening Committee & Department of Health, 2008),  
Denmark (Ekelund, Jørgensen, Petersen, Sundberg, & Tabor, 2008), and Australia and 
New Zealand (RANZCOG, 2010), as an essential part of the offer of prenatal screening. 
For example, the Canadian guideline states that women should be provided 
“understandable information … to ensure informed decision-making” (Chitayat et al., 
2011).  While there is no single recognized definition of informed decision-making 
(Bekker et al., 1999; van den Berg, Timmermans, ten Kate, van Vugt, & van der Wal, 
2006), the most common element is that a reasoned decision is made by a reasonable 
individual (Bekker et al., 1999); this informed decision is based on “relevant knowledge”, 
consistent with the “decision-maker’s values” and is “behaviorally implemented” 
(Marteau, Dormandy, & Michie, 2001).  
There is extensive literature on informed decision-making8  in prenatal screening and 
testing.  Existing literature has assessed women's knowledge about prenatal screening 
(Dahl, Hvidman, Jørgensen, & Kesmodel, 2011; Gekas, Gondry, Mazur, Cesbron, & 
                                                 
7
 A version of this chapter has been submitted for publication: Vanstone, M., Kinsella, E.A. & Nisker, J.  
Pregnant women's self-identified information requirements when deciding to participate in prenatal 
screening.  
8
 “Informed decision-making” is often used interchangeably with “informed choice”, and sometimes 
conflated with “informed consent”. Informed consent is a legal term. “Informed decision-making” 
emphasizes the decision-making process, whereas “informed choice” emphasizes the decision made. 
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Thepot, 1999; Goel, Glazier, Holzapfel, Pugh, & Summers, 1996;  Jaques, Halliday, & 
Bell, 2004; Mulvey & Wallace, 2001; Schoonen et al., 2011), and evaluated whether or 
not decisions about prenatal screening could be considered informed autonomous 
decisions (Gourounti & Sandall, 2008; Jaques, Sheffield, & Halliday, 2005; Markens, 
Browner, & Press, 1999; Rowe, Fisher, & Quinlivan, 2006; van den Berg et al., 2006; M. 
van den Berg, Timmermans, ten Kate, van Vugt, & van der Wal, 2005; Williams, 
Alderson, & Farsides, 2002). Informed decision-making has been promoted through the 
provision of varied information and decision-making resources (Bekker, Hewison, & 
Thornton, 2004; Dahl, Kesmodel, Hvidman, & Olesen, 2006; Hunter et al., 2005; 
Stapleton, Kirkham, & Thomas, 2002).  
It is well established that when asked to make a decision about non-invasive prenatal 
screening, many women do not have enough information to make a decision that could be 
characterized as an “informed” decision (Gourounti & Sandall, 2008; A. M. Jaques et al., 
2005; Kohut, Dewey, & Love, 2002; Markens et al., 1999; Reid, Sinclair, Barr, Dobbs, & 
Crealey, 2009; Rowe et al., 2006; van den Berg et al., 2006; van den Berg et al., 2005; 
Williams et al., 2002), and lack of information is one of the most significant sources of 
decision-making difficulty (Reid et al., 2009). An “uninformed” decision-making process 
has been attributed to insufficient or incorrect information given by the clinician offering 
the test (Green, Hewison, Bekker, Bryant, & Cuckle, 2004;  Marteau, Slack, Kidd, & 
Shaw, 1992;  Marteau, Plenicar, & Kidd, 1993; Smith, Slack, Shaw, & Marteau, 1994; 
Tyzack & Wallace, 2003), or as a result of either time constraints (Legare et al., 2011; 
Legare, Ratte, Gravel, & Graham, 2008; Williams et al., 2002), inadequate clinician 
knowledge (Hunt, de Voogd, & Castañeda, 2005; Marteau et al., 1993; Tyzack & 
Wallace, 2003) or insufficient effort to include women in the informed decision making 
process (Gagnon et al., 2010).   
There may also be differences in the information priorities of women and clinicians when 
counseling about prenatal screening (Farrell et al., 2011; Freda, Andersen, Damus, & 
Merkatz, 1993; Hunt et al., 2005; Park & Mathews, 2009).  For instance, the topics 
clinicians were observed to emphasize during clinical conversations (ex. risks of 
anomaly) were not described as important by patients, or reflected as important in their 
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reports of what they understood about prenatal screening (Hunt et al., 2005); clinicians' 
lists of pregnancy information topics women would want to hear about during a prenatal 
consultation differed significantly from the lists provided by pregnant women (Freda et 
al., 1993); women report that pieces of information they deem important for decision-
making are not discussed by their clinicians (Farrell et al., 2011; Park & Mathews, 2009). 
A reported discrepancy between information desired by women vs. information provided 
by clinicians was also noted in women who were offered amniocentesis (Durand, Stiel, 
Boivin, & Elwyn, 2010). 
Further, research on the offer of prenatal screening may place more emphasis on the 
information domains that are considered to produce an "informed" decision (information 
to understand the test), and less emphasis on the topics that have been identified by 
women as influential decision-making factors (information to make a decision about the 
test). These information areas may not always overlap (Farrell et al., 2011), suggesting 
that for some women, there may be a difference between possessing the knowledge to 
understand the test and possessing the knowledge required to make a decision about the 
test.  This gap may contribute to the reason why health care providers have found it 
difficult to construct a conversation to facilitate informed decision-making 
(Gottfreðsdóttir & Árnason, 2011).  The difference between information for 
understanding and information for decision-making may help explain findings that the 
level of knowledge a woman has about non-invasive prenatal screening does not 
necessarily correlate to self-reports of whether the information received was sufficient for 
decision-making (Dahl et al., 2006; Gourounti & Sandall, 2008; Stapleton et al., 2002), 
supporting the call for individualized information tailored to each woman's needs in order 
to support informed decision-making (Hunt et al., 2005; F. Legare et al., 2011; Vanstone, 
Kinsella, & Nisker, 2012). The relationship between the information needed for 
understanding prenatal screening and making an informed decision about prenatal 
screening is unknown. This project aims to identify the self-reported information 
requirements of women to make an informed choice about participation in non-invasive 
prenatal screening. 
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7.2 Methods 
Constructivist grounded theory (CGT) (Charmaz, 2000; Charmaz, 2006) uses inductive 
reasoning to identify thematic categories about the phenomenon under investigation. It is 
particularly suitable when knowledge is being sought from the ‘ground’ up, for instance 
in this study from the first hand accounts of pregnant women (Charmaz, 2006). Grounded 
theory is an iterative process, with each round of coding and categorization contributing 
to new insights and prompting the need to return to the data to re-analyze, or to return to 
the field to collect more data with these new insights in mind.  
7.2.1 Recruitment.  
Sixteen pregnant women were purposively recruited through the London-Middlesex 
Health Unit’s Prenatal Fair [10], advertisements on pregnancy and classified ad websites 
[4] and through snowball sampling [2].  Women were sampled to represent a diversity of 
perspectives about participation in prenatal screening (Table 7). Sampling was completed 
when theoretical saturation was thought to be achieved, that is, when no new categories 
were seen to emerge in further  interviews. This study received research ethics approval 
from the University of Western Ontario (#16988E). 
Table 7: Participant Demographics 
Pseudonym Participated in 
Screening? 
Age Urban/Rural # years of 
education 
Recruitment 
method 
Abby No 27 Urban 17 Snowball 
Bridget Yes 30 Urban 21 Online 
Carrie No 29 Urban 16 Snowball 
Danielle Yes 31 Urban 14 Prenatal Fair 
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Eva Yes 20 Rural 13 Prenatal Fair 
Farah Yes 27 Rural 16 Prenatal Fair 
Gail Yes 24 Urban 12 Online 
Holly Yes 26 Urban 15 Online 
Isobel Yes 24 Urban 20 Prenatal Fair 
Jade Yes 28 Rural 16 Prenatal Fair 
Kyla Yes 29 Urban 17 Online 
Lucy Yes 29 Urban  12 Prenatal Fair 
Madelaine No 30 Urban 21 Prenatal Fair 
Nadia Yes 30 Urban 16 Prenatal Fair 
Olivia No 29 Urban 18 Prenatal Fair 
Penny Yes 28 Rural 12 Prenatal Fair 
 
7.2.2 Eligibility. 
Women were eligible for the study if they were carrying their first pregnancy, self-
identified as having a “low risk” pregnancy, were under the age of 35 at expected date of 
delivery, fluent in English and received the offer of prenatal screening from a family 
physician.  The criteria of young age and self-identified "low-risk" pregnancy reflect 
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women who may not have been offered prenatal screening prior to the introduction of the 
2007 Canadian professional practice guideline (Summers, Langlois, Wyatt, & Wilson, 
2007). The criterion of first pregnancy attempts to capture a sample who are formally 
considering prenatal screening for the first time. Women who accepted the offer of 
prenatal screening were eligible if they had not yet received their results. Women who 
declined the offer of prenatal screening were eligible if they were at 20 or fewer weeks 
gestation.  
7.2.3 Data collection. 
Interviews were conducted between May and November 2010; 16 participants were 
interviewed before theoretical saturation was achieved. Interviews were audiotaped and 
transcribed verbatim, and researcher field notes were recorded. Women chose to be 
interviewed in person [5] or over the phone [11], with interviews lasting between 25 and 
69 minutes (average 41 minutes). Interview questions were open-ended, and inquired into 
participants’ experience of being offered prenatal screening by their family doctor and 
how they came to make the decision about whether or not to participate. Women were 
asked about their information needs and sources, including information from physicians 
and other health care clinicians, information from friends, family or others, and 
information that they specifically sought out. Women were asked what information was 
helpful or confusing in making a decision and what information they thought someone in 
their situation would require before deciding about whether or not to participate in 
prenatal screening. 
7.2.4 Data analysis. 
Data were hand-coded and the initial analysis guided subsequent sampling, refining of 
interview questions, and analysis in an iterative fashion. QSR N-Vivo 8 (QSR 
International 2010) was used to manage the data. Data were coded in a line-by-line 
fashion for mentions of information needs, and then re-coded in categories and by theme 
(K. Charmaz, 2006). The technique of constant comparative analysis was used to explore 
the connections between different codes or categories between multiple participants, and 
between different codes or categories from the same participant (Strauss & Corbin, 
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1998).  Visual diagrams were generated in this process and later used to re-code and re-
categorize the data in subsequent phases of analysis. Through an iterative process eight 
categories were identified related to women’s perceptions of their information needs 
concerning the decision to participate (or not) in prenatal screening. The findings are 
presented as questions related to information needs during the process of prenatal 
screening (Table 8).  
Table 8:Self-identified information requirements of women considering prenatal  
screening 
 
7.3 Findings  
7.3.1 Category I: What is prenatal screening?  
Each of the women in this study was interested in information about what the screening 
test was, and what it would entail.  Most women were aware of the existence of the 
screening test but were unclear about the details of the test before meeting with their 
physician, "my friend saw the same doctor so she told me ... that there would be 
screening, but we didn't go into detail about it" (Carrie). At the time of the research 
interview,  the majority of women demonstrated a good understanding of at least part of 
Category Question 
I What is prenatal screening? 
II What conditions are being screened for?  
III How will the results of prenatal screening be communicated? 
IV How will the results of screening be interpreted? 
V What are the options after receiving the screening results? 
VI What does it mean to live with a child with a condition or disability? 
VII How can an informed decision about participating in prenatal screening be 
made? 
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the information about the test. Nonetheless,  many demonstrated gaps in knowledge, for 
instance about the elements of the screening test: 
Jade: Even just that information, explaining what it [screening] actually was.  I 
didn't even know what the elements were when I agreed to do it.  I just thought it 
was some extra checks they would make during your first ultrasound.  I didn't 
really know. 
The link between the non-invasive, non-definitive prenatal screening tests and the more 
invasive, definitive diagnostic testing options such as amniocentesis was confusing to 
some women. Five women did not know about the option for definitive testing (such as 
amniocentesis), and several others were not sure how the screening test they were 
currently being asked to consider was related to definitive testing. 
Abby:  It wasn’t clear to me that if you choose to have the blood test and if that 
comes back positive you can choose the amniocentesis. I thought you can choose 
to have the bloodwork AND the amniocentesis.  
Madelaine was similarly confused about the relationship between amniocentesis and 
prenatal screening, but a discussion with her doctor clarified this information. 
Madelaine: When I went to my doctor's office I got more of a sense of it actually 
being two distinct stages .... that's part of the reason that having a discussion with 
your doctor is important, because it sounds like it's a package deal and in reality, 
maybe it isn't.  
A desire for more information about the logistics of the test was a theme consistently 
identified by participants. Women identified important aspects of logistical information 
such as: what the elements of the test would be “how the test is done” (Olivia); how 
information would be obtained “I'm interested in what the results are, but also to 
understand what they are measuring” (Bridget);  what information the test could provide 
“what they could find” (Gail); if there is any risk to the mother or fetus “potential risks of 
the procedure” (Madelaine); and when the screening tests take place “at how many weeks 
you do certain things” (Jade). 
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7.3.2 Category II: What conditions are being screened for? 
The women in this study expressed interest in receiving information about the conditions 
included in prenatal screening. All women identified that it was important to know what 
conditions the screening test could detect and to understand what those conditions were. 
Madelaine’s family physician told her what conditions could be found, but without prior 
knowledge of these conditions Madelaine had difficulty interpreting this information: 
“there were a couple of terms that were dropped casually that I had no idea what they 
meant.” This information is important because:  
Madelaine: If this is a prenatal screen for colour blindness, I think a lot of women 
would make a different decision than if it were testing for something like Down 
syndrome.  
Several women mentioned that it would be helpful to have information about the 
conditions written down, so they could do more research if they wished, or so that it 
would be easier to remember unfamiliar terms. 
Holly:  I forget all of them [conditions screened for] except for Down syndrome ...  
I would've liked to have a little bit more information on that, maybe a pamphlet 
from my doctor ahead of time, so I could look it up. 
7.3.3 Category III: How will the results of prenatal screening 
be communicated? 
Information about how and when the results would be communicated was an important 
theme. All of the women who chose to participate in the test were interested in 
understanding how and when the results would be communicated, for instance, "would it 
be a phone call or would it be in writing?" (Olivia),  and who would be relaying this 
information: 
Farah: She'll get the results and relay everything to me instead of having anyone 
else call me directly with any scary information. It definitely made me feel better 
that she's in the middle of it all and relates that information back.  
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The element of receiving results mentioned by most women was the timing of the results:  
Holly: When would I find out? Are you to call me if the results are positive? Are 
you just going to wait until I come back in?   
Understanding when the results would be received was mentioned by Isobel as important 
for thinking about future options, because if a high risk result is received, "you have to 
make a decision about amniocentesis pretty quickly".  For Danielle, the timing of the 
results was important in terms of weighing the options available in the event of a high 
risk result,  
Danielle: I didn't realize how long it takes and how far along you are when you 
get the results. ... I think it would have been a good thing for her [family doctor] 
to tell me.  ... I just kind of assumed it would be something you find out early on ... 
knowing that it's taking this long, I don't think I could get rid of the baby even if 
they did find something.  
In retrospect, Danielle stated that if she had understood how long it would take to receive 
the results and "how far along you are when you actually find out anything" she "would 
have just said 'no thank you' and gone on and waited until the baby came". 
7.3.4 Category IV:  How will the results of the screening be 
interpreted?  
Information about the results of the test was identified by women as important when 
making a decision to participate in prenatal screening. All of the women in the study were 
interested in understanding how the results would be interpreted and how reliable the 
results were. This information also informed discussion of Category V, the options 
available after receiving results from the screening test. 
Understanding the results of the test was one of the most frequently mentioned 
information needs. In order to decide if they wished to participate in the initial prenatal 
screening test, women indicated that they wanted information about how and when the 
results would be conveyed, “how long it takes to get the results” (Olivia);  the limits of 
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the screening results, “they should say this is what you can learn, this is what we 
potentially can’t tell you … give a comprehensive picture of what screening can and 
can’t do” (Madelaine); and the reliability of the screening results “I think it’s important, 
in the part about what the results tell you that they do communicate that it is not 
definitive” (Olivia), “the percentage that it’s a false positive or false negative is this” 
(Madelaine). 
In addition to understanding the results of the test, each woman expressed interest in 
information to help her understand the reliability of the results. 15 of the 16 women 
recognized that the test did not provide a definitive answer, but rather suggested a range, 
probability, or risk statistic: 
Eva: I know it's not a for certain thing, they give you a fraction or a percentage of 
the chance of having a child with one of these disorders or defects.  
Among women who understood they would be receiving results in the form of a risk 
statistic, there was significant variability in how women reported interpreting that 
number: 
Farah: I think it would probably have to be a pretty high percentage for me to be 
concerned with, probably over 20% risk, for me to really be worried. 
Nadia:  One in 1000 would be high-risk.  
 Understanding the potential for false negative and false positive results was stated as an 
important part of interpreting the risk statistic.  
Nadia: People [friends] have said that there are false negatives and false 
positives, and it is not extremely accurate... it is just numbers and you never really 
know how accurate it is. 
Olivia: I was surprised to hear that there are a lot of false positives... Why do all 
of these women do this test and then end up having it not really tell them 
anything? 
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7.3.5 Category V: What are the options after receiving the 
screening results? 
Each woman expressed interest in understanding what options were available in the event 
of a high-risk result from the screening test, or a positive result from amniocentesis: Eva: 
“What would happen if it came back after an amniocentesis that it was positive, what 
would I do and where would I find out information and how do they handle that?”.  At 
the time of the interview, each of the women in the study indicated that they understood 
that pregnancy termination was an option in the event of a high risk result,  "you have to 
make that decision of what you want to do to continue on with the pregnancy or not to 
continue on."(Holly), however many reported that this information was not discussed by 
their physician. Jade explained that her family doctor told her that "if there was a positive 
test for something we would talk about the options at that point." Others reported that 
their physicians left this part of the conversation out entirely:  "The one thing that was 
missing was if it was positive, what would you do, what were your choices?" (Nadia).  
Several women reported that their physicians discussed the options after high risk results, 
especially termination, in an opaque way:   
Abby: "It's [the option to terminate] something I knew from previous education. 
She [family doctor] did say these are defects there is no cure for, but she didn’t 
come out and say if you find something wrong you can abort the baby or you can 
keep the baby knowing it has a defect."  
Madelaine: "She [family doctor] wasn’t using terms like abortion or anything like 
that, but she was implying that some couples would take that information and 
make a decision and sort of, you know, dot dot dot, expecting us to fill in the 
blanks of what that might mean. It wasn’t necessarily obvious, you know, that 
couples might make a decision about whether to proceed or terminate with the 
pregnancy."  
While Madelaine and Abby inferred the options of terminating or continuing the 
pregnancy from this discussion, a couple of other women did not understand this. Gail 
talked about her assumption of the opportunity for early treatment “I’m sure there is 
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research out there on something to help improve Down syndrome in utero”. Kyla stated 
she drew similar conclusions from the information received from her physician, but 
learned differently after doing her own research:   
Kyla: "It was put to me as 'we are going to be testing for chromosomal 
abnormalities like down syndrome or spina bifida'. That's all that was said. It 
wasn't 'because sometimes people decide they don't want to go through with the 
pregnancy'. ... I kind of thought that there might be treatment. ... maybe he is 
bringing it up because there is something they can do about it ... and then I 
thought well maybe it is so you're prepared. .... I didn't think that people would 
terminate because of the test."  
7.3.6 Category VI: What does it mean to live with a child with 
a condition or disability? 
A few women, like Holly, were interested in knowing details about the experience of 
parenting a child with one of the conditions. She suggested this information should be 
provided by clinicians before women decide to participate in the test.  
Nadia: maybe explain a little bit more in depth...  Like, down syndrome is a 
chromosomal abnormality, the baby will have this, this and this.   
Most women, however, indicated interest in learning about what it would be like to 
parent a child with a particular condition only if they received a high risk result. When 
speaking about understanding what it would be like to parent a child with one of the 
tested-for conditions, women used language like “educate myself” (Eva), “give me a 
chance to research” (Danielle) or “I would find resources” (Jade), implying they did not 
expect that  information to  be provided by their physician. The two women who stated 
they would terminate the pregnancy no matter what condition was found indicated that 
they were not interested in receiving this type of information.  
A few women who were more familiar with the conditions cited the spectrum component 
of the conditions as an important piece of information for women to consider.  
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Abby: I know that just because your child has Down syndrome, it varies 
drastically. It can be very very mild, or it could be more severe.  
This was not, however, a frequently occurring topic of discussion, perhaps because many 
women appeared not to be aware of this information.  
7.3.7 Category VII: How can an informed decision about 
participating in prenatal screening be made? 
 Participating in an informed way in the decision making process about prenatal 
screening was identified by each woman in the study as an important opportunity. Even 
the women who had no intention of participating in testing indicated that they were glad 
to receive information and to have the opportunity to make their own decision about 
participation.  While women spoke about the importance of having the chance to choose 
whether to participate, many women spoke with concern about making sure they had 
enough information to make this decision.  
     While this ability to make the decision for one’s self was frequently identified as 
desirable, a number of women discussed how this may be challenging at times: 
Nadia: It is your choice if you want to do it or not. I don’t think she [family 
doctor] emphasized that enough with me. I think she made it sound like it was 
routine. 
Kyla, to whom prenatal screening was presented as the next step in prenatal care, stated 
that women need to feel informed enough to make decisions about participation: 
I was a little upset.  I mean, a better description would be that I didn't feel 
informed enough to make the decision ....  I think it's great that it’s available for 
people who want it, but I think that everybody should be informed before they are 
given the option. 
Women who indicated that they did not receive sufficient information to feel informed, 
frequently described engaging in research and seeking information independently. 
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Nonetheless, the participants indicated that information or guidance about resources was 
best provided by the clinician offering the test. Gail stated:   
If they don’t have enough time to tell you, then they should direct you to some 
kind of pamphlet or something.   
Madelaine undertook significant independent research on the contextual and logistical 
details of the test. She said that it could be “overwhelming” for women and that women 
may require the help of their care provider in locating relevant information.  
I think there is potentially a lack of knowledge and I don’t know that it should just 
be up to women to have to seek that information.  
In summary, women spoke of the importance of participating in an informed way in the 
decision making process about prenatal screening; of adequate information being 
required to make that decision; and that it would be helpful to receive information (or 
information resources) from the clinician offering the test. 
7.4 Discussion   
The participants in this study raised many topics when discussing their information needs 
for making a decision about participation in non-invasive prenatal screening. Some of 
these topics require a sophisticated understanding of complex information. Analysis of 
the interview transcripts identified seven major categories of information that that may 
assist pregnant women to make informed decisions about participation in non-invasive 
prenatal screening. The categories are framed as questions that may be useful for 
clinicians to consider during the offer of prenatal screening, and include: I) What is 
prenatal screening? II) What conditions are being screened for? III) How will the results 
of prenatal screening be communicated? IV) How will the results of the screening be 
interpreted? V) What are the options after receiving the screening results? VI) What does 
it mean to live with a child with a condition or a disability? VII) How can an informed 
decision about participating in prenatal screening be made?. 
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Counseling about non-invasive prenatal screening may present challenges to clinicians, 
who may not have enough time available to counsel in a comprehensive way. For 
example, in Canada, the average prenatal screening counseling session has been found to 
last less than five minutes (Cavanagh & Mathews, 2006; Cavanagh, Mathews, & Crane, 
2007). Further, 56% of Canadian physicians were neutral or in agreement that counseling 
for maternal serum screening was too time consuming, and only 8% agreed that this type 
of counseling is adequately reimbursed (Winquist, Ogle, & Muhajarne, 2008).  In 
response to such difficulties, clinicians may also consider alternative approaches to 
providing information about prenatal screening such as group information sessions after 
the first prenatal visit where pregnant women may ask questions, which may require less 
clinician time and result in better knowledge outcomes for pregnant women (Baldwin, 
2006; Kaiser et al., 2002). Peer support and the opportunity to learn from the questions of 
other women is educationally valuable to pregnant women (Freda, 2004),  as is more 
educational time with a clinician (Baldwin, 2006), such as a physician or other member 
of the health care team, such as a nurse practitioner. Additionally, clinician groups may 
wish to advocate for appropriate reimbursement for the counseling time required for 
prenatal screening. 
Pamphlets and other written education materials may be an additional way of conveying 
information, as they may be read at a time of convenience, and provide key words for 
women who may wish to undertake further investigation (Kenny et al., 1998). 
Informational pamphlets have been rated by women as a valuable resource, second only 
to a conversation with their physician (Dahl et al., 2006). However, careful selection of 
written resources is important because written materials have the potential to be directive 
towards a particular course of action through the terminology used, tone, and balance of 
content (Bryant et al., 2001;  Dahl et al., 2006; Hodgson, Hughes, & Lambert, 2005; 
Loeben, Marteau, & Wilfond, 1998; Stapleton et al., 2002; Vanstone & Kinsella, 2010)  
and may not provide sufficient content for an informed decision making process due to 
either a high literacy level requirement (Freda, Damus, & Merkatz, 1999), or provision of 
insufficient information (Shepperd et al., 2006; Van den Heuvel et al., 2008).  In addition, 
video education has been shown to enhance retention of information (Browner, Preloran, 
& Press, 1996), particularly in groups with lower levels of literacy (Freda, 2004). 
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Interactive computer education may also increase knowledge, however some have 
suggested it may be difficult to integrate into a clinical setting (Griffith, Sorenson, 
Bowling, & Jennings-Grant, 2005). 
The need for adequate information to make an informed decision about participation in 
prenatal was identified as an important theme in this study, and making informed choice 
an explicit clinical goal may be helpful for clinicians. One important aspect of an 
informed decision is to ensure that women understand that participating in prenatal 
screening is optional (Marteau et al., 2001; Michie, Dormandy, & Marteau, 2003). 
Although this is clearly expressed in clinical practice guidelines (ACOG, 2007; Chitayat 
et al., 2011; Ekelund et al., 2008; Health Council of the Netherlands, 2006; UK National 
Screening Committee & Department of Health, 2008), a number of women in this study 
and other studies (Kohut et al., 2002; Ladfors et al., 2001; Santalahti, Aro, Hemminki, 
Helenius, & Ryynänen, 1998; van den Berg et al., 2005)  indicated that they were not 
aware that prenatal screening  was optional.   Clinicians might reflect on how they can 
facilitate informed decision making by using the questions identified in this study as a 
guide (Table 8), by offering women opportunities to ask questions (Hunt et al., 2005; 
Legare et al., 2011; Legare et al., 2008), and by offering information through various 
mediums. Clinicians might also facilitate informed decisions by examining their own 
assumptions about ‘what is best’ for women (Bhogal & Brunger, 2010), by thinking 
about the language they use to discuss  prenatal screening (Grant & Flint, 2007; Hodgson 
et al., 2005; Parens & Asch, 2000) and by considering the content and presentation of 
information (Brunger & Lippman, 1995; Weil, 2003; Williams et al., 2002) . 
7.5 Conclusion 
The results of this study contribute to knowledge about women's perceptions of their 
information needs during the decision-making process about prenatal screening. The 
themes identified (Table 8) may present practical guidance that could inform the practices 
of clinicians who introduce the offer of prenatal screening.  In addition, written 
information, direction to resources for further information, and unique education formats 
such as prenatal screening groups may help to meet the information needs identified by 
women and promote informed choice about prenatal screening.  
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8 Women's decision-making about participation in 
prenatal screening: Beyond the clinical encounter 
8.1 Introduction 
Prenatal screening is a testing process offered to all pregnant women in Canada (Chitayat, 
Langlois, & Wilson, 2011)  and in many other Western countries (ACOG, 2007; 
Ekelund, Jørgensen, Petersen, Sundberg, & Tabor, 2008; Health Council of the 
Netherlands, 2006; RANZCOG, 2010; UK National Screening Committee & Department 
of Health, 2008) through a process of informed decision-making.  Prenatal screening 
produces a probabilistic prediction of fetal chromosomal anomalies and incomplete 
neural tube closures by combining the results from blood tests and an ultrasound  with the 
woman's age at the expected date of delivery (Chitayat et al., 2011; Lam et al., 2002). 
After receiving this information, each woman may be asked to make multiple, contingent 
decisions about whether or not to pursue diagnostic testing such as amniocentesis, which 
carries a risk of miscarriage between 0.5-1.5%  (Wilson, Langlois & Johnson, 2007), and 
pregnancy termination.  
Informed decision-making about participation in prenatal screening is presented by many 
clinical practice guidelines as an essential part of the process (ACOG, 2007; Chitayat et 
al., 2011; Ekelund et al., 2008; Health Council of the Netherlands, 2006; RANZCOG, 
2010; UK National Screening Committee & Department of Health, 2008). While there is 
no authoritative definition of informed decision-making (Bekker et al., 1999; van den 
Berg, Timmermans, ten Kate, van Vugt, & van der Wal, 2006), the common element of 
different definitions is that a reasoned decision is made by a reasonable individual 
(Bekker et al., 1999); an informed decision is based on “relevant knowledge”, consistent 
with the “decision-maker’s values” and is “behaviourally implemented” (Marteau, 
Dormandy, & Michie, 2001).  
Several counseling models have been used to describe how clinicians might facilitate 
informed decision-making (Clarke, 1994; Elwyn, Gray, & Clarke, 2000; Emery, 2001; 
Legare et al., 2011; Marteau et al., 2001; Thornton, Hewison, Lilford, & Vail, 1995); 
these models primarily focus on the roles and informational content of the interactions 
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between clinician and patient (Entwistle & Watt, 2006) .  This paper examines the 
perspectives of pregnant women considering participation in prenatal screening, 
examining their information seeking and decision-making practices within and beyond 
the clinical environment. The central question of the study is: How do pregnant women at 
low risk of having a fetus with an anomaly make decisions about participation in prenatal 
screening? 
8.2 Existing Models of Medical Decision-Making 
Several models of patient-physician communication describe the facilitation of decision-
making, from different perspectives. Consumerist models of informed decision-making 
(Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992) envision the physician transferring relevant knowledge to 
the patient so that the patient can make a decision. These one-way models of information 
transfer for informed decision-making have been described as analogous to the "banking 
concept" model of education criticized by Freire (1970), where patients are passive 
"receptacles" for information that is transferred to them, or "deposited" by the physician 
(Lee & Garvin, 2003). Consumerist models of one-way information transfer have been 
observed to be the prevailing model of patient-physician communication used by British 
general practitioners (Goss, Mazzi, Piccolo, Rimondini, & Zimmermann, 2005). 
The rise of patient-centered medicine may be linked to the development of models of 
shared decision-making, as described by many authors (Charles, Gafni, & Whelan, 1997; 
Charles, Gafni, & Whelan, 1999; Coulter, 1999;  Elwyn, Gray et al., 2000). Shared 
decision-making is a two-way model which involves an interactive dialogue between 
patient and physician, with each sharing knowledge and values, then deliberating together 
to arrive at a shared decision (Charles et al., 1999).  Shared decision-making aims to 
achieve an active partnership between patient and physician (Charles, Whelan, & Gafni, 
1999; Elwyn, Edwards, & Kinnersley, 1999;  Elwyn, Edwards, Kinnersley, & Grol, 
2000), but has been explored by few authors in the context of prenatal screening (Legare 
et al., 2011).   
Additional models of two-way information exchange falling somewhere between 
informed decision-making and shared decision-making have been described (Braddock, 
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Edwards, Hasenberg, Laidley, & Levinson, 1999; Towle & Godolphin, 1999; Towle, 
Godolphin, Grams, & LaMarre, 2006). Patient-centered communication may also be 
conceptualized as a two-way information exchange with some shared characteristics to 
shared decision-making (Wensing, Elwyn, Edwards, Vingerhoets, & Grol, 2002; Weston, 
2001).  
The common element between these different models is a focus on the ways in which 
decision-making occurs inside the clinic, as a result of or during the interaction between 
the patient and physician. A complementary body of literature about decision-making has 
developed in the discipline of library and information science. With a sensitivity to the 
ways in which knowledge is sought and used, there exist a number of models describing 
the ways in which information seeking practices and behaviours inform decision-making 
processes inside (McKenzie, 2004; McKenzie, 2009) and outside of the clinic (Belkin, 
1980; McKenzie, 2003; Pettigrew, Fidel, & Bruce, 2001). Information sciences has long 
moved away from a view of the learner as an empty receptacle waiting to be filled with 
information (Dervin & Nilan, 1986) to explore more nuanced understandings of the ways 
in which information seeking affects decision-making.  
Evidence that decision-making about participation in prenatal screening occurs outside of 
the presence and direction of a clinician is plentiful, however this topic is under-
examined in the healthcare literature. National surveys in Canada (Public Health Agency 
of Canada, 2009)  and the United States (Declercq, Sakala, Corry, & Applebaum, 2007; 
Sakala, Declercq, & Corry, 2002)  have stated that health care providers are no longer the 
primary source of pregnancy information, with women reporting that they find more 
information about pregnancy from books, friends and relatives, and the internet (Declercq 
et al., 2007; Public Health Agency of Canada, 2009; Sakala et al., 2002). There is a 
growing body of literature describing how patients use the internet, friends and family, 
and other sources of information to inform their health decisions (Diaz et al., 2002; Hsieh 
& Brennan, 2005; Lagan, Sinclair, & George Kernohan, 2010; Lagan, Sinclair, & 
Kernohan, 2011; Larsson, 2009); but little theorizing about the ways in which women 
seek, retrieve, and use information when trying to make a decision about participation in 
prenatal screening.  
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8.3  Methods 
Objective:  The purpose of this study was to investigate the decision-making processes of 
pregnant women with respect to participation in prenatal screening. 
8.3.1 Study design. 
The methodology of Grounded Theory (GT) (Charmaz, 2000; Charmaz, 2006)  was 
adopted for this study. Using a grounded theory approach, data were gathered from first-
hand accounts, and analysed inductively develop theory about a particular phenomena. 
Data were collected and analyzed simultaneously, in an iterative fashion where insights 
inform further data collection and analysis.  
This study received research ethics approval from the University of Western Ontario’s 
Health Science Research Ethics Board (#16988E). 
8.3.2 Recruitment.  
Pregnant women were recruited through the London-Middlesex Health Unit’s Prenatal 
Fair (10), notices on pregnancy and classified ad websites (4) and through snowball 
sampling (2).  Women were purposively sampled to represent a diversity of perspectives 
about participation in prenatal screening (Table 9). Sampling was completed when 
theoretical saturation was achieved. Charmaz (2006) describes theoretical saturation as 
the time when “gathering fresh data no longer sparks new theoretical insights, nor reveals 
new properties of these core theoretical properties” (pg. 113). 
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Table 9: Participant demographics 
Pseudonym Participated 
in 
Screening? 
Offered a 
choice 
about 
participati
on? 
Would 
consider 
terminating 
pregnancy 
if condition 
was found? 
Age at 
time of 
interview 
Urban/ 
Rural 
# years of 
education 
Recruitment 
method 
Abby No Yes No 27 Urban 17 Snowball 
Bridget Yes Yes No 30 Urban 21 Online 
Carrie No Directed  No 29 Urban 16 Snowball 
Danielle Yes Yes Unsure 31 Urban 14 Prenatal 
Fair 
Eva Yes Yes No 20 Rural 13 Prenatal 
Fair 
Farah Yes No Not unless 
fetus 
would not 
survive to 
term 
27 Rural 16 Prenatal 
Fair 
Gail Yes Directed Yes 24 Urban 12 Online 
Holly Yes Yes Depending 
on 
condition 
26 Urban 15 Online 
Isobel Yes No No 24 Urban 20 Prenatal 
Fair 
Jade Yes Yes No 28 Rural 16 Prenatal 
Fair 
Kyla Yes No No 29 Urban 17 Online 
Lucy Yes Directed Depending 
on 
condition 
29 Urban  12 Prenatal 
Fair 
Madelaine No Yes No 30 Urban 21 Prenatal 
Fair 
Nadia Yes Directed No 30 Urban 16 Prenatal 
Fair 
Olivia No Yes No 29 Urban 18 Prenatal 
Fair 
Penny Yes Directed Yes 28 Rural 12 Prenatal 
Fair 
 
8.3.3  Eligibility. 
Eligible women were: under the age of 35 at expected date of delivery, carrying their first 
pregnancy, received the offer of prenatal screening from a family physician, and fluent in 
English. Participants were interviewed after they spoke about prenatal screening with 
their family physician, and before they received their results from the screen (if they 
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chose to participate in the screening), or before 20 weeks gestation (if they chose not to 
participate in the screening). Table 9 describes demographic and theoretical 
characteristics of the sample.  
8.3.4 Data collection. 
Semi-structured interviews (see Appendix 4 for interview guide) were conducted between 
May and November 2010 with 16 low risk Canadian women. Interviews were audiotaped 
and transcribed verbatim, and field notes were recorded. Women chose to be interviewed 
in person (5) or over the phone (11), with interviews lasting between 25 and 69 minutes 
(average 41 minutes). Interview questions were open-ended, and inquired into 
participants’ experience of being offered prenatal screening by their family doctor and 
how they came to make the decision about whether or not to participate in prenatal 
screening. Responses were further probed to explore ideas of where information was 
sought and received, opinions and feelings about the test, and areas of confusion or 
clarity.  
8.3.5 Data analysis. 
Data were hand-coded in a line-by-line fashion, and then re-coded in categories and by 
theme (Charmaz, 2006).  The initial analysis guided subsequent sampling and analysis in 
an iterative fashion. QSR N-Vivo 8 (QSR International 2010) was used to manage the 
data. Visual diagrams were generated to examine the connections between different codes 
or categories between multiple participants, and between different codes or categories 
from the same participant. These diagrams were used to re-code and re-categorize the 
data in subsequent phases of analysis. 
8.4 Findings 
The findings inform a preliminary theoretical model depicting the processes by which 
participants made decisions about participation in prenatal screening. In addition 
participants continued to investigate and think about prenatal screening after the initial 
decision had been made, often in preparation for making a decision about the results. All 
but one woman in the study described an iterative process of receiving, seeking and 
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interpreting information. Women described this process beginning before prenatal 
screening was introduced by their physicians and continuing after the decision about 
participation in prenatal screening had been made. For example, Gail was directed to 
consent to prenatal screening at her doctor's office. She described her process of decision-
making starting with the reception of the information that prenatal screening existed and 
proceeding with the gathering of more information to improve her understanding of what 
she had consented to do and what future decisions she might be asked to make about the 
results of the screening test. 
The process of making an informed decision is conceptualized in four categories (Figure 
4): 1) Receiving information; 2) Seeking information; 3) Working towards 
understanding; 4) Making a decision.  This section provides an analytic overview of the 
proposed model; describing each dimension, addressing the range of responses 
throughout each aspect, and highlighting the different views across circumstances.  
Figure 4: The process of decision-making about prenatal screening 
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8.4.1 Category 1: Receiving information about prenatal 
screening.  
The category of receiving information was elaborated by all women in this study. In 
particular, three aspects were prevalent in women's accounts: the sources of information 
received, the content of information received and a reconciliation of prior understandings 
of prenatal screening, pregnancy, and parenthood with the new information received. 
Receiving information about prenatal screening was described as the first step in the 
process towards making a decision, even if at the time information is received, a decision 
is not necessary. For example, many women described learning about prenatal screening 
through a friend's experience before becoming pregnant themselves, but stated that they 
drew upon the knowledge gained from their friend when it was time to think about 
making their own decision.  Related to this type of previously gained knowledge, most 
women stated they were aware of the existence of prenatal screening before they were 
offered it, but did not know many details about the procedure: 
Bridget: I really didn’t know about the nuchal translucency long before. Only 
when thinking about becoming pregnant did I really read about what it was. But I 
was aware of amniocentesis. Obviously diagnostic, but I didn’t realize that there 
was something that could be measured as early as 14 weeks or 11 weeks. 
A few women had more extensive knowledge from formal education, or because a close 
friend or family member had gone through the process:  
Lucy: A lot of my girlfriends have got it done and told me about it.  That's how I 
knew about it.  That's how I knew it was coming and that you had to get it done 
before a certain time, before 13 weeks. 
For five women, the offer of prenatal screening from the physician was the first time they 
learned about the possibility of this test:  
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Jade: That [doctor's offer of prenatal screening] was the first time I'd heard about 
it.  I knew that you went for certain checkups when you're pregnant, but nothing 
with any detail.  
8.4.1.1 Sources of information received. 
Women discussed their sources of received information about prenatal screening, 
mentioning health care professionals, friends and family, secretaries or administrators in 
the offices of health care professionals, prior education and experiences, the media, and 
written sources passed along from health care professionals, friends, family and the 
public health unit. The most commonly identified sources of received information were 
the family doctor, friends and family.  
Most women indicated that their family doctor (or nurse working under the direction of 
the family doctor) was the most consistent source of information, although not 
necessarily the most comprehensive source. All participants received some kind of 
information from their physician, however, the depth and breadth of this information 
varied greatly. Some women reported that doctors mentioned the existence of prenatal 
screening and then scheduled the screening tests without much discussion: 
Gail: Beforehand we had no information. Going into it we just knew that there 
was a certain time limit we had to follow. 
One women stated that her doctor provided ample information: 
Madelaine: She spoke about it in detail, to the point where I remember thinking "I 
know this- I read the forms". She was very thorough. 
The most commonly reported experience was a short conversation with a doctor who 
provided written information in lieu of a longer discussion: 
Abby: I honestly don't think she talked about it that much. She just said here's the 
information pamphlets. ... It was really short, she didn't go into great detail about 
anything at all.  
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8.4.1.2 Content of sources received 
Women reported receiving a number of different types of information from their doctors, 
most commonly general logistical information about the test as well as information about 
what conditions are screened for and the non-definitive nature of the results. Detailed 
information about prenatal screening was usually received from doctors in written form. 
Ten women were offered written information by their doctor and described this form of 
information as important. Of the six women who did not receive written information, five 
spontaneously mentioned that they would have liked to receive written material about 
prenatal screening.  
Gail: Your family doctor or whatever doctor is caring for you should be able to 
tell you [about the screening tests]. If they don't have enough time to tell you, then 
they should direct you to some kind of pamphlet or something. I never got 
anything.  
Friends and family were also cited as a valued source of information by thirteen women. 
Most of those who spoke with family or friends about prenatal screening described 
receiving experiential information from friends and family that informed the way they 
thought about their own decision to participate in the screening test. 
Holly: I actually have a friend who missed her date for prenatal screening and ... 
her daughter .... has Down syndrome and she wasn't prepared for it.  So she 
hasn't returned to work ...  It affects your life quite a bit,... she's ecstatic that she 
has her and she would never want to change anything ...  Probably if she did find 
out they would have chosen not to have the baby if it was a high probability, and 
she's kind of happy that she never did find out because of that.   
Fourteen women described receiving information from family, friends, and from past 
education and experience about the lived experience of the conditions tested for through 
prenatal screening.   
Eva: I have a friend who has a child with Down syndrome, so I also knew that if I 
needed information or needed support or needed help with anything like that, I 
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was sure that she would have tons of it.  And obviously, being a parent of 
someone with Down syndrome she is kind of an expert about it.  
Danielle: I work with kids with disabilities.  So I'm probably more aware than the 
general population would be about the things that children can be born with and 
the complications that might arise. 
The theme of receiving information about prenatal screening had two different 
components: medical information received in the context of decision-making, and 
information (experiential and medical) received in the course of everyday life. Women 
described receiving a wide variety of information from these two sources; information 
was received from physicians in the context of decision-making, at the time when 
prenatal screening was introduced. In contrast, many women discussed the information 
they had received in the context of their everyday lives, before they were considering 
participation in prenatal screening.  
Showing the relationship between category 1 (Receiving Information) and category 3 
(Working Towards Understanding) of the proposed model, women described the process 
of contextualizing information received in the context of everyday life with new 
information received from their physician. As will be elaborated in category 3, women 
discussed the ways in which information received from their physicians was 
contextualized and made personally relevant in relation to previous information they had 
received from friends and family, or past work or educational experiences.  
8.4.2 Category 2: Seeking information about prenatal 
screening. 
In addition to receiving information, fifteen of the sixteen women actively sought 
information about prenatal screening in written form, both offline (15 women) and online 
(12). Offline written information reportedly accessed by women included information 
pamphlets (10), popular books on pregnancy (5) and textbooks from previous formal 
education (3).  
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Nadia: I have my maternal textbook...and it's not in my textbook.  I looked for it...  
I went to look for the beginning parts of pregnancy and there was nothing in there 
about prenatal screening...That textbook is from 2002, 2003.  
Bridget: I had heard of the nuchal translucency and the reason that was used ... 
from a book I had bought, A Pregnancy Day by Day.  
Twelve women reported accessing online information sources, including popular 
pregnancy sites, pregnancy forums or blogs about pregnancy (7 women); medical sites 
hosted by the local public health unit, hospitals and research centres (4); and general 
‘reading online’ (2). Kyla visited both popular and medical websites:  
Kyla: Most of the information I got was from searching on the Internet.  It 
actually started from a message board of other pregnant women who are talking 
about it [prenatal screening].  ... that's where I started finding more and more, to 
dig deeper and deeper.  I think I came across some official medical sites, but it 
would have been nice to have that given to me right off the bat, without having to 
search through.  Some people might stop there at the message board.  And that's 
not always the most reliable information. 
Kyla's concern about reliable information was echoed by many other women who talked 
about: (a) being wary of the information they encountered: "the internet can lead you all 
over the wrong place and give you the wrong answers. If you don’t know what’s bogus 
and what isn’t, well, you will end up in a web somewhere." (Gail); (b) the ways they 
assessed trustworthiness of the information they encountered, "a friend just recommended 
'Your Pregnancy Week by Week' because it was written by a doctor, so it seems a bit 
more comprehensive and useful" (Farah); and (c) the ability to verify information 
between sources: I went to a whole bunch of websites to see if they were around the same.  
I know websites can just kind of throw out information, so I went to four or five different 
websites.(Eva). 
Not all women were interested in seeking information about prenatal screening. Although 
fifteen reported seeking information to some extent, the one woman who did not seek 
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written information stated she felt the information from her doctor and her friends was 
sufficient. She indicated that she wanted to think positively about her pregnancy:  
Lucy: The testing can go either way. I'm thinking positive so I don't think that 
anything is going to be wrong, I just keep that in my mind.  I'm excited to see the 
baby in the ultrasound.  That is honestly all I think about.  I don't think about the 
testing, and I don't think about spina bifida and I don't think about Down 
syndrome.  I don't think about any of that. ...  I'm trying to have a great 
pregnancy.  I don't want to think anything negative about my pregnancy, or about 
the baby. 
This sentiment about avoiding information that produces fear or anxiety was echoed by 
Nadia, who initially started looking online for information but later stopped: 
Nadia:  I typed in integrated prenatal screening, and I think I read maybe the first 
two or three sites.  It just explained it in more detail.  I read a couple blogs about 
it, about women and their experiences and that kind of scared me so I stopped 
reading it. Since then, any type of question I have had about my pregnancy or any 
fear or anything, I don't even bother looking it up anymore, because everyone has 
told me just stay off the Internet and don't read anything. ... I have stayed off the 
net and just tried to enjoy my pregnancy the best I can.  
Farah was discouraged from seeking information by the nurse in her doctor's office in 
order to prevent anxiety: She’s [nurse] been very good to just.... relax me. Stop reading 
books! She says. Calm down! Farah agrees with this approach and followed the nurse's 
suggestion, avoiding seeking additional information because: I would rather have it 
explained to me in terms of what my actual results are than get myself all worked up 
about what this number means or that number means. 
All but one woman stated that they sought out information about prenatal screening as a 
way to enhance their understanding. Some women described seeking information in 
preparation to make a decision. Others described seeking information to increase 
understanding, or to prepare for future decisions that might need to be made. A few 
245 
 
women described ceasing to seek information in response to confusion or anxiety aroused 
by information that they found. The proposed model attempts to account for the 
possibility that a woman might not be interested in seeking information by allowing that 
this category may be bypassed. For instance, a woman may receive information, judge it 
to be sufficient, and proceed directly to making a decision. 
8.4.3 Category 3: Working towards understanding prenatal 
screening. 
Working towards understanding the information received and sought about prenatal 
screening was the category with the most variety and variability, reflecting a multitude of 
different ways of interpreting information in preparation to make a decision. The 
category of working towards understanding was characterized by discussions about the 
ways in which different pieces of information informed one another. 
Some women described a process of working to consolidate the information received 
from the physician. Strategies such as reading a pamphlet over again, thinking further 
about the information presented, talking to a spouse, friend, or family member, or seeking 
more information were used to better understand the information presented by the 
physician or encountered in other contexts: 
Eva:  I liked having the pamphlet at home after I had talked to the doctor and had 
all my questions answered, then I could go through it again.  When you're in the 
office they're throwing one million things at you, you're just kind of like "yeah, 
sure, that's great".  When you get home you're like "yeah, what did she say 
again?"  You can go through it [the pamphlet] and just refresh your memory.  If 
you have other people that you want to explain it to, you are giving them accurate 
information.   
Almost every woman talked about the ways in which she contextualized new information 
by comparing it to information obtained at an earlier date. For instance, women who 
described previous understandings of prenatal screening frequently elaborated on the 
knowledge that informed their current understanding. When Danielle decided to 
participate in prenatal screening, she didn't understand how long it would take to receive 
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the results. This piece of information, obtained during the wait for results, fostered 
reflection on the purpose and process of screening: 
If I knew how long it took and how far along you are when you actually find out 
anything, I don't think that I would've taken the time to do it, or put myself 
through the worrying about what if I do get a positive.  I would've just said "no 
thank you" and gone on and waited until the baby came.  If they see something 
serious in the regular ultrasound [second trimester ultrasound] they'll do further 
testing and tell you about that anyhow. 
Carrie described the experience of being pregnant and her sense of responsibility for 
another life as contextualizing information that informed her sense of what was important 
to her decision making:  
 I thought I'd get a screen done if it's available, why not?  Why wouldn't I, for my 
own interest's sake?  ...  Being pregnant is different, and talking to my doctor, 
reading the pamphlet, talking to my husband, it is more like there is actually a life 
now that I'm responsible for.  I think that that is more, instead of just doing it for 
the heck of it, well let's evaluate what would really happen.  
Others talked about their past life experiences and how this shaped the ways they 
interpreted information and understood the potential outcomes of prenatal screening. 
Farah: I spent high school working in group homes with adults with autism and 
down syndrome and stuff so it’s something I always had in the back of my head 
that it might be a challenge I have in my life but if that’s the way it goes, that’s the 
way it goes. It’s not any kind of dealbreaker or anything.  
As women talked about their understandings of the screening test, many described a 
process of piecing together different parts of information obtained from a variety of 
sources: 
Gail: I found it was fairly easy once I understood, like you get to that beginning 
level, once you understand what the ultrasound does and you understand what a 
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nuchal translucency is, then you work from there. As long as you get that first 
building block and you keep following the right steps and learning what this is 
and why you do this and what’s for this and that. You kind of find the ladder and 
figure it out at the end.  
Women understood and contextualized information in individualized ways, drawing on 
their own perspectives to interpret the meaning of information they received. For 
instance, after learning about false positives, Bridget and Olivia had very different 
reactions: 
Bridget: I wasn't aware of the false positive rates, but that was described well in 
the pamphlet. That was probably the thing that changed [my thinking] the most, 
and that was reassuring, the thought of the possibility of having a positive test, 
but even then it's not necessarily a true positive. 
Olivia: I was surprised to hear there are a lot of false positives. I was surprised to 
hear it is not a very definitive test. I was like well, then why do they do this? What 
is the point? Why do all of these women do this test and then end up having it not 
really tell them anything? 
The individualized nature of interpreting information about prenatal screening was also 
demonstrated in the way that women described contextualizing information in relation to 
their own personal situation. Danielle, who works with children with disabilities, 
described the way this affects her thinking about raising a child with a disability: 
 I think I worry more than the average person might. ... I think I have a better 
understanding of what the families with children with disabilities go through on a 
day-to-day basis. 
Some women described instances where the pieces didn't fit, or they realized that a piece 
of information was missing, leading to identification of a gap in understanding: 
Danielle: I don't even know if at the first round they can say I think your child has 
Down syndrome or if they have to do the amniotic fluid test to say what they think 
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it is, or if they know that from the first.   
Kyla: It was put to me as "we are going to be testing for chromosomal 
abnormalities like down syndrome or spina bifida". That's all that was said. It 
wasn't "because sometimes people decide they don't want to go through with the 
pregnancy". ... I didn't think that was a possibility when I was thinking about it. ... 
Once I went home and did more research, I realized that wow, this is why people 
do it.  
The category of "Working Towards Understanding" identifies the ways in which women 
talked about integrating the information that they received and sought from a multitude of 
sources. This category might be seen as a "puzzle piece" approach, with women 
describing a process of building understanding of the situation at hand by gathering 
different small pieces of information, comparing these pieces of information and 
considering them in light of past experiences. The articulated understandings were 
formed from medical information but also relied on more personal information, including 
information gleaned from the woman's own experiences, information she had received or 
was familiar with from friends or family. These different pieces of information were 
made personally relevant in conjunction with a consideration of the woman's values and 
perspectives.    
8.4.4 Category 4: Making a decision about prenatal screening. 
All women in the study, even those who were not given the choice of participating in 
prenatal screening, discussed multiple decisions to be made. First, the decision of 
whether or not to participate in the screening (Table 10). Second, anticipation of future 
decisions that may have to be made. These decisions were discussed in relation to 
information received and sought, and ways of working to understand the information; the 
need for participants to make decisions about prenatal screening provided the context that 
bound together and made relevant the information. 
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Table 10: Self-reported choices regarding participation in prenatal screening 
 Made a choice Directed to 
choose 
No choice 
offered 
Total 
Participating in Prenatal 
Screening 
5 4 3 12 
Not Participating in Prenatal 
Screening 
3 1 0 4 
Total: 8 5 3 16 
As summarized in Table 10, eight women stated they made their own decision about 
participating in prenatal screening tests without direction from their health care provider; 
five women indicated they were directed towards a particular course of action; three 
women reported that they were not given a choice about whether or not to participate in 
prenatal screening. The majority of women indicated that they appreciated the 
opportunity to make their own decision about participation: 
Nadia: I like that I had a choice, that I was given that choice by my doctor. 
Olivia: I really appreciated her willingness to let me make my own decision.  
Five women indicated that their health care practitioners were directive in some way, 
such as verbal phrasing and facial expression (Carrie), giving explicit advice about what 
to do (Lucy, Nadia), or through non-verbal means, such as booking the ultrasound before 
explaining the purpose of the screening test (Penny, Gail).  
Carrie: I know she did say that less than half of her patients choose to have the 
prenatal done.  She actually said that twice.  I thought that, based on her facial 
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expression and the look that she gave me, I thought she would encourage us not 
to.   
Gail: When they mentioned it they said you don’t have to, but we advise it.  
Three women stated that they did not perceive that they were given a choice about 
participation in prenatal screening. Each woman recounted a different reaction to this 
situation. Farah talked about her relationship with her prenatal care provider and was not 
concerned that she was not given a choice:  
Farah: She didn’t mention if it was a choice. I am sure that if I had concerns with 
it, then that would have come up. .... I don’t question, because I’m very 
comfortable with her, I don’t question. It might have been different if it was a 
doctor I had never met, but because it was someone I have had a relationship with 
for years, I’m very comfortable with what she says needs to be done.  
Isobel indicated that she had decided to do the test before she entered her doctor's office 
and was surprised that it was not offered as a choice. However she was not really 
bothered because she planned to do it anyway. 
Isobel: It was just thrown in there that this is what you will do then and prenatal 
screening was one of the things thrown in there- at a certain time you do this.  So 
I think it was just assumed that it was something I would want without having a 
discussion. 
Kyla learned by searching online for information on nuchal translucency that the 
screening test is optional and that women who choose to do that test can later choose to 
have an abortion if the test comes back positive. Kyla indicated that she was disturbed by 
this, because she would not choose to have an abortion and therefore didn't wish to 
participate in testing. She was upset that her family doctor did not explain this to her.  
Kyla: My doctor just presented it to me as this is what we normally do, and didn't 
give me any options. So I'm sure that other doctors are doing that too.  For the 
most part, people tend to really trust what doctors are saying, they see them as 
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the be-all and end-all. What they say is what I should be doing.  That's not really 
the case.  I think it's important for them [women] to be given all the information 
that they deserve, so basically informed consent.   
Whether or not she was given a choice about participation, each woman in the study 
indicated that she had thought about the decisions she might be required to make in the 
future. Kyla, reported anticipating how she would handle those choices: 
The results, from my understanding, are not 100% unless you do an amnio.  I 
don't think that I would risk the amnio, if it could be potentially harmful to the 
baby anyway.  I would just wait and see what happened.  
Nadia talked about how she would make a different decision in her next pregnancy: 
I am a first-time mom and I am kind of just going with the flow, with what my 
doctor suggested to me.  ... Thinking about it now, I just don't think that I would 
do it again. ... Now that I know about it, and I know as much as I know about it, I 
would make a different choice next time. 
Of the thirteen women who made a decision about participating, most talked about the 
link between how they would approach potential decisions in the future and their decision 
to participate in the first part of prenatal screening. 
Bridget: Even when we had the choice of whether to book the ultrasound or not, 
... at that point I wanted to be sure about having the ultrasound but not wanting to 
be pressured to make a decision to go ahead with an amniocentesis. That was 
something we had to consider in deciding to have the ultrasound. 
Madelaine: I sort of thought of it as a package deal, you know? It was presented 
as different stages, it sounded like there would be a decision made after stage one, 
but you automatically think of the whole process.  
 Some women reported that they based their decision of whether or not to participate in 
prenatal screening on their anticipation of future decisions that might have to be made.  
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For instance, all four women who chose to refuse screening stated that they would not 
have an abortion regardless of the screening results. All four women talked about their 
decision to refuse prenatal screening in relation to their unwillingness to terminate the 
pregnancy, and wish to avoid the potential anxiety that might be faced when waiting for 
the screening results.   
Abby: I knew that I wouldn’t just all of a sudden decide to terminate the 
pregnancy and so that was the primary reason to not even do it. If we did it 
knowing that I wouldn’t make that decision, we could potentially have 
information that would actually weigh down on us a little bit. 
Many women who participated in the test linked their decision-making to what they 
planned to do with the results; six participating women stated that they would not 
terminate the pregnancy, no matter what the results were.  
Eva: Myself, I wouldn't terminate. I would just kind of educate myself on how to, 
like what programs there are or what information I need to know to help a baby 
with that specific disorder.  
Four women who decided to participate were uncertain of whether or not they would 
choose to terminate the pregnancy if a condition was found, stating that it would depend 
on the particular condition detected.  
Lucy:  If it was Down syndrome I'd keep it, but if it had spina bifida or the other 
thing.  Then I'd have to find out the details, but if it was a severe case, I don't 
think we would keep it.   
For the two women who stated they would terminate the pregnancy if a condition was 
found, this opportunity was the reason for participating in the test. 
Gail: It [raising a child with a disability] would be too much for us to take on 
right now. We know it would be too much for our relationship. ... It just wouldn’t 
be good for us. We’re both [specific occupation] and we’re both [additional 
occupations].  
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Making a decision about prenatal screening was a theme which was described in multiple 
contexts, from the initial decision to participate in the screening test to the anticipation of 
later decisions that may have to be made regarding what to do with the results of the 
screening test. Of the 16 participants in this study, eight stated that they made their own 
choice about participation, five felt directed to a particular decision by their health care 
provider, and three were not offered the opportunity to make a decision about 
participation in prenatal screening. When women talked about their decision-making 
process, many talked about considering multiple decisions at once, often describing their 
initial decision about participating in the screening tests in relation to what they would or 
would not consider doing with the results of the screening test. 
8.5 Discussion 
The findings of this research draw on women’s reports of the process of decision-making 
about participation in prenatal screening to depict it as an iterative process of receiving, 
seeking, and working to understand information to inform practical decision-making and 
action. In these findings, the interaction between a pregnant woman and her physician 
was identified as an important, although not exclusive, part of the process of making an 
informed decision about participation in prenatal screening. This was in contrast to 
existing models of informed decision-making, which focus primarily on the roles and 
interaction between the physician and the patient and the information shared by each 
person (Charles et al., 1997; Charles et al., 1999; Coulter, 1999;  Elwyn et al., 2000; 
Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992; Michie, Dormandy, & Marteau, 2003). Interestingly, the 
women in this study received information from physicians, but also actively sought and 
worked with information obtained from non-medical sources, such as popular books, and 
the experiences of their friends and family members when making their decisions to 
participate in prenatal screening. Given the broad range of sources from which women 
obtain information, attention and further research into the information practices of 
women may be warranted, so that health care providers seeking to facilitate informed 
decisions can support women in obtaining relevant and credible sources of information 
(Coleman, 2003; Diaz et al., 2002; Diaz, Sciamanna, Evangelou, Stamp, & Ferguson, 
2005; Shepperd, Charnock, & Gann, 1999). 
254 
 
Existing models of informed decision-making provide information about strategies that 
may be used within a clinic to impart or exchange information to prepare the patient to 
make an informed health decision. These models, however, fail to consider the sense-
making and decision-making work that occurs outside the clinic, despite ample evidence 
that patients seek information from a variety of sources (Case, Andrews, Johnson, & 
Allard, 2005; Declercq et al., 2007; Larsson, 2009; Public Health Agency of Canada, 
2009; Sakala et al., 2002) . Given the lack of attention to this aspect of the process, 
physician counseling time may not be used as effectively as possible and women may not 
be receiving appropriate informational and decision-making support. 
Recognizing and acknowledging the information work that some people choose to 
engage in outside the clinician's office may contribute to a different way of understanding 
the role of the physician in informed decision-making about prenatal screening. Existing 
models of informed decision-making conceptualize the physician as the main 
information-provider and the woman as the information-receiver and decision-maker 
(Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992), or both the physician and woman as  information-
providers, receivers and decision-makers (Charles et al., 1999). The findings of the 
current study question the boundaries of these roles, emphasizing the breadth of the 
woman's role as an information seeker, receiver, interpreter, and decision-maker in 
addition to the role of the physician as an information-facilitator.  Existing models 
conceptualize the content of information relevant for informed decision-making about 
prenatal screening quite narrowly, as including primarily medical and logistical 
information about the test (Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992). Some models acknowledge the 
importance of information about the values and perspectives of the woman and health 
care provider (Charles et al., 1999) . In addition, this study and others (Farrell et al., 
2011; Hunt, de Voogd, & Castañeda, 2005; Vanstone, Kinsella, & Nisker, 2012)  suggest 
that women may be interested in considering different types of information when 
deciding to participate in prenatal screening, such as timing of the test, options after 
diagnosis, possibilities of experiencing anxiety and opportunities for promoting the 
welfare of the baby. While the majority of women in this study expressed a strong desire 
to seek and use information, it is important to note that not all women have the resources, 
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information literacy, or desire to seek information, and women may resist the imperative 
to become an "informed patient" (Henwood, Wyatt, Hart, & Smith, 2003). 
8.5.1 Models of information seeking to inform health decision-
making from information science 
Beyond the decision-making models considered in the medical literature (Charles et al., 
1997; Charles et al., 1999; Coulter, 1999; Elwyn et al., 2000; Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992; 
Michie et al., 2003), scholars in the field of information science have examined patient 
information seeking practices to inform decision-making  (Case, 2002; Lambert & 
Loiselle, 2007; McKenzie, 2004). The information-seeking models however have not 
been widely disseminated in the health care disciplines. The contributions made by such 
models may have implications for health fields generally, and for prenatal screening in 
particular, as they may assist clinicians to re-conceptualize their role as facilitators of 
information-seeking rather than as conductors of informed decision-making. 
Health information-seeking behaviour has been conceptualized as a means for patients to 
obtain the information required to participate in medical decision-making involving a 
conscious choice to actively pursue information (Case, 2002; Lambert & Loiselle, 2007). 
Models which emphasize active seeking, and do not include passive receipt of 
information, or retrieval of information from memory, have been critiqued as potentially 
oversimplifying the process of information seeking as a linear, non-iterative action 
(Johnson, 1997; J. D. Johnson, 2003; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lenz, 1984; Longo et 
al., 2010; Miller, 1989). This critique is consistent with the findings of the current study, 
in which participants emphasized the influence of information obtained through past 
experience when interpreting new information about prenatal screening. Iterative models 
of health information seeking where the seeker plays an active role have been suggested 
by some to be more appropriate than linear, non-iterative models (Case, 2002; Foster, 
2004; Lambert & Loiselle, 2007).  
Sense-making (Dervin, 1983; Dervin, 1999; Dervin, 2003) is a theory which may 
contribute to an understanding of the iterative nature of information-seeking for decision-
making about prenatal screening. Participants in this study spoke about the ways in which 
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(a) information gathered through past experiences informed their current information 
seeking and (b) the ways in which past experiences helped them make sense of the 
information they found when actively seeking. According to Dervin ( Dervin, 1983;  
Dervin, 1999;  Dervin, 2003),  sense-making is a person-centered approach which 
describes the metaphorical activity of recognizing gaps in understanding and overcoming 
these gaps by building bridges with different pieces of knowledge acquired from different 
sources (Dervin & Nilan, 1986). Sense-making holds that knowledge is not a static 
representation of reality (Dervin, 1999), but is constantly being shaped and re-shaped, as 
well as constructed, re-constructed, and de-constructed.  In this way, sense-making rises 
beyond the "implicit assumption that there is one right way to produce knowledge or to 
use information" (Savolainen, 2006) (p. 1117).  Women in this study spoke about the 
ways in which knowledge about disability, parenting, and pregnancy gathered through 
past conversations and experiences informed the way that they sought, interpreted, and 
used information about prenatal screening. This past information from history and 
experience was frequently used to contextualize new information, it was the situational 
'bridge-building' material (Dervin & Frenette, 2003). It was used to scale the gap in the 
information provided by clinicians, or found elsewhere, forming a knowledge from which 
to make a decision about participation in the prenatal screening test.  
When considering the sources of information used to make sense of information about 
prenatal screening, the sociocultural and individual context of the information seeker 
(Savolainen, 1995; Tuominen, Talja, & Savolainen, 2002) and the ways in which this 
particular contexts shape the information acquired through everyday life (McKenzie, 
2003) are important considerations. The ways in which women seek and receive 
information about prenatal screening may be unique from other information-seeking 
tasks.  Women seeking information about prenatal screening are not yet visibly pregnant, 
and may not have chosen to share the news of their pregnancy, which may make them 
invisible to others they encounter in their everyday life who may have relevant 
experiences or knowledge to share (McKenzie, 2003). The personal nature of the decision 
to participate in prenatal screening may contribute to a reluctance to discuss this topic 
with all but one’s closest friends or relatives. The sensitive nature of the decisions 
involved in prenatal screening may provide a barrier to discussion with those who do 
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have visibly relevant experiences. For instance, women parenting children with a 
disability may find inquiries about their experiences with prenatal screening offensive 
(Beck, 2000). This context of an "invisible" situation (Yeoman, 2010), may help explain 
why women seeking information on prenatal screening talk more consistently about 
information gleaned from past experiences, active seeking and active scanning and 
mention proxy information sources only in relation to very close friends or relatives 
(McKenzie, 2003). 
8.5.2 Discrepant cases: Avoiding information to manage 
uncertainty. 
While most women in this study actively sought information, one woman did not seek 
any extra information and two other women chose to stop seeking information. In 
addition, four women chose to avoid particular types of information, by choosing not to 
participate in the screening tests. Considering these cases in light of the consumerist 
imperative placed on patients to be informed and make decisions about their care 
(Henwood et al., 2003) may contribute to understanding the phenomena of information 
seeking for informed decision-making, especially given that the discourse around the 
need to inform oneself is particularly strong for pregnant women and mothers  (Lupton, 
1999a; Lupton, 1999b). 
Information avoidance is a strategy of information management (Brashers, Goldsmith, & 
Hsieh, 2002), and refers to behaviour designed to prevent or delay the acquisition of 
unwanted information (Sweeny, Melnyk, Miller, & Shepperd, 2010). It has long been 
recognized that information avoidance is a technique to avoid anxiety (Maslow 1963 in 
Case et al., 2005). Information avoidance has been theorized as an adaptive behaviour to 
manage uncertainty  (Brashers et al., 2002) by reducing, avoiding, and manipulating 
potential sources of uncertainty (Sairanen & Savolainen, 2010). Uncertainty is a 
fundamental characteristic of the human experience (Boholm, 2003) and has been 
described as a universal feature of pregnancy (Sorenson 1990 in Teman, Ivry, & 
Bernhardt, 2011), given the context of increased opportunity for decision-making and 
responsibility within a context of ever-increasing choice and risk  (Lupton, 1999b).  
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In this study, seven women discussed different ways of avoiding information. Four of 
these women avoided information about the disability status of their fetus by declining to 
participate in prenatal screening.  This choice is congruent with Barbour's (Barbour, 
Rintamaki, Ramsey, & Brashers, 2011) findings that people tend to avoid information 
when they feel no action can be taken, and similar to Sweeny's (2010) theorization that 
information is avoided when no desirable action can be taken. All four women who 
declined to participate in prenatal screening rejected the option of terminating the 
pregnancy if information suggesting an anomalous condition was found (marking this 
action as undesirable) (Sweeny et al., 2010). Three women who participated in prenatal 
screening also discussed avoiding information. Lucy stated that she did not seek 
information about prenatal screening beyond what she received from her doctor or had 
previously heard from friends because she already had the information she needed, and 
did not wish to seek more information that might detract from her goal to think positively 
about her pregnancy. Avoiding fear and anxiety was also cited by Nadia and Farah as a 
reason to stop looking for information about prenatal screening, aligning with Sweeny's 
(2010) finding that people avoid information when it may cause unpleasant emotions, or 
diminish pleasant emotions, and Barbour's  (2011) finding of information avoidance as a 
strategy to manage negative emotional reactions and avoid interference with enjoyment. 
Nadia and Farah's approaches may fit more closely with the strategy of selective 
avoidance; both were willing to seek and receive some information about prenatal 
screening, but stopped seeking information when that information became unpleasant and 
unreliable (Sairanen & Savolainen, 2010) . When Nadia speaks about her experience 
reading about other women's experiences of prenatal screening online, she exhibits 
'knowledge dismissal', choosing to avoid that information after evaluating it as potentially 
inaccurate and threatening (Jemmott, Ditto, & Croyle, 1986; Sweeny et al., 2010). 
Managing information provided by prenatal screening is a balancing act between seeking 
and avoiding information in order to achieve the multiple goals of reducing uncertainty, 
maintaining optimism (Brashers et al., 2002), and meeting the medical consumerist 
imperative of  being an informed patient and exercising decision-making agency 
(Henwood et al., 2003).   
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8.6 Conclusion 
As the women in this study described the ways in which they received, sought , and 
worked towards understanding information about prenatal screening in order to facilitate 
decision-making, they described a type of knowledge production that centered on each 
individual and was gathered, interpreted and used for decision-making outside of the 
clinician's office. Women described engaging in active and passive information-seeking 
activities, and making sense of that information in relation to prior knowledge and 
experiences. Knowledge about prenatal screening was produced through an iterative 
combination of knowledge from physicians, medical pamphlets, and medical websites, 
with social and experiential knowledge from friends, family members, and other women.  
This knowledge was then contextualized with each woman's own life circumstances, 
perceptions of risk, and understandings of motherhood, disability, and family.  This 
complex formation of understanding was described as the basis for decision-making, with 
the information provided by the clinician as only one rung in the ladder of knowledge. 
The findings have implications for informing a broader understanding of prenatal 
screening; one that extends beyond the clinic, recognizes women’s active agency in the 
process, and aims to support women in the process of collecting, interpreting and acting 
upon information about prenatal screening. 
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9 Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction 
The following chapter ties together the themes presented so far and contextualizes them 
as part of a doctoral study with information on the process of the research and 
suggestions of quality criteria and strengths and limitations. First, I discuss the research 
process, including the contributions and impact of my supervisory committee. I explicitly 
address reflexivity, which has been mentioned in Chapter 1 and 4, outlining my particular 
understanding of the term and the ways in which I engaged in reflexive thought 
throughout the research process. In the middle of the chapter I discuss the links between 
the integrated articles presented in Chapters 5-8, tracing the theme of informed decision-
making through the manuscripts and exploring the underlying themes introduced in 
Chapters 2 and 3 through an examination of discourse. In this section, entitled 
"Discursive Tensions", I provide a short survey of the language found in data from the 
three studies: patient education materials, policy documents, and participant interviews. I 
use this material to argue that this language indicates participation in different discourses, 
and I discuss the common links between the four manuscripts (Chapters 5-8) in terms of  
ideas of medicalization and normalization. In this discussion, I explore the ways in which 
medical-institutional discourses structure the social relations and institutional processes 
of prenatal screening. After this discussion of the common themes between the 
manuscripts, I introduce two sets of quality criteria that could be used to judge this work 
from the literature of interdisciplinary scholarship and grounded theory. I discuss 
potential contributions this work may make to understandings of patient education 
materials, clinicians offering prenatal screening, policy documents, and informed 
decision making. Finally, I outline some potential directions for future research and 
discuss some of the strengths and limitations of this work.  
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9.2 Insights and Reflections on the Research Process: 
Impact of supervisors 
It is not possible to consider the process of the doctoral research separately from that of 
the doctoral program, where each element (coursework, comprehensive exams, proposal, 
dissertation) is related, feeding into and building a foundation for the next step. I can 
trace particular elements of this dissertation to each component of the doctoral program 
and in this way, the research process started long before I began to think about the study 
design or collected any data. In this section I discuss the many contributions of my 
supervisors as a way of reflecting upon the type of scholar I am attempting to 'come to be' 
(Green & Lee, 1995), in order to explicitly highlight the threads  of the doctoral process 
and the ways in which I have tried to weave them together.  In a later section, "Insights 
and Reflections on the Research Product", I will discuss the conceptual integration of the 
four manuscripts. 
The doctoral research process is inherently linked to the supervisory relationship, a 
relationship which is not well studied or understood (Grant, 2003; Grant, 2005), as it is 
idiosyncratic and traditionally conducted behind closed doors (Green & Lee, 1995; 
McWilliam & Palmer, 1995). Green and Lee (1995) contend that "supervision is not 
simply a matter of coming to know ... it is also a matter of coming to be" (p.41) and that 
it is through the student's relationship with her supervisor(s) that she begins to form her 
own identity as an academic. The formation of the academic identity happens through 
multiple social and discursive sites, but the supervisory relationship remains one of the 
most influential (Petersen, 2007).  
I have been tremendously fortunate to have been given the opportunity to work with my 
supervisors and their influence and support has shaped this project, and my academic 
identity, enormously. Until recently, I had not questioned the convention of mentioning 
gratitude to one's supervisors in the acknowledgement section at the beginning of the 
thesis. I took for granted that most students are grateful for the time and effort of their 
supervisors and that the acknowledgements section was an appropriate place to mention 
this. My acceptance of this convention began to shift as I started to think more deeply 
about what it means to be a supervisee, and what is asked of the supervisor. Over the past 
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two years (2010-2012), I have acted as a research assistant to a project studying 
interdisciplinary doctoral supervisory relationships (Hibbert et al., 2012; Vanstone et al., 
2012). My experiences with this project caused me to reflect more consciously on the 
contribution of my supervisors and conclude that their influence goes far beyond that 
which could be acknowledged up front and then set aside. I have written in Chapter 1 and 
later in this chapter about the importance of acknowledging my standpoint and thinking 
reflexively about the decisions I've made throughout the research process. This reflexive 
consideration of standpoint is not complete without consideration of the ways in which I 
have been influenced by my supervisors.  
If we consider the dissertation as a piece of woven fabric, I may have chosen the threads 
and woven them together, but that is so little of the work of weaving. My supervisors 
guided my selection of threads, worked hard to bring new threads to my attention, 
pointed out congruencies and inconsistencies in the threads I had chosen, strategized with 
me about what threads would be most valuable, most resonant, most useful, and most 
realistic. They helped me pick a pattern that could showcase my abilities and overcome 
my weaknesses while ensuring that pattern was not overly ambitious or impossible to 
complete with the available time and resources. My supervisors taught me how to weave, 
demonstrating their preferred techniques and helping me make connections with other 
weavers who use different techniques I might wish to incorporate. When I made a 
mistake in my weaving, they helped me back up, pick out the flaw, and re-weave the hole 
that was left. Sometimes I recognized that I had made a mistake, or left a weak spot in my 
fabric; sometimes I would not be aware of this. In this instance, they would gently draw 
my attention to the flaw in the fabric, perhaps by suggesting why some might consider it 
a flaw, and what action I might take to shore up my work against these criticisms. They 
managed to bring my attention to these flaws without making me feel like a flaw in the 
fabric was reflective of a flaw in the weaver. When I brought a completed section of 
fabric to them, they would work with me tirelessly, helping me re-work that section until 
it was as strong and beautiful as I was able to make it. When I felt like tossing the 
weaving aside and starting over, perhaps as a potter or a glass-blower, they calmed me 
down, picked up the discarded weaving, pointed out the strengths and worked with me to 
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overcome the weaknesses, re-inspiring me to start again, and keep going. Truly, I could 
not ask for more. 
Through my work on the interdisciplinary doctoral supervisory practices project, I came 
to realize that for many interdisciplinary students, supervisory committees are rife with 
conflict. Interdisciplinary supervisory committee members may have conflicting ideas 
about what the PhD is and how it is done (Pole, 1998), what the content and structure of 
the different components should be (Blackmore & Nesbitt, 2008), or whether the content 
or the act of learning is of primary importance (Franke & Arvidsson, 2011). They may 
have different ideas about what their role should be (Franke & Arvidsson, 2011; B. 
Smith, 2001). These issues may be further complicated when there are two main 
supervisors (Kiley, 2009). After reading about the potential for conflict on 
interdisciplinary committees and speaking with many students who have experienced this 
conflict, I am so grateful for the intellectual generosity, mutual respect, and flexibility 
that my supervisory committee members have demonstrated. While we encountered 
many differences of opinion, these differences were always expressed in a respectful and 
open way which invited discussion and consideration of the different ways of proceeding. 
As a result, I think these differences led to a strengthening of my work, encouraging me 
to consider and respond to different conventions, perspectives, and sets of expectations. 
This collegial way of working across disciplines has modeled for me an exemplary way 
of interdisciplinary working, acting as a strong influence on my process of "becoming 
and being" an interdisciplinary scholar (Green & Lee, 1995, p.41). 
While it feels artificial to name specific influences and contributions that my supervisors 
have made, I will highlight a few specific ideas here. These specific instances are only a 
small part of what each person has contributed, but I discuss them in an effort to be 
reflexive about what has influenced me and to highlight the way I have approached this 
research process. My co-supervisors are Elizabeth Anne Kinsella and Jeff Nisker. My 
third supervisory committee member is Pamela McKenzie. One trait these three have in 
common is that scholarship is not just a job, but a way of life. As I have come to know 
each person better and understand each person's work more fully, I can see the ways in 
which they embody the principles espoused in their academic work. To me, this 
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demonstrates a consistent philosophy which informs the way they approach scholarship, 
teaching, supervision, and collegial relations.  The message I take from this role-
modeling is that you should love what you study and study what you love, and approach 
academic work with integrity and a comprehensive, consistent philosophical approach. 
Over the course of the doctoral research process, I have had the experience of 
encountering ideas that change the way I think about the world, a sort of falling through 
the rabbit-hole from which there is no waking up. I have begun to understand that the 
way to draw strength from this experience is to match these ideas with your personal 
philosophy, so that you are forged as a stronger individual rather than as a fragmented 
one. Academically, you might experiment with different topics or methods, but the 
underlying philosophy of being and knowing forms the core of a consistent and 
congruent approach to the work.  
The idea of choice has become a central theme of my doctoral work, and I think my 
interest and emphasis on choice reflects the ways of working I have observed with Anne, 
Jeff and Pam. None of them have ever said that a particular way of doing scholarship is 
right or wrong, just that there are different choices. Some choices fit better with others, 
each choice in a project leads down a different path, and being a researcher is about 
making carefully considered choices. It's not simply about measures of "validity", but 
about thinking through the implications of each choice and forming a piece of work that 
fits together, speaks to other work in the area, and forms a whole project that you are 
proud to stand behind. I think this emphasis on choices and decisions rather than a right 
way or a wrong way has been an important aspect of why I have enjoyed the doctoral 
process so much: I have been empowered to make my own choices, and entrusted with 
thinking through the implications of those choices. 
Some of the other lessons I will take with me throughout my own academic journey: 
generosity and collaboration over competitiveness and territory; academic work should 
not live and die in the ivory tower, but should be based in, respond to, and make a 
difference in some part of the world; getting out there, taking risks, trying new things is 
always a good idea; research can have powerful effects, so it should be based in 
something you strongly believe in; ensure internal congruency by keeping your research 
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question in mind throughout the process; the influence of the researcher's personal 
convictions and perspective cannot be avoided and so must be acknowledged, if not in 
publication at least to yourself. For these ideas and for the continued support, 
encouragement, and guidance,  of my committee members I am grateful. 
9.3 My understanding of reflexivity. 
Throughout my doctoral work I have developed an appreciation and understanding for 
the potential impact of reflexivity in the research process. Through my reading and 
coursework, I have developed an understanding that reflexivity is a contested term used 
by many people in many different ways. Most scholars agree that it is necessary for 
qualitative research, but there is little agreement on what it is, or how to do it (Finlay & 
Gough, 2003).  In the following section I detail my own understanding of reflexivity and 
outline the ways in which I engaged reflexively with this research. 
I am working with Smith’s (1987) idea that reflexivity should not be something done at 
the end of research, but that a qualitative research methodology should be inherently 
reflexive. This idea has been embraced by feminist researchers from different disciplines, 
working in different methodologies (Hesse-Biber & Piatelli, 2007). When Smith (1987) 
describes her version of sociology from the standpoint of women, she describes it as “a 
sociology that will lay out for people how our everyday worlds are organized and how 
they are shaped and determined by relations that extend beyond them” (p. 121). This is 
what I think qualitative research should strive to do, and I see reflexivity as the way of 
doing it.   
I understand reflexivity as a two-pronged activity, occurring through conscious processes 
of meaning making (Taylor & White, 2000) as well as through attempts to make sense of 
our personal experience of the world when it poses a conflict with the ways we 
experience what Smith (Smith, 1990b) terms the 'relations of ruling'-  dominant 
ideological relations that organize our activities in standardized ways (Smith, 1997). 
Smith (1983) describes our lived experiences as existing in our memories and encoded to 
our memories with social meaning. Our memories of "what actually happened" (Smith, 
1983, p.321) arise only at the moment of reflection, and at this moment of reflection are 
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encoded as accounts of experience. According to Smith, our methods of constituting 
"what actually happened" are not only individual but also social, influenced by 
ideological practices and enshrined through this process of encoding. I understand the 
implications of this assertion to be that our lived experiences are understood by us 
through a process of interpretation which relies on our social experiences and location 
(Smith, 1987). I conceptualize this process of experiencing and encoding experiences as 
iterative, with each experience reinforcing, shaping, or shedding insight on to our 
particular assumptions about the way the world is organized, therefore shaping the way 
we encode future experiences. To understand our experiences, we draw on our personal 
assumptions, interacting with the world around us to make knowledge, form particular 
decisions, and reify or challenge assumptions. This is how I understand situated 
knowledge to be created, and why I think it is important to recognize our individual 
locations, particular histories, and experiences, and the ways in which these locations, 
histories, and experiences shape our interpretations and are located inside a broader social 
context.  
9.3.1 Engaging in reflexive thought to understand standpoint. 
As I began to consider reflexivity as the combination of experiences and socially located 
ways of understanding these experiences, I tried to examine my own thought processes to 
understand the ways in which I was thinking about my data and my taken-for-granted 
assumptions about the way the world works and my corresponding place in it. Smith 
would call this  an attempt to examine my un-interrogated ways of living within a world 
organized by ruling relations (Smith, 1997). While reviewing cancer genetics charts for 
another project (Vanstone et al., In Press), I found myself imagining the women beyond 
the words in the chart. I recognized in this exercise that imagination was what enabled me 
to understand my participants as people and that it could act as a window into their 
particular standpoint, as a way to 'make strange' (Greene, 1988) my assumptions about 
the data and to query different ways of interpreting what was there. I began to understand 
Smith's notion of encoding experience by thinking about the process of imagining, by 
monitoring what kinds of aspects of the social world I thought about when  I wasn't 
trying to do reflexivity or be reflexive, but  when I was thinking about something 
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uncomfortable and wondering how it might be different. I see this imaginative thought 
process as closely linked to narrative reasoning (Mattingly, 1998). When we engage with 
narrative reasoning and when we create thick narratives (Nisker, 2004), we are using our 
imagination to fill in details of the story that we may not know, or know completely (for 
how can anyone ever know completely the details of even a small part of the life of 
another?). Examining the ways we choose to fill in these details can be a form of 
reflexivity when compared with possible alternative versions of the same story, or 
different stories.   
We create narratives from our own experiences. Smith (1987) talks about the importance 
of beginning from a standpoint rooted in every day experiences and a particular 
subjectivity located in a constantly shifting matrix of social locations (Hesse-Biber, 
2007). This emphasis on experiences and subjectivity is essential to radicalizing (which 
Smith reminds us means “remake from the root”) power relations and ideological 
structures. When speaking with interview participants, reviewing interview data, reading 
patient education materials or policy documents, I engaged with my own every day 
experiences of being a daughter, a sister, a wife, a friend, an employee, and a patient. In 
this way, I tried to examine particular situations from the perspective of a social actor in 
that experience, in order to recognize how I might place my own person and values into 
that experience (Smith, 1983). I consciously imagined what it would be like to be a 
pregnant woman reading these documents, or having the experience of considering 
prenatal screening within a nexus of social relations. I also used this imaginative exercise 
to 'make strange' the experiences of the participants, to try and identify my taken-for-
granted assumptions of what they were expressing. This attendance to inferred 
experiences or opinions was particularly important since I shared several demographic 
characteristics with my participants (Delamont, Atkinson, & Pugsley, 2010). Through 
this imaginative composition of narratives, I could begin to see the way that particular 
standpoints  may interact, providing congruence or conflict with other standpoints.  
Creating imaginative narratives about the data I read was a device I used to allow me to 
make visible the different facets of my own standpoint, enabling me to see the differences 
and similarities between my standpoint and that of my participants. Harding (1987) 
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emphasizes the permanent partiality of this type of feminist inquiry- every story is 
intrinsically multi-faceted. There is no one true story. I used short quotes as an 
opportunity to imagine several different stories that may inform a particular utterance, 
and then looked back at the data as a whole for indications of what might or might not be 
present. By using an imaginative narrative technique to make visible traces of standpoint, 
I attempted to re-ground myself in the data, in what was said, rather than what I heard or 
chose to not hear. 
9.3.2 Engaging in reflexive thought to make explicit research 
decisions. 
Decisions in the research process were continuous and ongoing. I was aware of the ways 
in which my decisions framed a particular study throughout the process, including the 
decisions I made as an individual and with my supervisory committee when choosing the 
research questions, picking a venue for recruitment, designing the recruitment poster and 
advertisements, writing the interview guide, engaging with women at the London-
Middlesex Health Unit Prenatal Fair, interacting with potential participants in person, 
over e-mail or over the phone- all this before I recorded a single word of an interview. 
Sometimes the need to make decisions about the research felt paralyzing. Every door I 
walked through meant that there were now other doors I could never walk through. When 
collecting data, I had to balance choosing the same doors for consistency between 
interviews with trying different doors to see if they yielded richer data. Even decisions 
that seemed insignificant, like choosing what clothing to wear to an interview or 
recruitment opportunity, at times took on momentous and paralyzing proportions. What 
did the clothing say about me as a researcher? What type of participants would see me as 
someone they would like to engage with? Who would turn away? How did my 
appearance and demeanor affect the way they portrayed themselves? How did my words 
create a particular atmosphere where certain responses were encouraged or discouraged? 
I noticed that many of the women I recruited in person were white, highly educated, and 
displaying subtle signs of wealth (e.g. orthodontically straight teeth). This didn't reflect 
the population I observed attending the Prenatal Fair. Did it reflect the population of first 
time mothers who attended the Prenatal Fair in their first trimester?  Did it reflect the 
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population who understood "prenatal screening" or the idea of an interview study as 
something they wouldn't mind participating in? Or did it just reflect me? I was really 
challenged to move beyond this paralyzing aspect of reflexive decision-making, in which 
I had a hard time making any decisions because of the possible ramifications.  I have 
detailed some of these decisions in Chapter 4. section 4.3.7. 
9.4 Insights and Reflections on the Relationships 
Among the Manuscripts 
I began this research by engaging with literature that was critical of medicalization in 
pregnancy, the judgments made by prenatal screening about the quality of life of people 
with disabilities, and the directive effects of the routinization of the offer of prenatal 
screening. After collecting and analyzing data, my results centered around questions of 
information seeking and informed choice, with little mention of the critical literature that 
informed the beginning of the work. In a way, this reflects the process of constructivist 
grounded theory (Dunne, 2011), wherein the literature review informs the researcher but 
is left to "lie fallow" (Charmaz, 2006, p.166) until the formation of the grounded theory 
in an effort to "avoid importing preconceived ideas and imposing them on [my work]" (p. 
165). The literature I presented in Chapter 2 and 3 informed the way that I designed the 
study and approached data collection, but when I analyzed my data, I was careful to 
develop the emerging propositions through induction. After analysis, when I returned to 
the literature, I found that the emerging theoretical propositions fit better with another 
body of literature, that of informed decision-making. I didn't recognize the significance of 
this literature at the outset of the work, as is common for many grounded theorists (Dick, 
2007; Dunne, 2011; Glaser, 1998), nor did I predict that informed decision-making would 
be the most compelling story in the data. While I chose to locate my work within the 
literature of informed decision-making for publication, my thinking throughout the 
research process was deeply influenced by the initial literature I engaged with, presented 
in Chapters 2 and 3. This section presents an opportunity to unite these bodies of thought. 
In this section I will discuss two different themes that unite the four manuscripts, and 
which engage with and respond to each other. The first theme is informed choice and 
decision-making. I engaged with this topic in different ways through the four 
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manuscripts, considering how different datasets spoke to this theme and what ideas 
different audiences may find most compelling. The second topic of this section is 
discursive tensions in prenatal screening. Using the critical literature presented in 
Chapters 2 and 3 I highlight and explore points of tension between the medical discourses 
used in policy documents and patient educational materials and those revealed in the 
narratives of women as they discuss prenatal screening. By contrasting dominant medical 
discourses with narrative discourses, I explore ideas of medicalization, normalcy, and 
risk. Finally, I will link these two topics together and discuss the ways in which 
discursive tensions may impact informed decision-making by creating obstacles to 
women's capacities to articulate their own perspectives and make choices congruent with 
their own values if these perspectives counter or resist dominant discourses. 
9.4.1 Informed decision-making. 
As mentioned above, informed decision-making is a theme I address in all four 
manuscripts. In manuscript 1, Chapter 5, I work with the concept of non-directive 
counseling proposed in the SOGC Clinical Practice Guidelines on prenatal screening 
issued in 2011 (Chitayat, Langlois, & Wilson, 2011) and 2007 (Summers, Langlois, 
Wyatt, & Wilson, 2007). These policy documents state that prenatal screening should be 
offered through a process of informed decision-making and that counseling about 
prenatal screening should be non-directive. I don't problematize non-directive counseling 
in this manuscript, instead I ask if this instruction is supported by existing patient 
education materials. By examining the language used in patient education materials, I 
suggest that the language used in the material may often be seen as implicitly directive, 
and direct the reader towards particular understandings and certain choices of action. 
In Chapter 6, I directly problematize the idea that counseling can occur non-directively, 
marshalling genetic counseling literature to argue that non-directive counseling is neither 
realizable nor desirable. I work with the concept of shared decision-making, as outlined 
by Cathy Charles and colleagues (Charles, Gafni, & Whelan, 1997; Charles, Gafni, & 
Whelan, 1999; Charles, Whelan, & Gafni, 1999) to delineate a particular way that model 
can be combined with a more consumerist, informative model of decision-making, as 
outlined by Emanuel and Emanuel (Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992) to facilitate a counseling 
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process wherein the clinician and woman both share their values and information, and the 
clinician actively counsels the woman in decision-making, although supports whatever 
decision she chooses to make. The model proposed in this manuscript works with two 
established models of counseling to propose a way in which informed decision-making 
may be facilitated without relying on the tropes of neutrality and non-directiveness, 
where each party acknowledges their own preferences and values, and is explicit about 
their role in the counseling process. 
Chapter 7 addresses the "informed" part of informed decision-making, relying on 
interview data to discuss what type of information women require in order to feel 
informed to make a decision. The findings are presented in a way that I hope can act as a 
guide for clinicians about what information they may want to consider addressing during 
the initial prenatal visit. Similar to findings from Hunt (Hunt, de Voogd, & Castañeda, 
2005) and Farrell (Farrell et al., 2011), the women in my study were interested in pieces 
of information that enabled them to make decisions, rather than information that may 
leave them "informed". The distinction between information-for-decision-making and 
information to-be-informed is delicate; information-for-decision-making pertains to 
topics such as timelines, anxiety, and details about the conditions tested for. This type of 
information, described by women as important for their decision-making process, is not 
always included in summaries of information which should be provided to ensure a 
woman is informed. This article serves to highlight the individual nature of information 
needs, and echoes Sue Sherwin's warning that the call for adequate information and 
understanding for informed decision-making is problematic because the information that 
is available is that which has been deemed relevant by research funders, researchers, 
professional colleges, and health care providers (Sherwin, 1998). This however may not 
be the particular information that an individual woman finds relevant to her decision-
making process.  
Chapter 8 presents a tentative model of the process of decision-making in prenatal 
screening, arrived at through an inductive analysis of women’s reports of their 
experience. It looks at how informed decision-making happens in a broader context, 
conceptualizing the clinical encounter as one part of an iterative, non-linear process of 
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information-seeking, information-receiving, and sense-making which inform the way a 
woman chooses to make a decision. The model outlined in this manuscript supports the 
idea presented by Charles (1999) and incorporated into Chapter 6, that women arrive to 
the clinic with knowledge about prenatal screening and ideas relevant to prenatal 
screening. The women in this study talked about how their experiences with people with 
disabilities, conversations with friends and family members, or other information they 
had acquired in everyday life (McKenzie, 2003) informed the way they thought about 
prenatal screening before they entered their clinician's office. This process of being and 
becoming informed did not end after the first decision was made, but continued, 
subsuming information acquired over the process of the pregnancy to make sense of 
prenatal screening in a way which was meaningful for the individual woman. Chapter 8 
also addresses the discrepant case, women who chose not to seek information about 
prenatal screening and women who chose to actively avoid particular pieces of 
information, resisting discourses which assert the imperative to become informed about 
health decisions (Henwood, Wyatt, Hart, & Smith, 2003).  
These four manuscripts present a case for informed decision-making as a complex, 
iterative process which is necessary, but also deeply problematic. Informed decision-
making is problematic for several reasons. First, notions that information can be provided 
non-directively may mask the assumptions embedded in the information provided, 
making it difficult for women to identify and resist messages contained in this 
information (Anderson, 1999). Second, informed decision-making as we know it relies on 
information that has been deemed authoritative and relevant by medical and academic 
institutions, shaping the way that we can think about and understand prenatal screening, 
motherhood, and disability. Finally, current conceptions of informed decision-making 
emphasize the role of the clinician, casting the woman as a vessel to be filled with 
information (relevant and comprehensive information, of course) (Freire, 1993; Lee & 
Garvin, 2003), from which a decision can be retrieved.  
Through the four manuscripts presented in this dissertation, I have challenged this notion 
in distinct ways. In the remainder of this section, I will challenge this notion more 
broadly, engaging with critical literature on medicalization, normalization and relational 
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autonomy to problematize the context in which informed decision-making takes place. At 
the end of this chapter, in the section entitled "Implications for Informed Decision-
Making" I attempt to offer a few generative suggestions for future research on this topic. 
9.4.2 Discursive tensions in prenatal screening. 
When considering whether or not to participate in prenatal screening, women are faced 
with the task of identifying their own preferences and values in order to make a decision. 
It may be challenging for women to identify and articulate values and preferences which 
run counter to dominant discourses of "healthy" pregnancy, "normal" bodies, and "good" 
mothers. This may be especially true when prenatal screening is presented without 
acknowledgement of the values embedded in the test (Caplan, 1993; Kolker & Burke, 
1998; Weil, 2003). Medical discourses of objectivity may disguise the presence of 
embedded assumptions and values (Asch, 2000), giving them a subtle form of power, and 
making it more difficult for women to think beyond or resist these discursive assumptions 
(Anderson, 1999).  
Discursive tensions are visible in the contrast between the ways topics central to the idea 
of prenatal screening are described in different venues. In this section I consider two 
particular areas of conflicting discourse by examining the range of language used to 
discuss two apparently straightforward questions. First, who does prenatal screening test? 
A fetus? A baby? A pregnancy? The mother herself?  Second, what is the aim of prenatal 
screening?  Does the test detect disorders, diseases, defects and abnormalities or 
particular conditions and other ways of being? The narratives of women in this study 
reveal that women may struggle against dominant cultural discourses informed by values 
and assumptions that may not be readily apparent.  Such discourses may pose challenges 
or create obstacles to women’s capacities to articulate their own perspectives and make 
choices concordant with their own values. 
9.4.2.1 Who does prenatal screening test? 
 As discussed at length in the first manuscript, Chapter 5, prenatal screening patient 
education pamphlets use a variety of terms to describe the subject of prenatal screening, 
sometimes inconsistently. Some pamphlets used consistent language throughout the 
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publication, such as pregnancy or baby; other pamphlets differentiated between fetus and 
baby at the point of birth; more problematic were the pamphlets which used the term 
fetus or embryo when referring to an affected pregnancy or decisions about pregnancy 
termination and the terms baby or infant or child when describing the reassurance that 
screening tests may provide, or the desire to have an unaffected child. At times, I found 
the choice of language jarring, with one pamphlet stating that a second trimester serum 
screen can "pick up approximately 60% of infants with Down syndrome" [emphasis 
added] (SOGC, Prenatal Diagnosis: Public Education Pamphlet).  
The language in the policy documents is intended for medical audiences. The SOGC 
guidelines on prenatal screening (Chitayat et al, 2011; Summers et al, 2007) use very 
similar language, duplicating many phrases and sentences. In both documents, baby is 
used twice, once referring to a child who was born with trisomy 18 (Chitayat et al, 2011, 
p.742) and once ambiguously, referring to age-related risk of affected pregnancy 
(Chitayat et al, 2011, p.739). In both, the word fetus is used many times, mostly referring 
to affected pregnancies, as pertinent to the topic of the guidelines. This differentiation is 
careful, and intentional, used consciously to signal whether the subject of the sentence 
has been born or not: "because the woman or her partner has a history of a previous child 
or fetus with a chromosomal abnormality" (Chitayat et al, 2011, p. 737). This wording 
further reminds clinicians gathering medical history information to inquire about living 
children and pregnancies that were aborted or miscarried. Pregnancy is by far the most 
prevalent term in both SOGC guidelines, used sometimes in place of a more specific term 
such as fetus or embryo: "the chance of identifying a pregnancy with a specific 
chromosomal abnormality" (p.738); "the practice of using [technique] to identify at-risk 
pregnancies" (p.739). These terms are sometimes ambiguous. For example, the 2011 
guideline refers to "pregnancies" as what is conceived (Chitayat et al, 2011, p. 737), 
whereas the 2007 guideline refers to "fetus" as the product of conception (Summers et al, 
2007, p. 149).  There was also ambiguity in the language used to describe who or what 
was at risk of having a condition. Sometimes the pregnant woman was at risk (Summers 
et al, 2007, p.152), sometimes the pregnancy. Chitayat et al (2011) use the word woman 
most frequently, but occasionally referred to her as a patient, a discourse that may be 
287 
 
seen as medicalizing pregnancy, e.g. "patients undergoing first trimester screening" 
(Chitayat et al, 2011, p.742). 
While spoken discourse is different than written discourse, examining the words women 
chose may reveal tensions between discourses. For instance, the word fetus was only used 
by three women, and only once each. In each case, the woman used fetus when 
explaining medical information she had received, such as the probability of Down 
syndrome, or what the ultrasound measured. Baby was by far the most common term 
used by women, usually prefaced by a or your when speaking hypothetically, and my or 
the when speaking personally. Women used the term baby to refer to the born and 
unborn, affected and unaffected. Child was also a fairly common term, and similar to 
baby was used to describe the born and unborn, affected and unaffected.  Seven women 
used the word kid, usually to describe what life would be like after they gave birth: "I 
think I would love that kid no matter what" (Olivia), or as a way of ascribing personhood 
to the fetus, such as Holly did when describing how it would be difficult to make a 
decision about whether or not to terminate an affected pregnancy because "it is still your 
kid, right?". Pregnancy was a term that was used by every woman, mostly to describe the 
process of being pregnant, getting pregnant, or feeling pregnant, except, notably, when it 
was used to describe decisions to terminate, end, or continue the pregnancy. In contrast to 
the policy documents, women did not talk about the pregnancy as being at risk or tested. 
In women's speech, pregnancy referred to the process of being pregnant, unless they were 
talking about abortion, in which case they used similar terminology to the policy 
documents. 
There was a noticeable difference between the discourses used by women and those used 
within the policy documents with respect to who or what was tested. Educational 
pamphlets struck a middle ground between the medical discourse of the policy documents 
and the narrative discourse of the women. Some pamphlets used similar language as the 
women, including adopting the term baby, even discussing events before birth. Others 
used medicalized discourse, referring to fetus and embryo, or using pregnancy to describe 
the 'product' rather than the 'process'. There were clear discursive patterns in the 
interviews with pregnant women; women commonly used the words baby, kid, or child to 
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refer to both the born and unborn. They rarely used the word fetus, except when repeating 
medical information. Similarly, pregnancy referred almost exclusively to the process of 
being pregnant, and was not used to talk about what or who was tested or affected.  
Women's tendency to use personal terms such as baby may reflect their adoption of the 
idea of motherhood; the use of medical discourse distances this relationship, perhaps a 
necessary tactic to make the possible consideration of terminating the pregnancy a little 
bit easier. 
9.4.2.2 What is prenatal screening looking for? 
As discussed in the first manuscript, Chapter 5, pamphlets used many different terms to 
describe what the screening test detected, including disease, disorder, defect, 
abnormality, anomaly, and the names of the conditions, such as Trisomy 18, or Down 
syndrome. Many pamphlets placed these terms in opposition to words such as healthy, 
normal, or perfect, stating that a negative result will lead to the birth of a healthy, normal, 
or perfect baby.  
The language used in the policy documents is consistent, with many phrases shared 
verbatim between the two SOGC guidelines (Chitayat et al, 2011; Summers et al, 2007).  
The language used in these clinical policy guidelines is more specific and scientific, 
including aneuploidy, which refers to the possession of an unusual number of 
chromosomes and refers to conditions such as trisomy conditions, (ex. Down syndrome) 
which manifest when three chromosomes exist (triploid) where two are typical (diploid). 
Both policy documents also refer to open neural tube defects, a class of conditions such 
as spina bifida, that result from incomplete neural tube closures, and open fetal defects, 
including gastroschisis and omphalocele. Neither SOGC policy document  uses the word 
defect to refer generally to birth defect, language that was present in a few pamphlets.  
The word disorder is prevalent in both policy documents, referring to single gene 
disorders, autosomal recessive disorders, and "rare disorders of cholesterol and estriol 
biosynthesis", "common and mild disorder, X-linked steroid sulfatase deficiency" 
(Summers et al, 2007,  p.151). Chitayat clarifies that "screening for a disorder should be 
undertaken only when the disorder is considered to be serious enough to warrant 
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intervention" (p.738). Disability was not used frequently in Chitayat (2011) or Summers 
(2007), only to state that screening programs should respect the needs and quality of life 
of people with disabilities, and to describe that particular conditions are associated with 
"intellectual disability" (Chitayat et al, 2011, p.744), an improvement from the language 
of "mental handicap" (Summers et al, 2007, p.148) and "mental retardation" (Summers et 
al, 2007, p.153) used in Summers et al (2007). Summers et al (2007) and Chitayat et al 
(2011) both use the less charged words affected and unaffected, but define affected  as 
"individuals who have the disorder for which the screen is being performed" (p.158; 
p.750). The word condition is used four times in each document, referring to 
"chromosome conditions" (Summers et al, 2007, p.148) and "genetic conditions" 
(Summers et al, 2007, p.153). Both Chitayat (2011) and Summers (2007) also use the 
normal/abnormal dichotomy, stating that prenatal screening has the "benefit of reducing 
the numbers of normal pregnancies lost because of complications of invasive procedures" 
(Summers et al, 2007, p. 146) 
In women's speech, disorder was infrequently used, once each by three women. Defect 
was more common than disorder, used by six women, once or twice each. Three out of 
the eight total occurrences of defect referred to heart defects. Disability was a more 
common word, used repeatedly by four women and a few times by three others. 
Handicap was used by two women, once each. Condition was the word I used as an 
interviewer, and many women picked that term up and used it once or twice after hearing 
it from me. Only two women used the word condition before I introduced it.  
Abnormality was used by four women, and followed the word chromosomal almost every 
time it was used.  Normal was most frequently used to describe results, habits, feelings, 
and was only used a few times to describe people. One woman, Jade, used sophisticated 
vocabulary such as "characteristics", and "disposition" to refer to the conditions tested 
for, but this was not common. The most common words used by women were problem or 
issue, describing "chromosomal abnormality or some other problem" (Bridget), 
"developmental issue" (Gail), "genetic issue" (Carrie) or just generally used to state that 
the test would provide information about whether there was a "problem with my baby's 
health" (Nadia) or the baby "has some kind of issue" (Abby).  At times it was apparent 
that women were struggling to find the right word to use, and interviews are full of 
290 
 
attempts to find the right word, such as "I think it will tell you if there's a chance of some 
sort of problem with the baby, like some sort of defect, I don't even know if that's the right 
word, some sort of genetic issue with the baby" (Carrie) or queries such as "is Down 
syndrome really a disease or is it just a defect?" (Penny). 
 
9.4.3 Discursive tensions and participation in narratives of 
medical discourse and everyday understanding: Illustration 
of broader critical themes. 
By examining the words used to answer two basic questions about prenatal screening 
(who does prenatal screening test? what is the prenatal screen looking for?), two distinct 
discourses were identified: medical discourse and the everyday discourse used by women 
as they describe their thoughts and understandings of prenatal screening. These 
discourses were found to overlap in many of the prenatal screening educational 
pamphlets, which are intended to act as a bridge between two types of knowledge, and to 
"educate" pregnant women into particular way of understanding prenatal screening 
(Dixon-Woods, 2001). Smith (1990) describes the function of texts encountered in 
everyday life as offering "access to the ontological ground of institutional processes 
which organize, govern, and regulate the kind of society in which we live" (p.122). By 
thinking about the ways in which the policy and patient education pamphlets act as 
constituents of social relations of discourse, we may begin to see the ways in which these 
texts act to organize social relations (Smith, 1990b). 
Drawing on the ideas of medicalization and normalization, I am interested in the ways in 
which medical-institutional discourses structure the social relation and institutional 
processes of prenatal screening. Using examples from data presented in this section and 
in the four manuscripts of this thesis (Chapters 5-8), I discuss such relations in the 
following section.  
Practices of bio-power, or governance through normalization of the body (Foucault, 
1990) act by encouraging women to act, to participate in the discourse of the body as a 
knowable, measurable, standardized object (Foucault, 1990). Such practices have the 
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effect of identifying and re-categorizing bodies which do not fit the medicalized ideal of 
normal. Through this process of identification and categorization, individuals are 
encouraged to exercise their power to intervene and transform these potential people into 
something which would be identified as normal or acceptable (Foucault, 2003). In this 
conception, "normal" is a social construct, aided by the ability of medicine to measure, 
count, and calculate, in order to appraise or judge acceptable and unacceptable ways of 
being. These practices of classification and codification are central to the emergence of 
the concept of disability, dividing some people from others and objectifying them 
(Tremain, 2005). The process of classifying or coding some types of people as "other" 
can be seen in the language of measuring, identifying, finding, detecting, reporting, so 
that labels of disorder, defect, disability, abnormality, can be applied. The language used 
by women in this study echoes the creation of the atypical person as "other" but is less 
quick to label, using general words such as problem or issue, that participate in a much 
larger category than the more heavily loaded words of disorder, defect, or abnormality.  
Informed decision-making participates in the process of bio-power by enabling women to 
choose to act; it encourages them to participate in this social normalization. Belief that 
one is acting autonomously and making choices however supports domination and 
normalization by hiding the real workings of power (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982); a 
mechanism that indicates the success of power (Foucault, 1990). By cloaking prenatal 
screening in language of choice and autonomy, women are encouraged to participate in 
the workings of this powerful apparatus, to measure and identify anomalies so they can 
be reported and extinguished (Lippman, 1991; Seavilleklein, 2009).    
When considering the different language used to describe who is tested, it is possible to 
see that depersonalized language of pregnancy or fetus may function to prevent a 
pregnant woman from thinking of her pregnancy as a member of her family until the 
testing process has been complete and the fetus/pregnancy has been measured and 
classified as "normal". The tendency to experience a pregnancy as "tentative" (Rothman, 
1989) until testing is complete has been understood as closely linked to prenatal 
screening and testing for some time (Rothman, 1989;  Taylor , 2008). Women carrying 
wanted pregnancies may resist this discursive attempt to distance themselves by using 
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personal terms such as baby or child  before birth. Women who stated they did not plan to 
terminate their pregnancy if a condition was found made comments that prenatal 
screening could not detect everything that might be "wrong" with their baby, or that they 
did not consider the conditions detected by prenatal screening to be reason to sever the 
relationship that already existed with their child. This can be understood as active 
resistance to medicalized understandings of normal and to the consequent discursive 
imperative to strive for "normal" children.  
When considering discursive imperatives to participate in prenatal testing and subscribe 
to medicalized ideas of normal, there were four women who chose to participate in 
prenatal screening, but stated that they would not terminate their pregnancies if a 
condition was found. They may be seen as participating in the medicalized discourse of 
measuring and classifying, however also as resisting the discourse of normalization, by 
stating that they would not choose to terminate their pregnancy if a condition was found. 
All four women explained their choice by stating that prenatal screening would give them 
a chance to educate themselves and prepare to raise a child with a disability. They 
acknowledged that they would face additional challenges as a parent and that their child 
would require additional support. This may represent a simultaneous acknowledgement 
of and resistance to the societal discourse of normalization. This discourse is 
acknowledged through an appreciation that a person with a disability may face many 
challenges, many of which are socially constructed as our society has formed itself to 
primarily accommodate typical people (Wendell, 1996). The women’s unwillingness to 
act to ensure that their child and family conforms to the normalized standard may be seen 
as an example of resistance.  
All women in the study made comments which acknowledged that children born with the 
conditions detected by prenatal screening will face additional challenges in their lives. 
Women indicated that they understood that they had personal responsibility to mitigate 
these challenges, either by terminating an affected pregnancy, or by educating themselves 
and securing the extra resources necessary to support an affected child to his or her full 
potential.  The individual as a locus of responsibility is a hallmark of medicalization 
(Wilkerson, 1998), where social roots of problems and solutions are obscured and 
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responsibility to act is transferred to the individual and away from society (Morgan, 
1998). Prenatal screening presents a clear example of this principle: the onus is placed on 
women to detect and abort fetuses with disabilities, obscuring the responsibility of 
society to help all people live to their full potential. The participants in this study  
discussed ways in which they would use their personal resources to support a child with a 
disability.  
Informed decision-making is the mechanism by which modern day genetics is separated 
from eugenics (Duster, 2003). Granting women the choice to participate in prenatal 
screening empowers them to participate in governing their own bodies and families 
(Foucault, 1990) and disguises the workings of medicalization and normalization. 
However, what does choice really mean when the choices and the context within which 
those choices will be enacted are constructed by others (Beaulieu & Lippman, 1995; 
Lippman, 1991;  Lippman & Wilfond, 1992)? The choice of whether or not to terminate a 
pregnancy is not truly a choice unless another viable option is offered, such as the choice 
to raise the child within a society that will provide the necessary resources and support to 
ensure that child is given the opportunities of all other children. It is not a choice to 
choose to terminate a pregnancy after a condition is found because you cannot afford to 
care for that child, even if you would value that child (Sherwin, 1998). When considering 
questions of informed choice, we must examine the context in which those choices are 
constructed: 
When a woman's sense of herself and her range of opportunities have been 
oppressively constructed [so that] ... hav[ing] a(nother) child will impose unjust 
and intolerable costs on her, it does not seem sufficient to restrict our analysis to 
the degree of autonomy associated with her immediate decision about a particular 
treatment offered. We need a way of acknowledging how oppressive 
circumstances can interfere with autonomy. (Sherwin, 1998, p. 28)  
Autonomy is a concept which underpins the idea of informed decision-making, and as 
discussed in Chapter 2, the concept of autonomy can be problematic for feminists, who 
support the protection it affords for vulnerable people, but are wary of the assumptions 
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embedded within it. Oppression may remain an unrecognized constraint to autonomy 
equal to coercion, internal compulsion and ignorance (McLeod & Sherwin, 2000). 
Models of counseling to support informed decision-making strive to remove coercion 
through careful directions to the clinician to act as non-directively as possible (Charles et 
al., 1999; Elwyn, Gray, & Clarke, 2000; Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992; Michie, Bron, 
Bobrow, & Marteau, 1997). These models attempt to remove ignorance by carefully 
considering the information necessary to be considered informed, and investigating how 
this information may be most effectively exchanged. Models of informed decision-
making, including the ones I present in Chapter 6 and 8, rarely address the question of 
oppression. 
Sherwin conceptualizes the relationship of autonomy and oppression as antagonistic, with 
the value of autonomy serving to hide the barriers of oppression by letting those 
indoctrinated into the North American culture of individualism and autonomy think of 
their successes as self-created and deserved, therefore creating an obliviousness to the 
barriers that oppression and disadvantage pose to self-determination and autonomous 
action (Sherwin, 1998). In turn, oppression poses a barrier to the necessary conditions for 
autonomy, by questioning rationality, constructing the information available and the 
definition of ‘informed’, and creating coercion through the circumstances of everyday life 
(Sherwin, 1998). Sherwin (1998) calls for attention to the broader social context in which 
individuals make decisions, acknowledging the interconnected nature of a person in her 
society (McLeod & Sherwin, 2000).  
These theories raise issues for further and future attention in considerations of informed-
decision making in prenatal screening. They suggest that rather than focusing solely on 
improving the counseling processes that facilitate informed choice about prenatal 
screening, attention needs to be paid to the societal context within which prenatal 
screening happens, including the resources available to women, children, and people with 
disabilities. When interview participants talked about what they would do if they received 
a high risk result from prenatal screening, they all discussed the available choices with 
some relation to their own ideas of what it would be like to raise a child with a disability 
in this society. For some, this was a feasible idea, but one which would require them to 
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draw on additional resources, to educate themselves, secure appropriate health care and 
child care, set their living space up to accommodate a child who may have a mobility 
impairment. For others, who stated they would choose to terminate their pregnancy if 
they received a high-risk result, the reasoning was also bound to society. Penny perceived 
that people with disabilities have fewer choices available to them: "I wouldn't want to live 
that life ... I just want a healthy child that can run around and have all the choices and 
make those choices". 
These considerations open up broader social issues of significance to prenatal screening. 
If we live in a society where people with disabilities don't have the same choices 
available to them as people without disabilities, how can we imagine that the choice of 
whether or not to raise a child with a disability is a free and autonomous choice? The 
choice to participate in prenatal screening is deeply embedded within the particular 
societal context in which it is made. With this understanding, promoting informed choice 
is re-constructed as promoting informed choice between a range of limited possibilities, 
where the limit of the range of available choices varies for each person, depending on her 
personal circumstances. While informed decision making in prenatal screening appears to 
be an individual autonomous choice, as my dissertation draws to a close I find myself 
raising questions concerning the social aspects of informed decision making. When 
considering informed choice against an understanding of the ways in which disability and 
normality have been constructed in our society, a significant tension emerges. This  area  
warrants in-depth consideration in future work about informed choice in prenatal 
screening.  
9.5 Quality criteria 
As introduced in Chapter 1, I approached this interdisciplinary inquiry from a standpoint 
rooted in a new way of considering the quality of scholarship in the humanities and social 
sciences; this shift draws on the criteria of reflexivity, situation/standpoint, 
(re)production, (re)presentation (Hodge, 1995) rather than generalizability, validity and 
statistical significance (Denzin, 2009). In the ongoing debate regarding quality criteria for 
qualitative research, I take a quasi-foundationalist stance (Denzin, 2009; J. K. Smith & 
Demeer, 2000), asserting that there is no "single gold standard for qualitative work" 
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(Denzin, 2009, p.154) and quality criteria should respond to the particular aims and goals 
of the research. For this research, I propose the use of specific quality criteria related to 
interdisciplinary research. I also outline some quality criteria specific to evaluating 
grounded theory work. 
9.5.1 Quality criteria for interdisciplinary work.  
In response to the shift in social scientific inquiry identified by Hodge (1995) and in 
recognition of the challenges of evaluating interdisciplinary work using disciplinary 
quality criteria, a body of literature has emerged which considers the unique challenges 
and contributions of interdisciplinary work  and proposes corresponding quality criteria 
(Boix Mansilla, 2006; Manathunga, Lant, & Mellick, 2006; Mitchell & Willetts, 2009; 
Mitrany & Stokols, 2005; Wickson, Carew, & Russell, 2006).  
Quality criteria for interdisciplinary work have begun to emerge from a number of 
different scholars. Common elements of this body of literature include: assessment based 
on contribution to different knowledge domains; effective communication of findings to 
multiple audiences; flexibility when working with a wide variety of literatures; breadth 
vs. depth considerations; reflexive approaches to the research process and different 
bodies of knowledge; coherent epistemological, methodological and theoretical 
perspectives (Boix Mansilla, 2006; Manathunga et al., 2006; Mitchell & Willetts, 2009; 
Mitrany & Stokols, 2005; Wickson et al., 2006; Vanstone  et al, 2012).  
9.5.1.1 Different disciplinary audiences. 
Contributing and communicating to different disciplinary audiences is a significant 
challenge, but one which lies at the heart of interdisciplinary work. As I continue my 
academic career, this measure of quality may become the most prominent and most often 
evaluated (Boix Mansilla, 2006). I will discuss specific contributions of this work in the 
next section of this chapter, so here I will address the efforts and challenges of 
communicating to different audiences. The integrated article format allowed me to 
examine different stories within my research and to write them up in a way that spoke to 
particular audiences. For each manuscript, I made choices about the story that would be 
told, the language that would be used, the findings that would be highlighted and the 
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conclusions that would be drawn. I thought of this exercise as employing different ways 
of looking, focusing on some elements while letting others fade into the background. For 
instance, in the first manuscript, I focused on the research process, on the ways in which 
critical reflection on metaphor and figurative language opened different types of insights 
and enabled a different way of looking at the forces which shape and construct informed 
decision-making in prenatal screening. The second manuscript  concerns the adoption of 
an approach from the discipline of genetic counseling into the discipline of medicine. I 
attempted to address this clinical audience by focusing on the practical applications of a 
theoretical idea, trying to walk the line between providing sufficient theory to explain and 
justify my idea without getting lost in an aspect of the work which may not be interesting 
or useful for clinicians. In the third manuscript, I focused on the findings of the research 
and the ways in which those findings might benefit a clinical audience. In the fourth 
manuscript, I attempted to address a gap between the literature in health and library and 
information sciences (LIS). Both disciplines address the question of how people use 
information to make decisions, but the nuanced theories and models in the LIS literature 
have not significantly permeated the health literature. In each manuscript, I tried to avoid 
terminology which may be confusing or misleading to particular audiences (Mitchell & 
Willetts, 2009), reviewing the disciplinary literature and reading similar work in the 
journal to which I planned to submit in order to ensure that I was writing in the expected 
style and genre of that discipline, so that the work would be relevant and applicable to the 
specific audience. 
9.5.1.2 Flexibility with the literature. 
Flexibility when working with a wide variety of literatures is a measure of quality that 
neatly summarizes why I enjoy interdisciplinary research. When I started reviewing the 
literature for this project, I focused on medical literature which addressed the nature of 
the prenatal screening test, including who was screened, who did the screening, and how 
and when the screening was done. I used social scientific literature to address the 
questions of why prenatal screening was problematic or beneficial, what the 
consequences might be for different groups of people. As the work progressed, I moved 
into the philosophical literature, reading about ethical and critical theory. I appealed to 
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linguistic literature when I started thinking about the function of metaphor and figurative 
language. Thinking about the argumentative powers of language led me to literature 
about genetic counseling, adult and patient education, counseling psychology, and 
decision-making. Collecting data and identifying a new story about the use of 
information for decision-making sent me to the literature in the field of library and 
information sciences. Each stage of the research revealed a door to a new body of 
literature, or perhaps more accurately revealed a hallway that contained several new 
doors. For me, one of the joys of doctoral work was the chance to explore a huge variety 
of literature and to think about the ways in which it was constructed, supported or 
challenged by other literatures and to see how the integration of bodies of literature that 
didn’t usually "talk" to one another led to new ways of thinking. I approached the criteria 
of flexibility by continuing to look for new ideas and by trying to relate these ideas back 
to each other. While this part of the work was a joy, its corresponding challenge was the 
notion of breadth vs. depth.  
9.5.1.3 Breadth vs. depth. 
‘Breadth vs. depth’ is often used as a shorthand to refer to the traditional requirement of 
doctoral work to ‘master’ a body of knowledge, rather than command a shallow 
understanding of many bodies of knowledge. Golde and Gallagher (1999)  challenge this 
traditional requirement by stating that the pursuit of depth over breadth has led to 
increasingly specialized scholars who may fail to "acquire a sufficiently solid base of 
knowledge in their own discipline, much less another field, to make significant research 
contributions" (p. 283). In order to understand the ways in which our work applies to 
multiple fields and to avoid re-inventing the wheel in a different discipline, we must have 
a broad understanding of the knowledges, histories, and problems of multiple disciplines. 
In an additional argument supporting the necessity for interdisciplinary scholars to have 
broad knowledge bases, Golde and Gallagher (1999) state that "working at the interstices 
of two disciplines means conceptualizing and undertaking research in the absence of 
established and proven frameworks and models. Trying to integrate two disciplines often 
means resolving conflicts between research paradigms and methods" (p. 283). It is in this 
challenge that I see the potential for interdisciplinary depth. As will be discussed shortly, 
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interdisciplinary work requires congruency between multiple epistemological, theoretical 
and methodological approaches. Constructing a congruent bricolage of approaches 
requires a depth of understanding of the literature and scholars used. My approach to the 
question of breadth vs. depth has been to attempt to acquire and demonstrate a broad 
command of the literature and a deep command of the research approach.  
9.5.1.4 Reflexive approach. 
Mitchell and Willetts (2009) suggest that reflexivity is important for several reasons: 
showing explicit engagement with the process of research across disciplines and 
literatures; demonstrating awareness of contradictions and gaps between materials from 
different contexts; providing evidence of the researcher's capacity to articulate her 
theoretical positioning and the impact of this position on research choices; externalizing 
the internal processes of the researcher in order to acknowledge limitations, offer 
alternative perspectives, and question research choices.  I have written about reflexivity 
in multiple places in this thesis, introducing the idea of standpoint and positional 
reflexivity in Chapter 1, discussing the use of reflexivity in the research process and 
reflexive decisions that have been made in Chapter 4, and outlining the standpoint of the 
current work, including limitations and possibilities for future work in the current 
chapter. 
 I think reflexivity is important to enable me to recognize the ways in which my personal 
standpoint influences the research I produce. I can point to three different ways I came to 
this understanding. First, my commitment to a constructionist perspective means that I 
am conscious of the ways in which I am, as a researcher, constructing knowledge 
(Charmaz, 2006), and the ways in which I am, as a person, constructed by knowledge 
(Foucault, 1972).  Second, one of the scholars I use to inform my theoretical perspective, 
Dorothy E. Smith, emphasizes the importance of a reflexive stance in relation to the 
decisions made about research and in recognition and consideration of the ways that the 
particular standpoint of the researcher, the research participants, and the readers interact 
to produce the research (Smith, 1987). Third, the exercise of writing reflective journals 
throughout the research project (Hesse-Biber & Piatelli, 2007) has demonstrated to me in 
a concrete way the relationship of research product and the research process. After this 
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experience, I cannot imagine being able to step outside of myself and design or conduct a 
study without acknowledgement of how my personal knowledge, experience, and 
standpoint is implicated. I think acknowledgement of the ways in which we shape the 
research we do is essential to the ability to move beyond that influence and establish a 
'strong objectivity' (Harding, 1987). 
9.5.1.5 Coherency and congruency. 
Coherent theoretical perspectives are an important element of good quality 
interdisciplinary work (Crotty, 1998). Good quality interdisciplinary work should have a 
thoughtful pairing of epistemological and methodological perspectives, with enough 
information about this choice that readers can understand the rationale for the pairing as 
well as the value and limitations of the chosen approaches (Mitrany & Stokols, 2005). 
Taking the view that disciplinary knowledge cannot be isolated from the ways in which it 
was created (epistemology, methods, theories, history) (Bauer, 1990), I agree with 
Wickson's (2006) proposition  that interdisciplinary scholarship should  use different 
bodies of knowledge to critically reflect upon each other. The value of interdisciplinary 
scholarship is the new knowledge created in through this integration. Manathunga (2006) 
explains that the development of a diverse yet coherent epistemological and 
methodological approach is an important aspect of interdisciplinary learning, and 
demonstrates the ways in which the student can construct and apply knowledge in a 
higher order way, providing evidence of meta-cognitive skills in the creation of this 
understanding.  In Chapters 2, 3, and 4 I have provided a fairly extensive review of the 
literature I am engaging with and an exploration of how the epistemological paradigm, 
theoretical perspective and methodological choices work together. While this work 
informed the way I designed the project, carried out the research, and wrote the four 
integrated articles, the relationship between these ideas are not made explicit in the 
articles themselves. In an earlier part of Chapter 9, I picked these ideas back up, and 
discussed how they formed the structure within which my articles were researched and 
written.   
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9.5.2 Quality criteria for grounded theory work. 
In addition to the interdisciplinary quality criteria outlined in the previous section, 
Charmaz (2006) offers guidelines for quality criteria grouped around the categories of 
credibility, originality, resonance and usefulness. Unfortunately, she offers few 
guidelines for achieving or evaluating these criteria (Flick et al., 2007). Below I detail 
how I worked to achieve credibility, originality, resonance and usefulness in both the 
process and product of my research. 
Credibility: I understand credibility in the research process to be related to the way in 
which categories and themes are generated inductively from the participant data. In the 
research product, I understand credibility to be related to making plausible claims 
appropriate to the strength of the data collected, neither overstretching nor understating 
the findings. I understand credibility to be ensured by conducting a thorough study 
(Charmaz, 2004a) and by providing enough evidence in the text that the reader can 
follow the logic of the researcher and form an independent assessment of whether the 
data support the findings. To achieve credibility in my work, I made sure I was intimately 
familiar with the data by doing all collection and transcription myself; completing memos 
and field notes throughout the process of data collection and analysis; working with the 
data in multiple contexts, asking varied questions of it; comparing the data to itself; and 
searching for discrepant cases to stretch my analytical categories. I engaged in 
simultaneous data collection and analysis, ensuring that further data collection and 
theoretical sampling was driven by analytical insights. In writing my findings, I included 
as much textual data as the format allowed, in order to allow readers to make an 
independent assessments of my findings. The criterion of credibility may be achieved by 
providing "thick descriptions" (Geertz, 1973, p.6) of the data, illustrating conclusions 
with substantial extracts from the raw data. This is a commonly used strategy in the 
interpretivist tradition, and serves to make the analytical processes more transparent to 
the reader as well as to emphasize that the conclusions drawn by the researcher are 
informed by her interpretations and are not intended to represent one universal truth 
(Peck & Secker, 1999). The integrated article format often restrained the amount of raw 
participant data that could be included; the fourth manuscript, significantly longer, 
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permits the inclusion of more participant data, allowing the readers better access to the 
data I collected.  
Originality: Charmaz (2006) suggests that the  findings of a grounded theory study 
should offer new, fresh insights that are both socially and theoretically significant and 
which can challenge, extend, or refine current ideas, concepts, and practices. The 
theoretical and practical contributions of this study are original in the questions that can 
be considered through an interdisciplinary approach. The findings are described in 
relation to the practical and applicable aspects of the medical literature; the critical 
insights of bioethical literature; and the information-seeking and decision-making process 
insights of library and information sciences literature. 
Resonance: Charmaz (2006) describes resonance as the way in which the findings of a 
grounded theory study portray the fullness of the studied experience, drawing links to 
larger groups, institutions, or individual lives. I attempted to address these links by 
drawing out different facets of the research findings for different audiences in each 
manuscript, demonstrating how the findings may be linked to clinicians, policy-makers, 
and women. Charmaz (2006) also explains that resonance is achieved by focusing on the 
insights revealed in liminal, unstable, and taken for granted meanings. I have attempted to 
achieve this by using metaphors and figurative language as a sensitizing concept for 
analysis, and by employing the technique of critical reflection to examine my analysis for 
tacit implications.  
Usefulness: Interpretations offered by the researcher should have practical applications in 
the everyday world, spark further research into other substantive areas and contribute to 
knowledge (Charmaz, 2006). In the manuscripts, I have attempted to make practical links 
to the potential applications of this research in various contexts. At the end of this chapter 
I discuss the possibilities for future research and the contributions and relevance of this 
research to various areas. 
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9.6 Contributions of this work 
9.6.1 Implications for patient education materials. 
As established earlier in this work, written materials can be a powerful way of shaping 
understanding and what constitutes our perceptions of truth. Written materials participate 
in particular discourses, are ascribed authoritative status, and define the truth of a 
phenomenon (Blood, 2005) therefore shaping and constraining the way that that object 
can be understood (Foucault, 1972).  Through participation in particular discourses, texts 
can act to organize social action, constructing facts to serve the purposes of particular 
groups (Smith, 1993; Smith, 1990b). Smith uses the metaphor of a crystal to describe the 
ways in which texts work, "bending the light as it passes through (Smith, 1990b, p. 121), 
or shaping and structuring information in a way which suggests a particular truth. Smith 
sees textual analysis as a way of examining the institutional context in which facts are 
constructed; the organization of the text reflects that context. "An inner coherence is 
established between the actuality thus represented and the statements that can be made 
about it" (Smith, 1990a, p. 78). 
With this understanding of the ways in which written material functions, it is important to 
consider specific word choices and the power that language has to shape understandings 
of prenatal screening, potentially describing particular actions or choices as more 
desirable or more correct than other choices. As established in Chapter 5, it is impossible 
to avoid metaphor or figurative language in human communication. The implication of 
this work is not that this type of language should be avoided, but that it should be 
carefully considered, and queried for the conveyance of intentional and unintentional 
meaning. 
Written information materials are strongly desired by pregnant women, as sources of 
information to refer to later when information is more relevant or when women feel less 
overwhelmed by new information; to help give information to other decision-makers (e.g. 
partner); to provide key terms for further information seeking; to give more detail than 
the healthcare provider is able to. Written information may be an important aid to 
informed-decision making, if the material is carefully considered in terms of 
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comprehensiveness, comprehensibility, and balanced tone and content. Written material 
may be especially helpful if received before counseling with a clinician, as it can provide 
a general understanding of the phenomenon at hand. In this way women may use the 
counseling time to ask questions and deepen their understanding about particular aspects 
of prenatal screening that are relevant to their decision-making process rather than using 
clinician counseling time to learn the basic information about screening tests. 
9.6.2 Implications for clinicians providing prenatal care. 
Language used in counseling can shape and constrain understandings in much the same 
way as the language used in written materials. It's important for health care providers to 
question themselves about the words and terminology they choose to use, asking what 
messages are being conveyed, both implicitly and explicitly to women. What 
assumptions are present? How are the beliefs, values, and opinions portrayed in the 
words they choose? How might this language support or obstruct the aim of informed 
choice? 
This process of self-questioning requires clinicians to recognize that they carry more than 
medical information about prenatal screening (Charles et al, 1999), and asks them to be 
aware of the ways in which personal values and opinions inform their thoughts and 
speech about prenatal screening (Bhogal & Brunger, 2010). Conversely, women carry 
more than just personal information and values; they may have medical information or 
understanding which informs their thinking about prenatal screening. This study asks 
clinicians to think of the counseling process as a two-way interaction where both parties 
have information to contribute and personal values to consider, and to recognize that for 
women, this process may begin before and may continue after the clinical encounter. It 
may be helpful for both parties to have an explicit conversation addressing what the 
woman needs or wants from her clinician in order to facilitate informed decision-making 
about prenatal screening, and what the clinician is willing and able to provide. 
This conception of the clinical counseling encounter as a two-way interaction where both 
parties possess information and values suggests the importance of understanding the 
varied ways in which individual women may make decisions on sensitive issues such as 
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prenatal screening, recognizing that a 'one size fits all' approach is not appropriate. Some 
women may choose to gather information and make sense of it outside of the clinical 
encounter, relying on the clinician as one information resource but not necessarily the 
main information resource. Others may wish the clinician to take a more primary role in 
information provision. Some women may have made their decision to participate in 
prenatal screening before they arrive at the first prenatal visit; others may require the 
chance to think it over, talk with their partners, friends, or family members or to ask 
questions of the clinician at a later date.  
There are many demands on clinician time and the suggestions for facilitating informed 
choice in prenatal screening exacerbate these demands. With acknowledgement of the 
additional time resources that counseling about prenatal screening may require, clinicians 
may wish to consider creative approaches to imparting information, such as directing 
women to online or other educational resources, having electronic information available 
at the office, offering group information sessions before individual counseling, 
employing non-physician health care providers for counseling purposes, or providing 
written information before the counseling session, so that clinician counseling time is 
used for particular questions and discussion rather than informing women of the basic 
information.  
9.6.3  Implications for policy. 
Following the suggestion that a 'one size fits all' counseling approach does not work for 
prenatal screening, this work suggests that counseling about participation in prenatal 
screening is a nuanced endeavour which requires clinician time and energy to respond to 
the unique requirements of each pregnant woman. The integration of counseling about 
prenatal screening into the existing time allotted for the first prenatal visit, without extra 
remuneration or educational resources, does not support clinicians in helping women 
make informed choices. The original clinical practice guideline universalizing the offer of 
prenatal screening (Summers et al, 2007) was issued by a professional college that does 
not control the fee-for-service payment structure of the Canadian health care system. It is 
not the SOGC’s role to financially support clinicians to dedicate additional time to 
counseling about prenatal screening, however they may provide educational support to 
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clinicians in the form of counseling strategies and informational resources for both 
women and clinicians.  
As genetic testing services become increasingly prevalent in primary care, prenatal 
screening will become one of a variety of tests that primary care physicians will be 
responsible for offering, or for identifying appropriate referrals to genetic counseling 
resources (Greendale & Pyeritz, 2001). Other work has shown that additional educational 
resources are needed to provide appropriate primary care for other types of genetic 
testing (Burke & Emery, 2002; Carroll et al., 2009; Carroll et al., 2011; Harvey et al., 
2007; Nippert et al., 2011; Suther & Goodson, 2003). This study focused on prenatal 
screening, but the findings about counseling, written materials, and information-seeking 
and decision-making are relevant to many other types of genetic screening. Genetic 
testing asks people to consider complex scientific information and mathematical 
probabilities in turn with their personal values and beliefs. The profession of genetic 
counseling has been established to aid in this consideration, but genetic testing has 
expanded into primary care; professional and funding policy needs to respond to this 
evolution by providing educational and resource support for primary care providers asked 
to assume this additional responsibility. 
9.6.4 Implications for informed decision-making. 
The ideas about informed decision-making and possible solutions outlined in this work 
are not able to be wrapped up in a neat paragraph or two. As described earlier in this 
chapter, I think current conceptions of informed decision-making are deeply problematic 
for several reasons, but I have yet to arrive at a better alternative. Sherwin writes that 
feminists are often conflicted about the idea of autonomy because this concept provides 
protection and agency to vulnerable people, but also "hides the workings of privilege and 
masks the barriers of oppression" (Sherwin, 1998, p. 25).  I think informed decision-
making is the best option we have right now, and in my work I have tried to suggest ways 
in which it could be improved, including acknowledgement of embedded values and 
assumptions, appreciation of the individualized requirements for information, and 
understanding that the information-seeking and decision-making processes start before 
and continue after a visit with the clinician. 
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I think for many women, prenatal screening is an important opportunity and I agree with 
the premise of the policy documents, that it should be offered to every pregnant woman 
(Chitayat et al, 2011; Summers et al, 2007).  I strongly believe that every pregnant 
woman should have the right to make her own choice about whether or not to participate 
and what to do with the information she receives from the screening test; just because a 
choice is constrained by societal context doesn't mean it's not an important choice. After 
working on this project for five years, my own take-home message is that we should 
afford people who have atypical needs the same support to reach their potential as we 
afford those who have typical needs (Wendell, 1996). If we spent as much money 
supporting the lives of people with disabilities as we do on research and clinical services 
designed to prevent those lives (Lippman, 1991), we might stand on firmer ground when 
espousing the importance of autonomous and informed choices. 
9.7 Directions for future research. 
While undertaking this research I have identified several tensions between individuals 
and society. The premise of expanding the offer of prenatal screening is based on 
individual rights; as evidenced in the Clinical Practice Guidelines (Chitayat et al, 2011; 
Summers et al, 2007) through the emphasis on informed decision-making and 
autonomous choices, women should be able to make their own choices about how much 
information they want to know about their pregnancy, and what to do with that 
information.  At the same time, social forces may act in many different ways (through 
language, available resources for child raising, social ideas of normality, 
accommodations of people with different needs) to shape and constrain the choices that 
are available to women. Future research may explore these tensions and their 
implications for informed decision-making.  
This thesis addresses a particular type of prenatal screening that can identify particular 
conditions through specific mechanisms. As medical science progresses, more conditions 
are able to be identified prenatally, and different therapies become available, the offer 
and consideration of prenatal screening will become more complex. In 2008, Fan and 
colleagues published an account of a technique that can be used to find and analyze fetal 
DNA through a maternal blood sample taken as early as the 14th week of gestation (Fan, 
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Blumenfeld, Chitkara, Hudgins, & Quake, 2008). This technology, known as non-
invasive prenatal diagnosis, will enable women to obtain diagnostic information early in 
pregnancy without any physical risk to the mother or fetus. The ability to analyze DNA at 
an early stage in pregnancy will widen the number of conditions that can be detected 
through prenatal screening, opening a Pandora's box of possibility (Benn & Chapman, 
2010; de Jong, Dondorp, de Die-Smulders,  Frints, & de Wert, 2009; Newson, 2008). 
In this work, I didn't explore the pragmatic and logistical aspects of the offer of prenatal 
screening. Family physicians are a famously overburdened group, who juggle challenging 
patients, a high workload and time limitations while also trying to participate in 
continuing education, improve relationships with their patients, cope with limited health 
resources, imposed rules and regulations, and a lack of support from specialists (Lee, 
Brown, & Stewart, 2009). Counseling about prenatal screening takes time, and the 
strategies I have proposed in this thesis increase the amount of time required by the 
family physician. There has been significant research into innovative ways to impart 
information about prenatal screening without one-on-one physician-patient interaction 
(Baldwin, 2006; Browner, Preloran, & Press, 1996; Griffith, Sorenson, Bowling, & 
Jennings-Grant, 2005; Kaiser et al., 2002), and further research may explore the ways in 
which this type of clinician-absent information provision impacts the process of informed 
decision-making. For instance, information may be provided prior to a visit with the 
physician, so that counseling time can be used to clarify understanding, deliberate, and 
discuss implications of different decisions rather than impart basic information. 
9.8 Strengths and Limitations 
9.8.1 Communicating with different disciplinary audiences 
Contributing and communicating to different disciplinary audiences is an important 
aspect of high quality interdisciplinary work. There were times in which I experienced a 
tension between retaining the intent and integrity of the work while adapting to the 
specific expectations and terminology of a particular discipline. Sometimes these were 
small issues, such as using the word results when I would prefer to use findings. In these 
minor instances, I took a pragmatic approach and structured the work in a way that I 
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thought would be understandable and compelling to a particular audience. At other times, 
communicating with different audiences posed more significant challenges to the 
integrity of the work. As an example, I had hoped to submit one of the manuscripts to a 
relevant clinical journal with a short word count. One of my supervisors advocated for 
this piece by contacting the journal editor to ask if there was flexibility with the word 
count, considering that my qualitative manuscript would include the data in the body of 
the text, rather than in tables or figures. We received a response that stated that while this 
particular journal was not opposed to qualitative research, they preferred that quotations 
be omitted, or paraphrased and summarized.  Since the exclusion of participant data 
would compromise the credibility of the work (Charmaz, 2006), we chose to submit that 
paper to another journal.  
9.8.2 Re-committing to a focused inquiry 
In the Quality Criteria section, I discussed the interdisciplinary imperative to engage with 
a wide array of literature and how this was one of the most enjoyable aspects of my 
doctoral program. However, engaging with a wide variety of literature has concomitant 
weaknesses. While a wide range of interdisciplinary literature allowed me intellectual 
flexibility and the ability to respond to my study data in a unique way, it was a challenge 
to keep a sufficiently tight focus on the research questions. Throughout the doctorate, but 
especially in the beginning, I was constantly reading new ideas and expanding my 
research proposal to encompass these new ideas. While I knew that I had to rein in this 
tendency so that the research did not become too diffuse, it was a constant challenge to 
put aside interesting, valuable, and invigorating ideas, especially when I could see the 
ways in which these ideas could be made relevant to the project. This task became easier 
after I started collecting data; I began to identify a theme of informed decision-making in 
the data and this became the touchstone for keeping my research focused.  
Engagement with a wide variety of interdisciplinary literature also presents the challenge 
of choosing what definitions and theories to represent as authoritative. Working within a 
disciplinary frame, some of this work has already been done. Disciplinary knowledge 
presents a range of possibilities to choose from, and a foundation of what combinations 
are acceptable. Working in an interdisciplinary way, I was challenged to find and 
310 
 
evaluate ideas from many different sources, reconciling tensions where I could find them. 
I fear that I have not found all the tensions, or exhausted all the sources. While I 
understand that it is impossible for any scholar, disciplinary or interdisciplinary, to 
conduct a literature review that is absolutely exhaustive, I think this is an additional 
challenge for those who engage with literature from a wide variety of disciplines. 
9.8.3 Process vs. product. 
While some may conceptualize the purpose of doctoral research to be the production of 
knowledge, I firmly believe that the purpose of doctoral research is also to learn, practice, 
and demonstrate proficiency in the research process (Franke & Arvidsson, 2011). This 
tension is often echoed in the language used to describe quality criteria (Reynolds et al., 
2011). The product of the research is one way of evaluating whether the student has 
fulfilled this criteria, but I propose several other indications of this achievement: the 
explanatory and narrative aspects of the thesis detailing the doctoral journey; indications 
of other research productivity and growth on one’s CV; a well organized and 
intellectually compelling public presentation; considered and thorough answers to 
examination questions; consistent and comprehensive theoretical underpinning to the 
work.  
I have engaged with the idea of the doctorate as a process rather than a product 
throughout the entire program, choosing methods, theories, and methodologies I wanted 
to learn and practice; incorporating as many ideas as possible; becoming actively 
involved in many other research projects in order to learn new ideas, work with different 
scholars, practice my existing skills, and expand my list of accomplishments. As I was 
writing my dissertation, I have used many ideas gathered from these extra research 
projects, the knowledge and experience I gained throughout the whole doctoral program 
has influenced not just the research product that I have produced, but the way I think of 
research, academia, and the world.  
9.9 Conclusion 
This dissertation has addressed informed decision-making about participation in prenatal 
screening in Canada, since the advent of the 2007 SOGC Clinical Practice Guideline 
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(Summers et al, 2007) which universalized the offer of screening tests. An examination 
of data from patient education materials, policy documents, and pregnant women 
currently experiencing this process has generated four integrated articles which comment 
on various aspects of informed decision-making. An examination of the literature on 
autonomy, normalization, medicalization, and governmentality has revealed a tension 
around an individualized way of considering informed decision-making: the choice to 
participate in prenatal screening is deeply embedded within the particular societal context 
in which it is made. It becomes clear that promoting informed choice about prenatal 
screening is not just a matter of providing clear and comprehensive information, but 
includes broader considerations of how choices are constructed and the ways in which 
particular courses of action are enabled and constrained.  
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Appendices  
Appendix 1: Example of Reflective Memos for participant "Lucy"  
The memos I wrote after interviewing Lucy and transcribing the data are typical of most 
of the memos I wrote- short and focused on a couple of aspects that seemed meaningful, 
or gave me pause.  
Post-Interview Memo for Lucy 
Lucy was one of my "typical" expected responses- didn't really understand it was a 
choice, didn't really think about it, is doing it to see the baby, would have an abortion if it 
was something "severe" but not for down's syndrome.  
 
Interestingly, she has been the only one not to know the meaning of "positive 
result"/"negative result" so far..... I expected this to be a more common confusion. She's 
also the only one without a university or college degree, so that might have something to 
do with it. 
 
She said her doctor was pushing the test and when I asked why she thought he was 
pushing it, she compared it to a flu shot, a precaution. this was interesting comparison, 
especially from someone who would keep the baby if it had down syndrome.  
 
She has also been the only participant to mention a nurse- the fam doc told her about it 
very briefly as a "everyone gets it", then she was brought to the nurse who gave her a 
pamphlet, but didn't really talk about the screening at all.... possible the family doc didn't 
really talk about it because it was expected that the nurse would?? 
 
the information that mattered most to her, and the info she suggested other women should 
have was details about living with the conditions tested for, before deciding whether to 
get the test.... she was quite focused on this. I wonder if this is also reflective of her lower 
education level? not knowing or caring about false positives, or probabilities? when I 
asked how much risk would be high risk (1%, 10%, 70%) she said "any" would be high 
risk.....  
 
I think I need to search out women with lower education levels to round out some 
categories which I can already see emerging. 
also, I have a hard time knowing how to talk when I sense there is a gap in understanding, 
or a lower level of education. I don't want to use words that are not known and make the 
person feel dumb, but I also don't want to talk down to her..... I struggled with that 
throughout this interview 
Post-Transcription Memo for Lucy: 
Transcribing this I remember how difficult this interview was, how I kept trying to pull 
answers out of her.... she didn't seem like she didn't want to participate, and she seemed 
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to have some strong opinions on the topic, but she just wasn't very eloquent. It was a 
difficult interview. A lot of yes and no answers with little elaboration.....  
 
I was also conscious of not wanting to use words she didn't understand, I could tell she 
had a lower level of education and I didn't want to talk down to her but at the same time I 
wanted to be accessible. This was made more difficult by the fact that she didn't have a 
lot of information or knowledge about the test, but also couldn't identify this.... there was 
nothing she was confused about, didn't want information from her doc on anything else, 
didn't want to talk about anything else, didn't have any questions.... For all the questions 
re: any more investigation or what could your doctor have done better, she would always 
answer "somebody else might....  but for me it was fine" 
 
I guess this interview was the stereotype of a low level of education and low level of 
interest. You don't know what you don't know.... it also may be a clue to my recruitment 
problems. Why would someone with these views agree to talk to me, to give their time? 
This might be the majority viewpoint and it might be what I am missing in my 
sample....... someone who doesn't know alot about the test, hasn't problematized it, doing 
what their doctor tells them, has misgivings about some things but is not really 
complaining or thinking about it too much......  
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Appendix 3: Recruitment Poster 
 
Contact information omitted 
from published thesis 
329 
 
 
Appendix 4: Interview Guide 
1. I wonder if as we begin if you could tell me a bit about your understanding of 
what prenatal screening is? 
2. Were you surprised to be offered prenatal screening? 
3. Can you give me some background about why you think your doctor offered 
prenatal screening to you? 
4. How did the doctor bring up prenatal screening?  
a. What did you talk about?  
b. Did you talk about prenatal screening with anybody else? 
5. What was the offer of prenatal screening like for you? 
a. Can you describe, in detail, the process of the offer and your thoughts 
about it? 
b. What kinds of things did you think about? 
c. What kind of things did your doctor draw to your attention? 
  
6. Did you think about prenatal screening before you became pregnant? 
a. Do you know other women who have been through this process?  
 
7. Please tell me what you understand about the screening process: 
a. What will the results of the screen tell you? 
i. Did you talk about statistics?  
b. If you receive a negative result from the screen, what does that mean to 
you?  
c. If you receive a positive result from the screen, what does that mean to 
you?  
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d. If you receive a positive result from the screen, what are your next 
options?  
i. What level of risk would you consider high? i.e. 1 in 10, 1 in 100, 
1 in 1000?  
8. Have your views about prenatal screening changed, since talking to your doctor 
about the option to participate in screening? 
9.  Was there anything you were confused about, or wished you had more time to 
discuss during the prenatal screening visit?  
10. Did your doctor give you any written material, or direct you to other resources to 
learn more about prenatal screening? 
11. Did you do any additional investigation into prenatal screening?             
ie. through the internet, through other educational resources, through other health 
care providers, through the internet, etc.? 
12. What information would you want someone else in your situation to know?  
a. Would this be best coming from a doctor, or written in a pamphlet, or 
communicated in another way? 
13. What is the next step for you? 
14. Is there anything else that you want to talk about? Anything that stood out for you 
about the process of prenatal screening? Anything you liked? Anything you wish 
had been done differently? 
Demographic questions: 
A) How did you find out about the study? 
B) How old are you?  
C) What do you do for a living? What type of education do you have?  
D) Do you live in a city, small town, or the country? 
E) Are you raising this child with a partner?  
F) How many weeks have you been pregnant for?  
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Appendix 5: Letter of Information and Consent 
 
Health Professional Education 
Faculty of Health Sciences 
University of Western Ontario 
Victoria Hospital, Rm E5-324 
London, ON Canada N6A 5W9 
(519) 661-2111 x89161, Fax (519) 685-8783 
prenatal@uwo.ca 
 
Title of Study: The process of prenatal screening from the perspective of low-risk 
pregnant women 
 
Student Researcher :  
Meredith Vanstone, PhD Candidate, Health Professional Education, Faculty of Health 
Sciences, University of Western Ontario 
(519) 661-2111 x89161, prenatal@uwo.ca 
 
Supervising Researchers: 
Dr. J. Nisker, PhD, MD, Schulich School of Medicine and Dentistry, University of 
Western Ontario (519)685-8781, jeff.nisker@lhsc.on.ca 
 
Dr. E.A. Kinsella, PhD, Faculty of Health Sciences, University of Western Ontario 
(519)661-2111 x81396, akinsel@uwo.ca 
 
Dr. P. McKenzie, PhD, Faculty of Information and Media Studies, University of 
Western Ontario (519)661-2111 x88497, pmckenzi@uwo.ca 
 
You are being invited to participate in research on prenatal screening, involving women 
in their first pregnancies who are receiving prenatal care from a family physician. Please 
take your time to make a decision and discuss this proposal with family members, 
friends, or your doctor, as you feel inclined. 
 
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the information you require to make an 
informed decision about participating in this research. It is important for you to 
understand why the study is being conducted and what it will involve. Please take the 
time to read this carefully and feel free to ask questions if anything is unclear. Once you 
have read and understand the information, you will be asked to sign this form if you wish 
to participate in the study.  
 
WHY IS THIS RESEARCH BEING DONE? 
This research explores the ways in which women in their first pregnancy experience the 
offer of prenatal screening, including consideration of this offer, and decision making 
about whether or not to participate in testing. The reason to study this experience at this 
 
 
 
 
Contact information omitted from 
published thesis 
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time is because a new medical policy has recently come into place recommending doctors 
offer prenatal screening to all women, rather than just women over the age of 35. This 
research is interested in your thoughts on prenatal screening based on discussions you 
have had with your doctor, friends, and family, and information you have read. This 
study is the main component of my PhD degree at the University of Western Ontario. 
 
WHO IS ELIGIBLE TO PARTICIPATE? 
To participate in this study, you should be under 35 years of age, less than 17 weeks into 
your first pregnancy, and receiving prenatal care from a family physician.  
 
HOW MANY PEOPLE ARE IN THIS STUDY? 
There will be at least 8 women interviewed, although this number might increase up to 40 
if the researcher feels that she needs more participants to get a better understanding of the 
issues.  
 
WHAT ARE MY RESPONSIBILITIES IF I PARTICIPATE? 
This project involves an audio-taped interview with the student researcher 
(Meredith).This interview will occur in a place of your choosing, such as your home, the 
interviewer’s office, or a public place of your choice. It is also possible to be interviewed 
over the telephone. The interview will take place after you discuss prenatal screening 
with your family physician, but before you receive the results from screening (if you 
choose to participate in screening). For most women, this will be between 9 and 17 weeks 
of pregnancy. The interview will last between 30 and 60 minutes, and address topics such 
as your understanding and opinions about being offered prenatal screening.  
 
There is only one planned interview, and you will not be contacted again by the 
researchers. If you wish to contact the researchers, you may do so using the contact 
information provided on this letter. 
 
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL RISKS? 
There will be no physical risks to you in this study. We are not studying any physical or 
drug therapies that you might be undergoing.  We will be asking you about questions that 
might make you feel uncomfortable, such as what you thought about when your doctor 
was describing prenatal screening, or how you talked about the test with your partner. 
 
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS? 
You may or may not receive any benefits from this study. There is no compensation 
offered to participants. You may benefit by knowing someone is interested in your 
experiences, and studying how this experience might be improved for other women. You 
may not benefit personally from your participation. 
 
WHAT INFORMATION WILL BE KEPT PRIVATE? 
All your information will be kept confidential. Any identifying information that is 
recorded on the audio tape during the interview (for instance, your name, your partner’s 
name, your place of work etc.) will be discarded when the data is turned into a computer 
transcript.  Information recorded on the tapes will be kept private. 
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The data from this research may be used in a future publication. Your words may be 
used, but they will not be tied to any information that may identify you.  
 
The audiotapes of the interviews will be kept in a secure location and will only be 
accessible by the researcher and her supervisors. They will be kept for up to five years 
and then destroyed. Anonymized transcripts of the interviews will be protected by 
passwords and stored on a secure server or computer, accessible by the researcher from 
home or office. Only the research team has access to the recordings and transcripts of the 
interviews.  
 
CAN PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY END EARLY? 
Participation in this study is voluntary. You may refuse to participate, refuse to answer 
any questions, or withdraw from the study at any time. If you choose to withdraw, you 
may choose if you would like the information you have provided so far to be destroyed, 
or if that information is ok to keep using in the final report.   
 
WILL I BE PAID TO PARTICIPATE? WILL I HAVE ANY COSTS OF 
PARTICIPATION? 
Although you will not be paid to participate, your parking and other expenses will be 
reimbursed. 
 
IF I HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, WHO SHOULD I CONTACT? 
If you have any questions now or in the future, you can contact the researcher, Meredith 
Vanstone. You can contact her by email at prenatal@uwo.ca or by telephone (519)661-
2111 x89161. You can also contact her faculty supervisors, Dr. Jeff Nisker 
(jeff.nisker@lhsc.ca) and Dr. Anne Kinsella (akinsel@uwo.ca). 
If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant or the conduct of the 
study, you can contact the the Office of Research Ethics at (519) 661-3036 or by email at 
ethics@uwo.ca. Please note that representatives of the University of Western Ontario 
Health Sciences Research Ethics Board may contact you or require access to your study 
related records to monitor the conduct of the research. 
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Title of Study: The process of prenatal screening from the perspective of low-risk women 
 
 
 
 
 
CONSENT STATEMENT: 
I have read the Letter of Information and I agree to participate. All questions have been 
answered to my satisfaction. I will receive a signed copy of this form. 
 
_________________________________________ 
Participant Name 
 
_________________________________________                              _____________  
Participant Signature                                                                              Date 
 
Consent form administered and explained in person by: 
 
________________________________________ 
Name and Title 
 
________________________________________                                 ____________ 
Signature             Date 
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Appendix 6: Example of Initial Analytical Diagram Created for Each Participant 
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Appendix 7: Publisher Permission to Republish Chapter 5 
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Appendix 8: Publisher Permission to Republish Chapter 6
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London, ON Interdisciplinary doctoral supervision teams: Working together within, 
between and outside of disciplinary boundaries 
 Center for Education Research and Innovation Annual Symposium 
  
09-2011 Watling, C.; Driessen, E.; Vandervleuten,C.; Vanstone, M.; Lingard, L. 
London, ON Understanding feedback responses: The potential and limitations of 
Regulatory Focus Theory 
 Center for Education Research and Innovation Annual Symposium 
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06-2011 Hibbert, K., Lingard, L., Pitman, A., Kinsella, E.A., Wilson, T., McKenzie, 
P., Vanstone, M., Masinire, A. 
Fredericton, 
NB 
Identifying strengths and challenges in interdisciplinary graduate 
research 
 Canadian Association for Information Science Annual Congress 
  
06-2011 Vanstone, M., Kinsella, E. A., Nisker, J. 
Vancouver, 
BC 
Facilitating informed choice in prenatal screening: What pregnant 
women want to know when deciding to participate. [Poster] 
 Annual Clinical Meeting, Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists of 
Canada 
  
05-2011 Vanstone, M., Kinsella, E. A., Nisker, J. 
London, ON Women’s Self-Identified Information Needs When Considering 
Participation in Integrated Prenatal Screening 
 Paul Harding Obstetrics and Gynecology Research Day 
  
01-2011 Vanstone, M., Kinsella, E. A., Nisker, J. 
Ottawa, ON Facilitating Informed Choice in Prenatal Screening: What do pregnant 
women want to know? 
 CIHR Bi-Annual Meeting, Training Group in Reproductive, Early 
Development and In Utero Health. [Student Keynote Presentation] 
  
06-2010 Vanstone, M., Chow, W., Lester, L., Ainsworth, P., Nisker, J., 
Brackstone, M. 
Kelowna, BC Characteristics and Understandings of BRCA-positive Women with 
Preventable Breast         Cancer 
 Canadian Bioethics Society  
  
06-2010 Vanstone, M., Kinsella, E. A., Nisker, J. 
Kelowna, BC Prenatal screening patient education pamphlets: Metaphors, figurative 
language, and ethical  implications 
 Canadian Bioethics Society  
  
03-2010 Bourgeault, I.L., Declercq, E., Sandall, J., Wrede, S., Vanstone, M., van 
Teijlingen, E., DeVries, R., Benoit, C. 
Dublin, IRE Comparative Perspectives on Maternal Request Caesarean Sections in 
Canada, the US, the UK and Finland. [Poster] 
 ESF EMRC/SCSS Exploratory Workshop: Promoting Normality in 
Childbirth Across Europe 
  
10-2009 Vanstone, M., Kinsella, E. A., Nisker, J. 
Washington, 
DC 
Non-Directive Counseling and Medical Metaphors: Critical Discourse 
Analysis of Prenatal Screening Patient Education Pamphlets [Poster] 
 American Society of Bioethics and Humanities Conference 
  
06-2009 Vanstone, M., Kinsella, E. A., Nisker, J. 
Halifax, NS Reading Between the Lines: Metaphors in Patient Education Pamphlets 
 Annual Clinical Meeting, Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists of 
Canada 
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06-2009 Vanstone, M. & Nisker, J. 
Halifax, NS Comparison of Genetic Testing in Canada: Legal, Ethical, Policy issues 
 Annual Clinical Meeting, Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists of 
Canada 
  
05-2009 Vanstone, M. & Nisker, J. 
London, ON Genetic Testing in Canada: From Pre-pregnancy to Adult 
 Paul Harding Obstetrics and Gynecology Research Day 
  
05-2009 Vanstone, M., Kinsella, E.A., Nisker, J. 
London, ON Metaphor as an Approach to Critical Reflection 
 Engaging Reflection in Health Professional Education and Practice 
Conference 
  
02-2009 Vanstone, M., Kinsella, E.A., Nisker, J. 
London, ON Prenatal Screening Patient Education Pamphlets: Critical Discourse and 
Metaphor Analysis [Poster] 
 Western Research Forum 
 
PRIZES, AWARDS & SCHOLARSHIPS: 
2010-2011 CIHR Training Award; Reproductive, Early Development and In Utero 
Health (REDIH) ($17,800) 
 
2010 
 
“Student Abstract Award” Canadian Bioethics Society. ($900) 
 
2009-2010 
 
CIHR Training Award; Reproductive, Early Development and In Utero 
Health (REDIH) ($17,800) 
 
2009 
 
“Young Scholar Award” Engaging Reflection in Health Professional 
Education and Practice 
 
2009 
 
University of Western Ontario Research Travel Award ($500) 
 
2009 
 
First Prize, Poster competition (Social Sciences, Arts, Humanities) 
Western Research Forum 
 
2008-2009 
 
University of Western Ontario Research/Thesis Award ($1500) 
 
2008-2009 
 
SSHRC J.A. Bombardier Canada Graduate Scholarship – Master’s Award 
($17,500) 
 
2008-2009 
 
Ontario Graduate Scholarship (declined) ($15,000) 
 
2003-2007 
 
McMaster University Dean’s Honour List 
 
2003-2004 
 
Canadian Millenium Foundation Scholarship 
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2011-present Research Assistant, Center for Education Research and Innovation 
 Schulich School of Medicine & Dentistry, University of Western Ontario 
 • Involved with data collection, analysis, interpretation, for several 
interdisciplinary medical education projects.  
  
2007-2011 Research Assistant, various departments 
 University of Western Ontario 
 • Drs. Lorelei Lingard, Kathy Hibbert, Anne Kinsella, Jeff Nisker, 
Susan Ray 
 • Departments of Medicine, Obstetrics and Gynecology; Faculties 
of Nursing, Education, Health Sciences. Interprofessional 
Network for Scholarship of Professions' Research Education 
(INSPiRE). 
 
 
ACADEMIC SERVICE 
2011-12 Reviewer, Reflective Practice, Canadian Family Physician, Journal of 
Obstetrics and Gynecology Canada 
 
2010 
 
Research consultant. Hamilton Civic League Survey on Public 
Engagement. 
 
2009 
 
Conference selection committee, program committeee (member), 
abstract review committee (Co-ordinator). Engaging Reflection in Health 
Professional Education and Practice, University of Western Ontario, May 
2009 
 
2007 
 
Organization and hosting committee (member), International Conference 
on the Healthy Embryo, University of Western Ontario, November 2007 
 
